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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses whether and how Brazil-Mozambique South-South cooperation (SSC) 
re-politicized or de-politicized development. Re-politicization involves the recognition of 
the contingency of development. In other words, the recognition that development can be 
articulated in different ways other than the technical and economistic recipe inherited from 
the North and the hierarchy between developed/ underdeveloped that this construction 
presupposes.  
At the official level, Brazilian SSC became a signifier linked with elements that both 
articulate different ways of engaging with development, challenging the hegemony of the 
North, and with elements that preserve the status quo of the international order.  
The politics of cooperation on the ground is also characterized by contradictions and 
ambivalences. I analyse two case studies, the agricultural large-scale project called 
ProSavannah, and the construction of an anti-retroviral (ARV) factory, both based on the 
Brazilian experience in agriculture and health. In the context of antagonism and conflict 
that unfolded with the implementation of these projects in Mozambique, the response of the 
various stakeholders (Brazilian implementing agencies, Mozambican Ministries and 
research institutes, civil society actors) to the contingency of development depended on 
their own domestic trajectory and alignment with SSC principles.   
Simply put, the ProSavannah reproduced a hegemonic model of development, but found a 
counter-hegemonic civil society on the ground. I analyse the strategies each actor applied to 
either re-politicize or de-politicize development. The ARV factory, on the other hand, 
promoted the re-politicization of development by emphasizing the role of the state in health 
(as an arena for debate of health issues), but found in Mozambique a health sector highly 
shaped by the Northern hegemony. Like in the case of the ProSavannah, I analyse the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction:  
In 2008, I was sent to Mozambique to write a report for a Latin American magazine about 
the renewed Brazil-Mozambique relations within the context of South-South Cooperation 
(SSC) 1. My visit coincided with Brazil’s president Lula da Silva’s (known as Lula) second 
official visit to Mozambique in order to open the first Fiocruz (Fundação Oswaldo Cruz)2 
office in Africa and to discuss the implementation of the Antiretroviral Factory project 
(ARV Factory) agreed by the two governments in 2003. Other bilateral cooperation 
agreements in “the areas of development and investment”, according to Mozambique’s 
President Armando Guebuza, were also in the agenda (Gallas, 2008). 
At the time, Brazil under Lula was in the spotlight of international attention, due partly to 
its annual GDP growth of over 5% and partly to successful social policies that ousted 
millions out of poverty (Watts, 2013). The optimism with Brazil was conveyed later in 
2009 by the cover of the pro-market British magazine The Economist, which showed a 
picture of the statue of Christ the Redeemer ascending like a rocket from Rio de Janeiro’s 
Corcovado mountain, under the rubric “Brazil takes off”.3 By 2009, Brazil had joined as a 
guest the Group of Eight (G8), had established development cooperation initiatives with 
other emerging economies, such as the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) group, and 
hosted for the first time the G204 summit. A year earlier, in another G20 summit, Obama 
had referred to Lula as “the most popular politician on Earth”. 5   
Brazil was, importantly, one of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries, a term 
that had been coined in 2003 by Goldman Sachs’s chairman Jim O’Neill in reference to the 
new emerging economies that would take over the economies of the G7 (France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the UK, Canada and the USA) by 2040. Indeed, while the developed 
economies of Europe and the USA had been hit hard by the global financial crisis, the 
BRICs were becoming increasingly economically and politically more important in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  There is no agreement on the definition of SSC. Some refer to SSC as a broad form of cooperation among developing 
countries,whichinvolves the interchange of experiences in the field of public policies and technical cooperation, humanitarian 
interventions, peacekeeping missions, cultural and educational programmes and loans, grants and debt relief. These can involve state-
owned enterprises, private investment and trade (Marcondes and Mawdsley, 2018). My case studies, even though immersed in the SSC 
strategy broadly speaking, constitute examples of technical cooperation for development, aimed at tackling development issues. 
2 Fiocruz is Brazil’s public health research institution in charge of implementing the Antiretroviral factory in Mozambique, amongst other 
projects. 
3 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2009/11/12/brazil-takes-off [accessed 16 June 2019] 
4 The G20 is the new Group of Twenty (G20) forum of finance ministers and central bank governors. 
5 https://www.newsweek.com/brazils-lula-most-popular-politician-earth-79355 [accessed 16 June 2019]	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international scenario, including in multilateral organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the IMF and the World Bank (Woods, 2010).  
In this context, the re-emergence of SSC was directly linked with the emergence of the 
BRICs, and later with other ‘rising’ states such as Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey 
(the MINT), amongst others. As part of these countries’ foreign and economic policy 
agendas, development cooperation6 represented a small element, but one that was playing a 
role in the “significantly changing geographies of world power” (Mawdsley, 2012a: 12). 
Against this background, my job then was to offer a picture of what Brazil-Mozambique 
SSC was like. Lula’s official delegation shed some light on what, or who, was at stake in 
these renewed relations: apart from ministers, diplomats, health experts from Fiocruz and 
other government officials, there was a business delegation that included powerful investors 
from the agribusiness sector, manufacturing and the construction industries, amongst 
others.  
In fact, Brazil’s presence in Mozambique was already diverse and to some extent 
controversial: the giant mining company Vale had been highly criticized by human rights 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch for a project to extract coal from the Moatize 
mine, in the North of Mozambique. Camargo Corrêa, one of Brazil’s largest construction 
companies, was responsible for the hydroelectric project in Nkuwa, and the Brazilian 
government was avidly promoting the expansion of biofuels based on Brazilian technology 
(MRE, 2009), a move that was criticized by many in Brazil’s civil society for the social and 
environmental impacts of sugarcane production (see Wilkinson, 2014). At the same time, 
Brazil had developed several cooperation projects in the areas of health, food security and 
education.7 
In Lula’s speech addressed at Mozambique’s president Armando Guebuza, SSC was linked 
to a number of signifiers, such as  ‘solidarity’, ‘shared values’, ‘technology and knowledge 
transfer’, ‘new investment opportunities’, ‘unity amongst countries of the South’, ‘[the 
South’s] own response to the challenges of development’, ‘a better distribution of power’, 
through a ‘reformed UN Security Council (UNSC)’, and ‘our own lasting solutions [to the 
problems of development]’ (Presidência da República, 2008).  The official discourse saw 
underdevelopment as a structural problem resulting from unequal power relations between 
the industrialized North and the developing South (MRE 2008; MRE 2010). In this sense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  I use the term ‘development cooperation’ and ‘SSC for Development’ interchangeably. 
7	  http://www.abc.gov.br/projetos/pesquisa [accessed 19 June 2019].	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SSC sought to re-politicize development and offer a different type of cooperation, shaped 
by principles such as ‘solidarity’, ‘horizontality’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’.  
More broadly speaking, for this thesis to re-politicize development means, in discourse 
theory terms, to expose the political construction of norms and principles related to the 
Northern model of development. In part, what the official discourse sought to do was to 
challenge the technical and economistic view of development held by the industrialized 
North and expose its structural character – that is, the relationship between development 
and underdevelopment as two sides of the same coin. In other words, re-politicization, as 
will be further discussed, foregrounds the contingency of social structures, showing that 
there is other ways of thinking of – and articulating – development, based on the South’s 
own principles and norms. 
De-politicization, on the other hand, characterizes the masking or denial of the contingency 
of social practices, or, in other words, the denial that things could be articulated in other 
forms, e.g., that development as proposed by hegemonic models is not immanent and 
necessary. In discourse theory terms, this de-politicization happens when the ideological 
dimension of social life, or the refusal in recognizing contingency and instability of 
discourse, is foregrounded, pre-empting the possibility to contest hegemonic norms.  
In the official discourse, SSC appeared to be framed in opposition to the North-South 
cooperation and its self-interest, verticality and interference (MRE 2008; MRE 2010).  But 
considering Brazil was playing an increasingly important role within the rules of the 
Western-dominated international order, to what extent was SSC really about promoting the 
re-politicization of development? Furthermore, considering the array of different actors and 
potentially different (and powerful) interests within president Lula’s delegation, how did 
these operate through a complex set of social and cultural structures – both in Brazil and in 
Mozambique – to produce something that in fact challenged power asymmetries? 
Importantly, in terms of development cooperation, the involvement of state institutions 
such as the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and Fiocruz with 
knowledge, skills, expertise and even equipment (Mawdsley, 2012a) rooted in their own 
domestic experience meant that different conceptions of development and SSC existed at 
the same time. 
Ten years later, in 2018, I returned to Mozambique as part of my fieldwork in an attempt to 
seek answers to the following question:  
 
	   21	  
• Has Brazil-Mozambique SSC re-politicized development? If so, how?  
 
Put simply, in this thesis I argue that Brazil-Mozambique SSC both re-politicizes and de-
politicizes development. I analyse both the official discourse on SSC and the discursive 
practices that shaped two technical cooperation projects: the large-scale agricultural project 
called ProSavannah, and the construction of a factory that was supposed to produce 
antiretroviral medicine against AIDS. The choice of these cases will be justified later in this 
chapter.  
On the one hand, SSC is a space for Brazil to enact its identity as a former colony and a 
country that belongs to the Global South. In this sense, the official discourse on SSC brings 
to the fore the radical contingency of social structures by articulating development 
cooperation differently from the Northern regime of development so that its political 
dimension is exposed. As such, SSC is about horizontality, sovereignty, solidarity and non-
interference in opposition to what has longed characterized the Northern regime of 
development, namely verticality, self-interest and interference. Moreover, the official 
discourse on SSC between Brazil and African countries is underlined by a more political 
view of the historical relationship between Brazil and Africa. The idea of Brazil as a ‘racial 
democracy’ (Freyre, 1933) whereby Africans and the Portuguese mixed harmoniously to 
build Brazil as a nation was challenged.8 Instead, the official discourse promoted the idea 
that Brazil had been built by African slave labour and was therefore historically indebted to 
Africa. Thus, the re-politicization of Brazil-Africa relations contributed to a more 
politicized view of SSC.  
On the other hand, looking more carefully at the genealogy of SSC as a Brazilian foreign 
policy strategy (cf. Chapter 3), I argue that SSC is also a space for Brazil to enact its 
identity of a future great power, or an emerging country, serving Brazil’s interest in playing 
a protagonist role within the international order without questioning its structural problems. 
In fact, in the official discourse Brazil has articulated the identities of a country from the 
‘South’ and of an ‘emerging country’ into an identity that allows the country to present 
itself as a ‘neutral’ bridge between the South and the North, hiding conflicting interests for 
change on the one hand, or preservation of the status quo on the other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The idea of Brazil as a ‘racial democracy’ started to be challenged since the 1980s, but in the 2000s it acquires another dimension (cf. 
Chapter 3). 
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The complexities and ambiguities – with dynamics of re-politicization and de-politicization 
– observed in the genealogy of SSC can also be observed at the level of implementation of 
cooperation projects, whereby several actors applied different political strategies in the 
context of antagonism and conflict that unfolded. Zooming in on my case studies, my 
analysis shows that different actors drew on discursive resources shaped by different 
historical experiences. Implementing institutions, ministries and other political actors that 
have been strongly shaped by hegemonic structures – such as the agribusiness rationale that 
has influenced Embrapa’s9 establishment and the government of Mozambique’s desire for 
the Green Revolution, or the norms of good governance promoted by the World Bank and 
pursued by Mozambique’s Ministry of Health – have tended to apply a political strategy 
that concealed the radical contingency of development.  
Alternatively, actors and institutions that have had a ‘counter-hegemonic’ trajectory reacted 
differently to conflict by bringing to the fore the contingency of social structures. As such, 
Mozambique’s civil society with its National Peasants’ Union (UNAC), and Brazil’s 
Fiocruz protagonist role in challenging the interests of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
development norms promoted by the World Bank and the World Health Organization 
sought to promote the re-politicization of SSC. 
In sum, SSC is complex and contradictory: it can either re-politicize or de-politicize 
development, both at the official level, and at the implementation level. Re-politicization 
depends on the strategies actors apply when conflict and divergence occur. These strategies 
draw on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic structures, and their success in re-politicizing 
development will depend on whether there is a politically strong agency exercised by 
collective actors rather than just an individual. This will be explored in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7, where I analyse the implementation of the two projects in Mozambique. 
After this introduction, section two seeks to discuss how the literature on SSC addresses the 
question of re/de-politicization. Despite contributions to the topic, no one has in fact 
discussed processes of de/re-politicization in SSC. I address this gap and lay out my 
contribution to the literature, and how this thesis can be located within the literature on 
SSC. 
Section 3 will address issues of methodology, such as the choice of theoretical framework 
(Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, in charge of the research componente of the ProSavannah. 
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explanation), the use of case studies and the rationale for choosing the ProSavannaha and 
the ARV Factory. I will also discuss the use of interviews and other primary and secondary 
sources. Finally, I will reflect on my social position and its effects on knowledge 
production, as well as the challenges and limitations of my research.  
The final section will outline the structure of the thesis, summarizing each one of the 
separate chapters. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
Since the 2000s, there has been a surge in academic and policy publications and 
conferences discussing the re-emergence of SSC.10 But within the International Relations 
(IR) and development fields, the question of re-politicization or de-politicization is hardly 
explored.  To a large extent, studies have been concerned with the difference between the 
Northern aid11 and SSC, and whether the latter challenges the well-established norms of 
foreign aid. The arguments and conclusions of these studies can be, of course, more or less 
nuanced. 
With the global financial crisis of 2008 and the crisis of international development 
triggered by the failure of neoliberal policies, many saw the new emerging states and their 
SSC initiatives as a possible alternative to the Northern dominated regime of development 
and a challenge to the hegemonic world order. Indeed, when writing about the imminent 
fall of the neoliberal consensus, Gore (2000: 789) argued that the main challenge to 
neoliberalism was a “latent Southern consensus”. Over a decade later, in what seemed to be 
the materialization of this ‘Southern consensus’, some claimed that the 2011 High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan was a shift not only in the architecture of global 
development governance, but also a serious contestation of core concepts and principles of 
the Northern development regime by Southern countries (Esteves and Assunção, 2014; 
Mawdsley, 2012a; Mawdsley et al, 2013; Gomes and Esteves, 2018).   
Along these lines, Vieira (2012) argued that the “normative agenda of the South” has 
offered an alternative to the conventional Northern-led development models. He explores 
how the ideas and issues that identify the South as post-colonial countries have shaped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The emergence of SSC is traced back to the 1955 Afro-Asian Bandung Conference attended mostly by newly independent states who 
opposed colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
11 I use Northern aid, foreign aid, North-South cooperation and Western development regime interchangeably to refer to the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) given by the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the words of Mawdsley (2012a: 5-6) “the DAC is a hegemonic node within the 
global aid governance architecture that regulates by far the largest global share of bilateral foreign aid”. 
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emerging countries’ interests and informed actions such as the IBSA initiative (Vieira, 
2012). For example, he argues that the intersubjective meaning of ‘distributive justice’ 
which informed the IBSA states’ foreign policies, promoting a “normative challenge”, is 
based on the Bandung principles established in 1955.  
From a similar point of view, in The South in World Politics Alden et al (2010) argued that 
the South (as a concept and an ideological expression) has been able to constitute and shape 
the underlying norms of the international system. Using constructivist tools, the authors 
explain the development of the South as an identity and how it created norms that were 
established through the UN and other Southern organizations.  
More recently, Gomes and Esteves (2018) argued that SSC has had significant impact on 
the structures of the international development cooperation system, dominated by the ODA. 
The ‘BRICS effect’, as Gomes and Esteves (2018: 131) call it, has manifested itself in the 
articulation of more horizontal positions beyond the “donor/recipient dyad”, the 
establishment of new modes of development cooperation emphasizing the principles of 
ownership and coordination, and the transformation of the institutional architecture of aid, 
exemplified by the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation (GPEDC). The latter’s main priority was the creation of a forum for developing 
and developed countries within the international development cooperation field. 
Alternatively, many – especially in line with the IR discipline’s neorealism – voiced their 
disbelief in SSC, claiming that it was just ‘old wine in a new bottle’, clearly used as a tool 
for emerging states to pursue a ‘seat at the table’, exemplified by Brazil’s active campaign 
to obtain a permanent seat at the UNSC (Burges, 2013; Burges, 2014; Almeida, 2009; 
Flemes, 2009).  
From a Marxist perspective, too, the view was that SSC was more of the same. Taylor 
(2013), for example, argued that while the emerging countries articulate themselves in 
groupings and alliances such as the G20 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to try to 
address the needs of the developing world, this articulation actually reinforces neoliberal 
globalization by defending greater integration into the world order through a greater access 
to global markets “on terms that favour externally-oriented elites”(Taylor, 2013: 145). 
Similarly, Bond and Garcia (2015) argued that the BRICS, rather than offering an 
alternative to the neoliberal world order, play the role of sub-imperialist countries in 
contributing to neoliberal expansion. 
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To be sure, however, the literature on SSC is not entirely divided between those who see 
SSC as a revisionist tool and those who see it as conforming to the status quo. Focusing on 
development cooperation and aid, many, such as Cesarino (2013; 2015), Gu, Shankland 
and Chenoy (2016) and Mawdsley (2012a) have explored the ambivalences, complexities 
and contradictions of SSC providers. The literature has also problematized the “simplistic 
binaries” such as ‘North’ and ‘South’ (Mawdsley, 2012a: 142; Cesarino, 2013; Gonzalez-
Vicente, 2019; Cabral, 2019), by exploring the great variation of historical lineages within 
artificial or heterogeneous groupings of states (Mawdsley, 2012a; Muhr, 2016) such as the 
BRICs (see also Sidaway, 2012; Gu, Shankland and Chenoy, 2016), or re-thinking the 
category of the ‘South’ through non-mainstream approaches (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2019) or 
binary constructions that obscure differences (Cabral, 2019). 
Overall, comparisons with Northern aid or discussions on whether SSC challenges the 
development norms established by the West are relevant to the question of re-politicization. 
Mawdsley (2012a), for example, argues that the language of sovereignty and non-
interference often de-politicizes development because it ignores the contested sub-national 
politics of development. In other words, by employing the language of sovereignty, 
emerging powers often disregard the sovereignty of the people in defence of the 
sovereignty of the government. Such is the case of ProSavannah, which despite being 
framed as Mozambique’s ‘national interest’ by the government, was highly contested by 
civil society organizations who claimed that peasants’ rights were threatened by the project. 
On the other hand, Pomeroy et al (2016: 187) discuss the engagement of civil society 
organizations of India, South Africa and Brazil in SSC for development and their 
(potential) role in promoting a more “equitable, sustainable and democratic development”. 
In the case of Brazilian civil society organizations, for example, the authors mention social 
movements that have constructed an international agenda focused on “resistance to the 
hegemonic development model” and the search for Southern peoples’ sovereignty.  They 
give the example of the role the international network formed by Brazil, Mozambique and 
Japan’s civil society organizations in the resistance against ProSavannah and the dominant 
agribusiness model. Re-politicization lies, in this case, in the contestation by this network 
of civil society organizations of an unequal power relation between investors and 
governments on the one hand, and peasants on the other. These relationships were 
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challenged by principles that put into question unequal development and hierarchical 
relationships. 
Perhaps the most relevant work on the question of whether SSC re-politicizes development 
is by Cesarino (2013; 2015). The author compares the highly bureaucratized Northern 
development apparatus with SSC and its lack of robustness and the effects their different 
organizational structures have on de/re-politicization. Examining the case of two 
agricultural projects, the ProSavannah (Brazil-Japan-Mozambique trilateral cooperation) 
and the Cotton-4 (Brazil with Western-African countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, and 
Chad), Cesarino (2013) argues that unlike the Northern regime of development, which has 
a highly bureaucratic structure that filters and systematically translates technical views of 
development into practice, Brazilian agricultural cooperation has a weak managerial 
structure, centred on the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Portuguese acronym, ABC). 
The effects of this ‘loose’ organizational structure is that while at the official level SSC 
principles are constructed in opposition to NSC, at implementation these principles are not 
systematically translated into policy by a robust apparatus. Casarino (2013) argues that 
even though some of the principles of SSC seem to shape practices on the ground, this 
happens due to practical conditions under which cooperation operates. For example, 
Cesarino (2013) discusses how Brazil, like other emerging development cooperation 
providers, do not have the capability to impose itself on recipient countries by, for example, 
monitoring conditionalities – either because of lack of resources or organizational structure 
– and as a result enact the principle of non-interference. Thus, for Cesarino (2013) re-
politicization of development would occur, more often than not, due to practical 
considerations rather than as the outcome of planned policy. 
These are all, of course, important examples and discussions for the question of SSC and 
whether it re-politicizes or de-politicizes development. As shown here, they sometimes 
focus on discourses and practices of SSC, and whether the much often politicization 
promoted by the discourse is translated into policies or projects on the ground. But with the 
exception of Cesarino’s (2013) brief discussion, the question of re/de-politicization is not 
directly explored.  
On the other hand, the literature on Northern aid, particularly the post-development 
literature, with the works of Ferguson (1994) and Escobar (1995), has extensively explored 
how power relations are played –and masked – through discourse. While this literature has 
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been instrumental in drawing my attention to the ways development is de-politicized, its 
theoretical framework and use of Foucauldian concepts such as governmentality do not 
offer a framework with which to understand and explain SSC. First, Brazil-Mozambique 
SSC lacks the robustness of the Northern bureaucratic aid (Cesarino, 2013). Second, Brazil-
Mozambique SSC is a story of resistance and contestation, whereby the political dimension 
of social practices is at times foregrounded, at others, backgrounded, providing examples of 
how development is politicized or de-politicized (see Chapter 2). The idea of how de-
politicization operates through discourse by pre-empting the contestability of hegemonic 
norms is crucially related to the antagonisms and contestations that I observed during 
fieldwork. This does not exclude Ferguson’s idea of rendering development technical, but it 
requires a more dynamic way of understanding the processes of re/de-politicization. 
Governmentality, on the other hand, is often criticized for being anaemic in the sense that it 
appears as a totalizing scheme without openings for struggle and without considerations for 
different social contexts (Joseph, 2010).  
The contribution of this thesis to the discussion of de/re-politicization of SSC is fourfold. 
First, it seeks to provide a more in-depth discussion of re-politicization as linked with 
transformative political action. Brazil and Mozambique as SSC partners are at times 
accommodating and at others challenging the historical layer that has been sedimented by 
decades of hegemony by former colonizers and extraversion processes, in the case of Africa 
(Cesarino, 2013). Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse provides a useful framework to 
understand these processes, as will be clear in Chapter 2. 
Second, the analysis proposed in Chapters 5 and 7 illustrates how antagonism and conflict 
(linked with the idea of de/re-politicization) are constitutive of the SSC projects examined 
here. Rather than a smooth process, thus, I understand SSC as a process of adaptation and 
contestation of norms and principles whereby the conflicting and contradictory nature of 
development is exposed. In this sense, it challenges the idea that “for every African 
problem, there is a Brazilian solution” (Amorim, 2016) based on the official SSC discourse 
that highlights similarities of context, climate and culture between partners from the so-
called ‘Global South’. 
Third, this thesis is also concerned with the conditions of possibility in which re-
politicization may occur. This, I hope, may shed some light on how possible it is to effect 
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transformative political action, both for the consideration of Brazilian and Mozambican 
policy-makers and researchers.  
It is important to note, thus, that the process of re-politicization is not seen in this thesis as 
effected by the Brazilian side, but also by Mozambicans themselves. For example, the 
opposition to the ProSavannah was led by Mozambican civil society organizations, who 
exposed the radical contingency of the norms shaping the ProSavannah, and how 
development could be articulated in different ways, in an alternative model. In this sense, 
this thesis also seeks to contribute to what has been neglected by the literature, as Gu and 
Kitano (2018: 4) had noted: “the viewpoint of the recipient of development cooperation”. 
Despite limited empirical material on Mozambique, I sought to incorporate their political 
dynamics and viewpoint in my analysis by considering SSC as a dynamic and two-way 
relationship. 
Finally, before moving on to the next section, it is important to note that SSC is understood 
here as a foreign policy strategy and subject to the politics of international relations. At the 
same time, Brazil as a state engaged in SSC is not seen as a monolith, but rather as an 
assemblage of different actors with different identities, views, and histories, who construct 
new relations and meanings in the development encounter with Mozambicans. I also treat 
Mozambique’s local politics and development dynamics not as the product of a state source 
or institution that homogenizes everything, but rather as co-constitutive of different 
historical processes and of its interactions with Brazil. In this context, I locate this thesis in 
the intersection of International Relations and Development Studies. 
 
1.3. Methodology  
In order to understand whether and how SSC re-politicizes development I analyse two 
projects of SSC between Brazil and Mozambique. These are the ProSavannah, a trilateral 
large-scale agricultural project, and the ARV (anti-retroviral) Factory, based on Brazil’s 
own production of anti-HIV drugs. I draw on Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist theory 
of discourse and on Jason Glynos and David Howarth’s Logics of Critical Explanation 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007), a framework that helps to operationalize the insights from 
these authors.  
This section seeks to justify and raise issues of methodology such as: the choice of 
theoretical framework, the case study and case selection, the primary and secondary sources 
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as well as techniques for interpretation and analysis. I will also discuss the limitations in 
conducting the research as well as how my identities may have shaped knowledge 
production. 
 
1.3.1. Why Theory of Discourse 
My choice of discourse analysis stems from the ontological assumption that the ‘reality’ is 
socially and politically constructed through and by discourses. Discourses can be 
understood as, amongst many definitions, “systems of meaning production that fix 
meanings, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world and to act within 
it” (Dunn and Neumann, 2016: 4). Since actors act based on how they construct their 
reality, discourse as a meaningful field “pre-exists any factual immediacy” (Laclau, 1993: 
431). Analysing how these meanings are produced and attached to subjects and objects is of 
central importance to my research question, that is, to understanding how development is 
re- (or de-) politicized through this construction. The analysis of the discursive strategies 
employed by different – and opposing – actors help explain how certain development 
models are seen as the only option (in a process that de-politicizes development), while 
others are delegitimized, for example.  
The linguistic turn in the social sciences reinvigorated the discipline of International 
Studies by focusing on language in use – or discursive practices – as a way of analysing the 
preconditions for social action (Neumann, 2002). But the linguistic turn produced several 
approaches to the subfield of discourse analysis. The reasons I have chosen to draw on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse are threefold.  
First, the key premise of discourse theory is that discursive structures, or discourses, are 
constitutively unstable and radically contingent. This will be further discussed in Chapter 2, 
but for the sake of justification, it suffices to say that this ontological proposition allows me 
to think of the social world as in constant flux and thus dynamic, which is only partially 
fixed through hegemony. This instability is explained by the fact that elements (or 
signifiers) can be articulated and rearticulated in different ways. Since SSC is about the 
adaptation of practices into different contexts, with different social structures, this 
ontological assumption allows me to capture and explore the highly dynamic construction 
and re-construction of meanings that characterized both projects. It is by exploring this that 
I seek to respond to my research question. To the extent this construction and re-
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construction expose the contingency of discourse, that is, shows that there are other 
possibilities of articulating elements, it re-politicizes development.  
The assumption of contingency and instability of discourses also allows me to demystify 
through a genealogical approach the taken-for-grantedness of SSC as a category which 
opposes North aid. Furthermore, although Brazil had adopted SSC as a foreign policy 
strategy in two previous periods, it was in the 2000s that SSC for development became a 
more systematic practice. This means that Brazil does not possess a robust and stable SSC 
apparatus. Policymaking, practices and legislation are still very much open to contestation 
and structuring. Post-structuralism and its ontology offer a better framework to capture this 
dynamism. 
But while the contingency of social relations is emphasized by post-structuralism in 
general, a more specific reason for choosing Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is their 
focus on ‘antagonism’ as a central category. ‘Antagonism’, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
is a product of struggles over meanings. The story of the ProSavannah was marked by 
antagonism, while the ARV factory was marked by crisis and conflict, precisely because 
the transferring of development projects whose norms were initially constructed in Brazil 
found different social structures in Mozambique’s context. As such, both projects 
represented events that triggered struggles between different actors. Laclau and Mouffe’s 
framework allows me to look at these struggles as a dynamic process whereby identities 
and meanings are constructed and reconstructed. Again, this process sheds light into how 
development can be either re-politicized or de-politicized. For example, the construction of 
meanings through antagonism and conflict reveals the contingency of taken-for-granted 
social practices, such as agricultural models, highlighting the fact that the existing system – 
of agribusiness practices, for example – represents only one of many ways of organizing 
social relations. This is an example of how development can be re-politicized. It is clear 
that my research question is related to – and draws from – Laclau and Mouffe’s theory. The 
very notion of re-politicization as the exposure of contingency derives from these authors’ 
ideas of contingency and antagonism. In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe’s theory provided 
ways of thinking about re-politicization and de-politicization ontologically rather than only 
empirically. 
Third, Laclau and Mouffe draw on interesting insights from Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory. 
The concept of fantasy, as will be clear in Chapter 2, provides a convincing explanation for 
why certain actors became attached to certain norms. Fantasy foregrounds the centrality of 
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the affective dimension of the social and political life.  In this sense, it helps explain why 
researchers at Embrapa, for example, were deeply invested in defending the norms of 
agribusiness, and consequently why development is de-politicized. In other words, it 
explains how contingency (or the possibility that social relations can be organized 
differently from the model defended) is hidden by a deep attachment to certain narratives 
and norms.  
As a final consideration, what drives me as a researcher is the possibility of uncovering 
dominant ideologies and opening up spaces for alternative ways of thinking of 
development. This involves a consideration of agency as essential in challenging social 
structures. While discourse analysis is limited in considering issues of agency precisely 
because discourses are constraining – albeit also productive – (Dunn and Neumann, 2016), 
Laclau and Mouffe offer the possibility of change due to the exercise of agency within the 
construction of antagonism. This will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
1.3.2. Why the Logics of Critical Explanation 
The Logics of Critical Explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) approach draws heavily on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and offers concepts that operationalize these 
authors’ insights. Although their approach will be discussed in more detail in the theoretical 
chapter (Chapter 2), I aim to briefly provide the justification for my choice of it. 
First, in trying to overcome the stark division between the natural sciences inspired models 
of social explanation and the hermeneutical approach to social sciences, Glynos and 
Howarth (2007) offer a set of concepts that allows for the examination of the specificity of 
the case study while at the same time admitting a certain degree of generality. In other 
words, they offer a theoretical grammar that transcends the particularity of context and 
provides a way of generalizing (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). This theoretical grammar is 
based on the concept of ‘logics’ as the unity of analysis (see Chapter 2). In sum, the 
approach allows me to explore the empirical particularity of my case studies while at the 
same time articulating it with theoretical elements that allow for certain generalization.  
Second, the Logics of Critical Explanation allows me to reflect on questions of 
methodology. It does so by discussing and developing the concept and practice of 
articulation. The authors draw on Laclau and Mouffe (1985), according to whom the 
practice of articulation involves the construction of nodal points (key signifiers) that 
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partially stabilize the flow of meanings (since there is no permanent fixity). Articulatory 
practices, thus, always create something new by articulating elements in different ways 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007). What is important to note is that paying attention to 
articulation helps me not only to understand how discourses related to the ProSavannah and 
the ARV factory were constructed, but also how I am, as a researcher, also taking part in 
the practice of articulation between empirical elements and theoretical elements (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007). My research is, thus, a product of discursive construction that seeks to 
provide a critical explanation of the phenomenon of SSC. The role of the ‘researcher 
subject’ is foregrounded, since every researcher has to rely on their own judgement and 
normative commitments in order to engage in articulatory practices.  
 
1.3.3. Case Study and the Case Selection 
The definition of case studies has varied amongst researchers in the social sciences 
(Sjoberg et al, 1991; Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995; Tight, 2010). Broadly defined, case studies 
may be seen as in-depth studies of particular units of analysis (Tight, 2010), although, as 
Sjoberg et al (1991) remarks, the unit of analysis is contentious. More specifically – albeit 
not much –, Simons (2009, in Thomas, 2011: 512) proposes a definition of case study 
which cuts across the positivist – constructivist divide: 
 
Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and 
uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a “real life” context. 
(p. 21) 
 
While for positivists the aim of studying a case is to find causality in order to build or test a 
general theory, the purpose of my study of cases is to grasp the complexity and dynamics of 
meaning constructions in cases that are relevant for my research objective. This also 
enables me to, in line with the Logics approach, reflect about generalizability. I shall start 
by justifying my choice of Brazil-Mozambique, and then justify my choice of the 
ProSavannah project and the ARV Factory. 
The choice of Brazil as a single case study is interesting for several reasons: first, as one of 
the main emerging states and part of the BRICS, Brazil considerably changed the course of 
its foreign policy from 2003 onwards in order to focus on South-South relations, strongly 
opposing, at least rhetorically, the current neoliberal world order. In this sense, on the one 
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hand, Brazil promoted principles such as solidarity, horizontality and non-interference. On 
the other hand, Brazil did not hide its ambitions to play a more import role in the very same 
international order by, for example, campaigning for a permanent seat at the UN Security 
Council or emphasizing the importance of its relations with the West. Furthermore, 
domestically Brazil has had contradictory development models, and was even accused of 
exporting these internal contradictions, such as the incompatibility between agricultural 
development models (Mello, 2013; Cabral, 2015). It is, thus, interesting to understand how 
apparently contradictory principles and norms play out in practice. As such, the case of 
Brazil can provide a nuanced view of the re-emergence of SSC in the XXI century and the 
complex dynamics of re-politicization or de-politicization.  
Second, although the ‘BRICS’ acronym became an important category and object of study 
in international relations and development, studies have also paid attention to how different 
these countries are, and thus how ineffective the category can be. In this sense, Hurrell 
(2010b) argued that the differences between the BRICS countries make it important to 
concentrate on each one of them individually. Of all the BRICS’s SSC, China’s has been, 
for obvious reasons, the most studied of them. Brazil, on the other hand, has not attracted as 
much attention. Brazil has spent little in SSC as compared to China12, but the country was 
referred to by the literature as a ‘normative actor’ (Abdenur, 2014) or as offering 
alternatives to old structures of development, especially the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) by the OCDE Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Esteves and 
Assunção, 2014). 
But justifying the choice of Brazil as a case study inevitably raises the question of whether 
Brazil, and in fact the BRICS, remains a relevant actor in the international realm. When I 
started my research in 2015 several academics and policy-makers, who had until recently 
tried to understand the BRICS’s potential challenge to the Western-dominated global 
governance, were posing this question. Indeed, presented as an economically mighty group 
and excellent recipient for foreign investment, the BRICS, with the exception of China, 
have performed very poorly in the last 5 years. Particularly Brazil, which was engulfed by a 
political and economic crisis from 2015, saw resources applied to SSC drastically reduced. 
But three points are worth making. The first is in relation to Brazil’s institutional resilience. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In 2009 Brazil’s SSC expenditure was approximately USD 362 million in 2009 values (Ipea, 2011) compared to more than USD 2 
billion spent only in 2009 by China (Information Office of the State Council 2011). This figure can be misleading, though, as Ipea (2011) 
does not include debt relief or consensual loans. 
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When I conducted my fieldwork in Brazil in 2017, I was surprised at the efforts of the 
ABC, MS and MRE to keep SSC alive despite the cuts. I had the opportunity to attend 
conferences and workshops dedicated to debating SSC. Second, even though Brazil is no 
longer emphasizing SSC as a foreign policy strategy, studying the political dynamics of its 
involvement in development can shed light into – and contribute with – the wider debate 
over emerging countries and their role in development cooperation. It also helps understand 
the persistence of colonial and post-colonial structures established in former colonies – 
including Brazil and Mozambique. Third, although Brazil’s new far-right government has 
drastically changed its foreign policy strategy and is trying to forge a new national identity 
disconnected from SSC, several signifiers attached to SSC still shape Brazil’s identity.  
Brazil’s SSC included, according to the Institute of Applied Economic Research’s 
(Portuguese acronym Ipea) (2011) official report, contributions to international 
organizations and regional banks, humanitarian assistance, scholarships and technical 
cooperation. The principles promoted by the official discourse on SSC are more related to 
the concept of technical cooperation, defined by the MRE and ABC as “[t]he transfer or 
sharing of knowledge, experiences and good practices between governments – bilaterally or 
through international organizations – on a non-commercial basis”13 . It was through 
technical cooperation that Brazil’s government sought to promote its own successful 
domestic policies such as the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos, which was adapted to 
the African context as ‘Purchase from Africans to Africa’ (UN, 2013), amongst others. 
Brazil’s technical cooperation projects14, as will be discussed, were the country’s showcase 
in the field of development and were supposed to serve as an example of SSC. It is for this 
reason, amongst others discussed below, that I focused on technical cooperation for 
development. 
The greatest novelty of Brazilian foreign policy since 2003 was its intense engagement with 
Africa, particularly with Lusophone countries. Among the BRICS, Brazil was the only one 
who shifted its “focus from the near abroad to the far abroad” (Chen and Wilson, 2014), 
concentrating most of its investment in development in Africa, particularly Mozambique. 
This engagement was underlined by a discourse that emphasized cultural affinities and 
similar contexts, which would presume easily adaptable projects. Moreover, it is also in the 
context of Africa that the debate on whether the BRICS’s SSC represents a new paradigm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/cooperacao/6711-technical-cooperation [accessed 15 May 2019].	  
14	  Particularly those defined as ‘structuring cooperation’, a concept that will be discussed in chapters 4 and 6.	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of development is situated. Thus, by focusing on the case of Brazil-Mozambique this thesis 
can contribute to the general debate on the BRICS in African countries.  
Of all technical cooperation projects in Africa as a whole and in Mozambique in particular, 
agriculture and health are the two fields that received the biggest number of projects and 
the most resources (World Bank/IPEA, 2011). There have been several projects 
implemented by the two main Brazilian research and policymaking  institutions (Embrapa 
and Fiocruz) in the area of agriculture and health. While in principle I could have 
investigated any of the projects in order to understand whether and how development is re-
politicized or de-politicized, the ProSavanna and the ARV factory were the most interesting 
ones. First, they were promoted as Brazil’s showcase in the field of SSC. Second, they have 
been the most expensive and longest SSC projects implemented by Brazil, and received a 
lot of (negative and positive) attention worldwide, which generated debates both in the 
academia and in policy circles. This means these projects have a higher degree of symbolic 
power to the extent that they can, more effectively than other projects, define what SSC is. 
Thirdly, for the reasons described above, they can provide more information and thus allow 
for a higher level of data richness (Stake, 1995). Indeed, at the beginning of my fieldwork 
in Brazil I also intended to focus on other, smaller projects alongside ProSavanna and the 
ARV factory. However, while conducting interviews with staff from Embrapa and Fiocruz 
the conversation would always shift towards the ProSavannah and the ARV Factory as the 
“really important and interesting projects” (Interview 7, Brazil, 2017). Interestingly, my 
interviewees from Fiocruz would at times also like to discuss the ProSavanna, while staff 
from Embrapa would sometimes mention the ARV factory. These were, in fact, the most 
meaningful projects of SSC, whose dynamics of re-politicization and de-politicization are 
worth understanding. 
Finally, Brazil’s SSC for development is executed by domestic agencies specialized in their 
particular field. Embrapa and Fiocruz offer two examples of distinct domestic trajectories 
and development models. At the risk of oversimplification I describe the first to be mostly 
in line with hegemonic norms of agricultural development, while the second has defined 
itself as counter-hegemonic in relation to Northern conceptions of – and approaches to – 
public health, such as those promoted by the World Bank and the WHO. Moreover, in 
Mozambique, the agricultural and health sectors present some important distinctive features 
for the examination of de/re-politicization: the former has a very strong grass-roots civil 
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society, while the latter doesn’t. Following Glynos and Howarth’s (2007: 202-03) 
discussion on case selection, my choice of ProSavannah and the ARV Factory would fall 
into the “maximum variation” category, which enables researches to “obtain information 
about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome because they 
are as different from each other as possible” (Flyvbjerg, 2001:79 in Glynos and Howarth, 
2007: 203). Understanding how these two key actors of Brazilian SSC, with different 
stances on development, construct meanings and respond to contestation in different 
contexts provides a greater picture of the political dynamics of SSC. 
 
1.3.4. Interviews and Other Primary and Secondary Sources 
Discourse analysts are concerned with the examination of texts, be they linguistic or non-
linguistic (Dunn and Neumann, 2016). For the purposes of answering my research question, 
linguistic texts – from primary and secondary sources – constituted the data of interest.  
In Brazil, I first selected and organized the sources of linguistic texts based on the 
distinction between the different levels of the SSC ‘apparatus’. The first level constituted 
the official discourse on SSC, articulated by diplomats, the president and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (MRE). The second level constituted those involved in the policy making, 
management, evaluation and implementation of the projects I chose.  These were within the 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the Ministry of Health (MS), the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MASA), and within the state owned Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) under the MASA and the scientific 
institution for research and development in biological sciences, the Oswaldo Cruz 
Foundation (Fiocruz).  
The first step in the collection of data involved reading secondary sources (academic 
articles, policy papers and the like), talking to researchers at the BRICS Policy Centre, a 
SSC think tank where I was a fellow while on fieldwork, and accessing institutional 
websites that would give me the names of the people who were directly or indirectly 
involved in the two projects. I then drafted a table with the names of diplomats, ministers, 
managers and directors within the main institutions, as well as researchers, consultants and 
other experts involved in the implementation and elaboration of the projects.  
For the specific case of ProSavannah, I also selected the civil society organizations who 
formed the REBRIP – Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos – a network of 
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organizations and movements whose main institutions were directly involved in monitoring 
Brazilian SSC, more specifically the ProSavannah. Since I had worked for one of these 
organizations in the past, it was easy for me to select and contact them for interviews. 
I wanted to map the different discourses in each of these institutions, find patterns and 
narratives that have shaped the projects, or in other words, the ways in which meanings 
were related to materiality. In this sense, not only high-ranking individuals mattered, but 
also those involved in making decisions in the field, on a daily basis, since there is a two-
way channel of communication between the different levels of staff, and (supposedly) 
between different institutions such as ABC and Embrapa. Since I was also interested in 
understanding Embrapa’s a and Fiocruz’s possible institutional identities and discourses in 
relation to SSC in general, my focus was not only the personnel involved with the 
ProSavanna or the ARV Factory, but also those who were involved with SSC more 
generally.  
My fieldwork experience and the literature showed that the coordinating function of ABC 
has been very weak and is still under construction. This, amongst other reasons, led both 
Embrapa and Fiocruz to play a very robust role in terms of response, coordination and 
decision making in general. For this reason, I focused mostly on them. 
I was able to conduct 35 in-depth semi structured interviews in Brazil, both elite and non-
elite. These were not solely a product of my own desk research and secondary literature, 
but were also suggested to me by some of my interviewees. Aware of the limitations of 
snowballing such as selection bias, I did my own research to double check the names 
recommended and the involvement of each of them in the projects, and whether I could find 
more names associated with the same position and/or same period of time. See table 1 with 
the interviews conducted while in Brazil, from July 2017 to December 2017, in the 
appendix. 
The second stage of my fieldwork was in Mozambique, where I spent two months. Not 
being a Mozambican myself, the pre-requisite for conducting research in a foreign 
environment was to acquire some degree of cultural competence. As Dunn and Neumann 
(2016: 119) put it, discourses are “grids of intelligibility” which are culturally specific.  For 
this reason, but understanding the limitations of acquiring cultural competence in a 
relatively short period of time, I read some general historical books on Mozambique, its 
development path and politics. I also read the literature on foreign aid and how it shaped 
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the Mozambican health and agricultural landscape. While in Mozambique, I talked to local 
researchers and intellectuals to better understand Mozambique’s political, social and 
economic contexts. 
I focused on the main institutions that participated in the projects analysed. In the field of 
health, these were the Ministry of Health (MISAU), the National Institute of Health (INS), 
the State Holding Company (IGEPE) under the Ministry of Finance, and the Mozambican 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (SMM – the official name of the ARV Factory). In the field of 
agriculture, these were the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA), the 
Agricultural Research Institute of Mozambique (IIAM), under the MASA, and all the 
organizations from civil society that participated in the official opposition to the 
ProSavannah as well as those who were in favour of it. I was also interested, as in the case 
of Brazil, in former employees and government representatives who were involved, at some 
point, in the projects. Moreover, I was interested in talking to the representatives in the 
Embassy of Brazil, particularly those who were deeply involved in managing the crisis that 
unfolded between the different actors. This proved more difficult because some of those 
representatives were no longer in Mozambique or in Brazil. As a consequence I had to 
conduct a few interviews by Skype. 
Apart from the interviews, in the case of agriculture I was able to collect a large amount of 
information through the institutions’ website. In the case of health, almost no information 
was available. I had to ask institution representatives for documents, leaflets and archival 
files. This was not always available. 
I used the same techniques I’d used in Brazil to make a list of interviewees. I managed to 
conduct 43 in-depth semi structured interviews with 47 people. Two of these interviews 
were in groups of two and four people (numbers 27 to 32 and 33, respectively). See 
appendix 2, with the interviews conducted while in Mozambique, from January to March, 
2018. 
 
1.3.5. Mapping, interpreting and analysing 
The interview questions sought to elicit as many meanings as possible from my 
interviewees. Their perceptions, the way they represented certain actors and objects, and 
their narratives of important events served this purpose. Broadly speaking, I was interested 
in: identities (which are always relational), norms and principles. I wanted to gather how 
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these were attached to SSC as a foreign policy strategy, to the projects themselves, to the 
institutions, and to the various actors involved. For this purpose, I also drew on manifestos, 
online articles produced by NGOs and other institutions such as the MASA, the IGEPE, 
WHO, UN agencies, amongst others, as well as on government documents within the 
Ministry of Health and the IGEPE. It is worth emphasizing that I was not looking for the 
truth or real motivations behind actors’ views, but rather their own construction of reality.   
Before interpreting discourses, I proceeded to identifying them.15 Hansen (2006, in Dunn 
and Neumann, 2016) provides a good rationale on how to map discourses. This would 
involve identifying those discursive practices which advocated “different policy options, 
with at least one in a recognizable position of privilege and the others situating themselves 
in response to and in criticism of that position” (Dunn and Neumann, 2016: 148). This was 
clear from the interviews I conducted, since the main topic of most of the interviews was 
events related to conflict.  
After mapping discourses, I used three methods for interpreting them. These were the 
analysis of nodal points, the genealogical method, and deconstruction (Dunn and 
Neumann, 2016). As such, I was particularly interested in finding nodal points (key 
signifiers) around which discourses were organized. These were central to the strategy 
employed by the several actors in trying to hegemonize discourses. I also sought to provide 
a historical contextualization of present norms (or social logics, as I call them in Chapters 4 
and 6) in order to understand when and how these were formed, and which norms were 
marginalized in this historical process.  
Similarly, I employed a genealogical method when interpreting the official discourse on 
SSC. This helped me expose the contingency of the contemporary discursive practices by 
offering a historical examination of SSC practices. For this purpose, I mostly drew on 
speeches by presidents and ministers of foreign affairs, as well as on secondary literature 
and literature that explored and analysed canonical texts. Canonical texts are traditional 
texts that are representative of a certain period and “have a broad reception and are often 
cited” (Dunn and Neumann, 2016: 133). The most evident example of a canonical text in 
the study of Brazilian foreign policy and national identity in relation to Lusophone Africa is 
Freyre’s (1964) Masters and Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization.  
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  Although to some extent the two processes occur concomitantly.	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Finally, my analysis also centred around deconstructing how development models, with 
their norms, principles and subject positions, were articulated in hegemonic discourses by 
juxtaposing them to the counter-hegemonic – and competing – discourses. The method of 
deconstruction serves the purpose of exposing the production of ‘truths’ through some 
discourses and how these are privileged to the detriment of other meanings. In using these 
methods, I was at the same time looking for change in identities and in political projects 
and social practices. 
As a final point, it is important to stress that my methodology did not rely exclusively on 
actors’ contextualized self-interpretation. As mentioned above, I used Glynos and 
Howarth’s (2007) concept of ‘logics’ which use not only self-interpretations in order to 
characterize and explain a phenomenon, but also “something beyond”, which allows me to 
critically explain the transformation, stabilization or maintenance of practices. 
 
1.3.6. Reflexivity 
The practice of reflexivity has allowed me to consider how my personal characteristics may 
have affected my interaction with interviewees and their responses, as well as my 
knowledge production in the construction of this research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 
2012).  
The first aspect to note is that before embarking in this PhD, I worked as a foreign policy 
adviser in an NGO in Brazil. The main task of this position was to engage in debates about 
Brazil’s SSC with other like-minded NGOs (particularly from Rebrip), and communicate 
with government representatives about our main concerns. In other words, we monitored 
Brazilian SSC and advocated for respect for human rights. In this context, the ProSavannah 
was at the top of our agenda. We have always sided with the Mozambican organizations 
that opposed the project, and in this sense, to us, the ProSavannah was also ‘the Other’. It 
represented land dispossession, food insecurity, and environmental devastation; in sum, 
consequences of a model of agricultural development of which we were highly critical.  
It is futile, thus, to deny that this experience and view of the ProSavannah has had impact in 
my knowledge production. In fact, the norms I have chosen to criticize are precisely the 
norms of agribusiness. At the same time, the awareness of my political position also made 
me careful not to romanticize peasants’ positions or to dismiss accusations made by the 
proponents of the ProSavannah. In this sense, I have always aimed at certain ‘distance’. 
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It is also important to note that I have used my position as a former policy adviser to open 
the doors of the Mozambican civil society organizations. I had prior knowledge that these 
organizations were highly suspicious of foreign researchers who could be potentially 
spying for the Mozambican government. Thus, I made clear to them my previous 
engagement with the debate and criticism of the ProSavannah. This has definitely been 
decisive in getting most of the interviews with NGOs representatives, as they themselves 
admitted. 
But while this aspect of my identity helped me get interviews and responses which I 
otherwise might not have gotten, it could at the same time have affected my ability to get 
interviews with Embrapa and the MRE personnel. Both institutions were very wary of the 
Brazilian NGOs who opposed the project. As a consequence, I chose to omit this 
information when requesting interviews with diplomats and researchers/analysts from 
Embrapa. Aspects of my identity that may have played a role during these interviews is my 
affiliation with a very reputable international institution (LSE), the fact that I am white in 
appearance and have a middle class, educated background. I believe that in certain 
instances this created a familiarity with my white, privileged, well-travelled and well-
educated interviewees. Many of my Embrapa interviewees, for example, had done their 
PhDs abroad, in elite universities. They would identify with my experience during an initial 
chitchat. In my view, however, what this familiarity created was openness when talking 
about certain aspects of race and ‘ideology’ when dismissing the Mozambican opposition to 
the ProSavannah. There were features of their narratives that would resist public official 
disclosure (See chapters 2 and 4) because they were socially unacceptable, but they 
somehow felt at ease in disclosing them to me.  
On the other hand, it is generally assumed that researchers who choose SSC as a research 
topic usually do so because of their overall positive view of SSC, even though most thesis 
are critical. As for Fiocruz’s personnel, I noticed there was an interest and curiosity about 
my doctorate research topic. This may have stemmed from the fact that as an institution 
Fiocruz identified with the principles of SSC (see Chapter 6). Upon reflection, this may 
have also opened the doors for – and shaped – the interviews I conducted. 
Finally, the main aspect of my identity that may have affected my interactions in 
Mozambique – apart from the one mentioned above – was my nationality. I perceived 
Mozambicans to be very friendly in general, and particularly fond of Brazilian culture. In 
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her ethnographic fieldwork in Mozambique, Cesarino (2013) pays attention to the strength 
of Brazilian soft power, promoted by the numerous Brazilian soap operas, TV shows and 
football. I did believe that these aspects might have played a role in shaping Mozambicans’ 
responses to me when it came to assessing Brazil’s role in SSC with Mozambique. At 
times, they refrained from criticizing either the Brazilian government or specific Brazilian 
institutions. In this sense, this affected my ability to construct a Brazilian identity as 
perceived by Mozambicans. 
	  
1.3.7. Challenges and Limitations 
The main challenges I came across as a researcher were related to sources of information, 
both interviewees and government’s documents. The former was more related to the 
ProSavannah project and the impossibility of interviewing a reasonable sample of peasants. 
According to Via Campesina (The International Peasants’ Movement), millions of peasants 
would be displaced by the ProSavannah. From what I gathered from fieldwork colleagues, 
as the ProSavannah started to unfold, opinions amongst communities of peasants varied. 
Some were excited about the possibility of seeing ‘some development’ in their area, while 
others were still very much against it. As such, the category of peasants is by no means 
homogeneous and the responses I would get from an extensive fieldwork would more likely 
be multiple and conflicting. On the other hand, when I refer to ‘peasants’, I refer to the 
National Union of Peasants (UNAC), which throughout the entire process remained firmly 
against the project. I was able to interview a local leader and a former member of UNAC. 
Another issue I encountered was specific to the ARV Factory project. There was very little 
government documents available, either online or within Ministerial offices. I requested 
documents from the MISAU archive, and from the IGEPE, which were given to me. 
However, they were mostly technical bilateral agreements which did not contribute much to 
the discursive construction of identity. Unlike the ProSavannah, whose documents were 
largely available on government and CSOs’ websites, books and leaflets, the ARV 
Factory’s main sources of information were my interviewees, which lead me to consider 
another challenge. The first one, mentioned above, was the difficulty in constructing 
Brazil’s identity according to Mozambicans. The second difficulty is related with the fact 
that interviewees were hesitant when I asked a question related to politics or the former 
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minister of health. I suggest that this hesitance is linked with the authoritarian nature of the 
Mozambican state.  
Finally, due to limitations of time and money, I could not interview representatives of the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), except for one. I did not see this as hurting 
my project, since I was mostly interested in the interaction between Brazil and 
Mozambique. Furthermore, from what I gathered from fieldwork, and according to 
Brazilians, Mozambicans and even the one Japanese interviewee, both sides (Brazil and 
Japan) worked independently, without much interaction between them. I do acknowledge 
however that this is a limitation, and that results may have been more complex had I been 
able to access JICA representatives.  
 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 is dedicated to discussing and explaining the 
main assumptions and ideas of Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist discourse theory. My 
aim is to show that Laclau and Mouffe’s attention to the political nature of the construction 
of certain meanings, which involves the re-establishment or reframing of identities, allows 
me to explore processes of de-politicization and re-politicization of the projects that make 
up my case studies. This happens within the context of antagonism and conflict, with 
different actors applying different resources and strategies. Chapter 2 will explain what 
discourse theory means by ‘the constitutive instability of discourse’, how antagonism is 
constructed through the logic of equivalence and difference, how power operates through 
hegemony, what is the role of empty signifiers as a site of hegemonic battle, the role of 
ideology in hiding the contingency of social relations, the malleability of social structures 
which allows for a higher degree of agency and thus the contestation of hegemonic norms.  
In order to operationalize the insights of Laclau and Mouffe, I use the ‘Logics of Critical 
Explanation’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) approach since it provides a useful framework 
centred around three types of logics for analysis: the social logic, the political logic and the 
fantasmatic logic. The social logic describes the sedimented norms that will be contested in 
the context of both projects. The political logic explains how these norms were contested or 
de-contested, and the fantasmatic logic explores desire-based narratives that explain a 
subject’s attachment to certain norms (Glynos et al, 2015).  
	   44	  
Chapter 3 offers a genealogy of Brazilian SSC and seeks to respond to the question as to 
whether the official discourse under the Workers’ Party (PT) government re-politicized 
SSC, as some analysts have claimed. I analyse the two previous periods (Jânio Quadros and 
João Goulart’s civil government in 1961, and Ernesto Geisel’s military government in 
1974) when Brazil adopted SSC as a foreign policy strategy, and seek to understand how 
the Workers’ Party discourse utilized and/or changed the legacy of the past to produce SSC 
as a discourse in the 2000s. In sum, by investigating the discourses that constitute SSC, 
their continuities and changes, I conclude that rather than solely representing a political 
logic of contestation and re-politicization, SSC also articulates interests that legitimize 
cooperation between the North and the South (NSC). Thus, the importance of this chapter 
is to problematize SSC as a category that opposes NSC in the context of Brazilian foreign 
policy.   
Chapter 4 explores the social logics of agricultural production in Mozambique, and the 
social logics of agricultural production promoted by the first blueprint of the ProSavannah 
project, the so-called first ‘Master Plan’. In Mozambique, smallholder farmers who practice 
family farming account for 95% of the agricultural production, while commercial farmers 
produce the remaining 5% (FAO, 2018). The government has neglected Mozambique’s 
agricultural sector, and food insecurity still persists throughout the country (Silici et al, 
2015). Mozambique has one of the highest levels of rural extreme poverty, occupying the 
181st position out of 187 countries in the UN’s 2016 Human Development Index.  
In the context of the arrival of the ProSavannah, two contrasting social logics were at stake: 
the first promoted by peasants, centred on ‘food sovereignty’, which articulated elements 
such as ‘autonomy’, ‘independence’, rights of peasants’, ‘technology and extension based 
on local values, knowledge and culture’, ‘local markets’, ‘economic, social and 
environmental sustainability’, ‘and ‘non-intensive agricultural practices’. The other set of 
norms was promoted by the government of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan, which I call 
‘the logics of agribusiness or green revolution’. These sought to promote a transition and 
transformation of Mozambique’s agrarian sector into a market-oriented agriculture, based 
on intensive agricultural technology and a key role for private investors. The ProSavannah 
was based on the idea of ‘clusters’, which promoted the integration of peasants and large 
agribusiness into a synergic relationship. I argue that the discourse promoted by the first 
blueprint is de-politicized to the extent that it foregrounds the ideological dimension of 
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social relations. In other words, this narrative has a necessary character as it sees the 
modernization of agriculture into highly productive and technologically intensive practices 
as the only path to development. 
Chapter 5 will analyse and explain the antagonism constructed once the Mozambican civil 
society and peasants learnt about the ProSavannah. I will explore the political logics of 
contestation employed by the opponents of the project, and the logics of de-contestation by 
the proponents. The latter I call the ‘logics of denial, differentiation and marginalization’ as 
it relies mostly on discourses that seek to deny the opponents’ agency, differentiate 
Mozambique from Brazil, and marginalize alternative forms of agricultural development. It 
is within the political logics of contestation and de-contestation that the process of re-
politicization and de-politicization become clear.  
I also explore the ideological fantasy underpinning the political logics articulated by the 
ProSavannah proponents. This fantasmatic narrative explains the grip of the political logics 
of de-contestation and relies on the narrative of the transformation of the Brazilian 
savannah, the cerrado, into Brazil’s breadbasket.  
This chapter concludes by saying that despite the victory of the civil society in slowing 
down the project, the effects of the logics of ‘denial, differentiation and marginalization’ 
were translated into a strategy that seeks to slowly incorporate the peasants into a ‘mixed 
model’. 
Chapter 6 explores the social logics of Antiretroviral Treatment (ART) in Mozambique 
and the contrasting logics of ART in Brazil, which sought to shape the ARV Factory. I first 
offer a historical overview of the Mozambican health sector, and the key role Northern and 
international organizations have played in instituting norms that have promoted 
fragmentation, aid dependency and brain drain within the health sector. I then discuss how 
the logics of ART in Mozambique and its norms of ‘AIDS exceptionalism’ and ‘vertical 
approach’ promoted by the West through vertical funds and international organizations 
have contributed to further fragment and promote Mozambique’s health sector aid 
dependency. In contrast, I argue that Brazil’s counter-hegemonic social logics of ART 
promoted by Fiocruz were based on sanitarist principles such as ‘state as health provider’, 
‘universal access to healthcare’, ‘domestic production of ARV’, and on SSC principles 
such as ‘structuring cooperation’, which reinforced the role of a strong state in providing 
health, and ‘horizontality’.  
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Chapter 7 offers an analysis of the political dynamics that shaped the implementation of 
the factory. I claim there were three phases in the implementation of the ARV factory: an 
initial phase, characterized by weak political support, in which the Mozambique minister of 
health tried to articulate norms in line with Fiocruz’s norms, such as ‘state as health 
provider’, for the implementation of the project. The second phase started with the change 
in ministers and the consequent articulation of the logics of good governance, which 
questioned the status of the factory as a public entity, and sought to privatize it. I argue that 
the logics of good governance de-politicized the factory to the extent that it sought to 
remove it from the State by promoting an economistic discourse according to which the 
state had no funds to invest in the factory. The third phase is characterized by a 
compromise between the two governments. The Brazilian government and more 
particularly Fiocruz mobilized their own set of political logics based not only on the 
reinforcement of sanitarist principles, but also on SSC principles. On the one hand, they 
sought to challenge the Mozambique Ministry of Health’s logics of good governance by 
reinforcing the norm of ‘State ownership’. On the other hand, Fiocruz articulated a 
discourse that facilitated a political compromise between the two contrasting sets of norms, 
that of ‘good governance’, and that of ‘state ownership’. This discourse strongly articulated 
SSC principles of horizontality and sovereignty. As such, rather than denying 
Mozambicans their agency, Fiocruz, the MS and the MRE recognized them as active 
partners in a cooperation project. In this sense, I argue that the ARV was partially re-
politicized. 
Considering that SSC as part of a political logic of contestation represents the re-
politicization of development (cf. Chapter 3), Chapter 8 reflects on the possibilities for 
SSC to articulate developing countries’ demands into a chain of equivalence against 
traditional aid. This would, first, need the alignment and convergence of domestic 
implementing institutions with principles and norms. I then reflect on the evolution of SSC 
since its re-emergence in the 2000s, and argue that rather than exclusively challenging 
traditional aid, emerging countries that lead SSC initiatives have also converged with 
Northern donors. On the other hand, Northern donors, particularly the DAC countries, have 
created spaces to accommodate SSC providers as well as tried to co-opt these into their 
hegemonic model. The chapter paints a complex picture of re-politicization and de-
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politicization, and reflects on the future of SSC in general, and in the specific case of 
Brazil. 
Chapter 9 resumes the main argument of this thesis and reflects on the importance of the 
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Chapter 2: Theory 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to discuss and explain some of the main assumptions and ideas of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist discourse theory that justify my choice of it. My aim 
is to show that Laclau and Mouffe’s attention to the political nature of the construction of 
meanings, which involves the re-establishment or reframing of identities within their 
conception of ‘social antagonism’, allows me to explore processes of de-politicization and 
re-politicization of the projects that make up my case studies.  
Underlying Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is the ontological assumption of the ‘constitutive 
instability of discourse’, which puts into question the supposedly fixed existence and nature 
of social structures, norms and rules, and allows to understand and explain how they are 
constructed in their historical context. This construction, particularly prominent in times of 
conflict and antagonism between actors, is by nature political in the sense that the 
construction of new meanings and the re-establishment of old ones involve power. Both 
projects I analyse were marked by change and dynamism in a process which, rather than 
politically neutral, constitutes a political battle around the articulation of discourses. As one 
of my interviewees sensibly said, “[SSC] is about the political dispute for concepts” 
(Interview 21, Brazil, 2017). And it is in this process that SSC was depoliticized and re-
politicized.  
Simply put, for this thesis, de-politicization operates through discourse and it characterizes 
the masking or denial of the contingency of social practices, or, in other words, the denial 
that things could be articulated in other forms, e.g., that development is not immanent and 
necessary. In discourse theory terms, this de-politicization happens when the ideological 
dimension of social life, or the refusal in recognizing contingency and instability of 
discourse, is foregrounded, pre-empting the possibility to contest hegemonic norms. Re-
politicization, on the other hand, is the very contestability of these norms through the 
recognition of their political construction (and thus instability). This happens within the 
context of antagonism and conflict, with different actors applying different resources and 
strategies. As I explain Laclau and Mouffe’s main concepts, this dynamics will become 
clearer. 
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For example, how did the proponents of ProSavannah, particularly the Mozambique 
Ministry of Agriculture, Brazil’s Embrapa and the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations 
(MRE), react to civil-society’s opposition against the ProSavannah? What were the 
discourses and strategies used to control or pre-empt the contestation of ProSavannah? In 
order to understand these processes, I will explore in this chapter the main concepts that 
allow me to conceptualize de-politicization and re-politicization. These involve 
understanding what discourse theory means by ‘the constitutive instability of discourse’, 
how antagonism is constructed through the logic of equivalence and difference, how power 
operates through hegemony, what is the role of empty signifiers as a site of hegemonic 
battle, the role of ideology in hiding the contingency of social relations, the malleability of 
social structures which allows for a higher degree of agency and thus the contestation of 
hegemonic norms. Finally, I discuss the importance of Lacanian psychoanalysis to explain 
the grip certain narratives have in explaining socio-political phenomena, more particularly 
narratives that apparently justify and legitimize hegemonic norms. 
In order to operationalize the insights of Laclau and Mouffe, I use the ‘Logics of Critical 
Explanation’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) approach since it provides a useful framework 
centred around three types of logics for analysis: the social logics, the political logics and 
the fantasmatic logics. The social logics describe the sedimented norms that will be 
contested in the context of both projects. The political logics explain how these norms were 
contested or de-contested, and the fantasmatic logics explore desire-based narratives that 
explain a subject’s attachment to certain norms (Glynos et al, 2015).  
 
2.2. The Constitutive Instability of Discourse 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) put forward a crucial 
ontological assumption that underpins their entire theory of discourse: That of the 
constitutive instability of discursive structures. The unstable and open nature of discourse 
and thus of social relations is the basis for my examination of the political struggle around 
meaning which resulted in the changing character of both the ProSavanna project and the 
ARV factory project. Moreover, it underpins the problematicization of SSC as constructed 
by the official discourse, an analysis I offer through a historical genealogy in Chapter three. 
In order to understand this ontological assumption and its consequences, it is necessary to 
explain what Laclau and Mouffe understand as discourse. For Laclau and Mouffe, all 
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objects and actions have meaning, and their meaning can only be known through 
“particular systems of significant differences” (Howarth, 2000). In other words, the identity 
an object acquires depends on the system of differences that constitutes this identity, and 
not on a system based on a one-to-one relation between signs and objects, or signifier and 
signified (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987). As Wittgenstein and Saussure had already showed, 
the word ‘father’ acquires its meaning only in relation to a structured system of differences 
with the words ‘mother’, ‘son’, etc. Derrida had similarly argued that this system of 
differential signs works through a series of juxtapositions of signs, which acquire meaning 
in relation to each other, and not by their ‘essence’ (Hansen, 2006). To cite another 
example, the ‘underdeveloped world’ is only meaningful in juxtaposition to a ‘developed 
world’ (Hansen, 2006), and so is SSC in relation to NSC. 
Beyond linguistic identities, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) argued that the relational and 
differential character referred to all signifying practices, that is to say, to all social 
structures, since discourse is an ontological category that captures the nature of social 
relations16. This follows from the assumption that all social practices, linguistic and non-
linguistic, are part of ‘discourse’, or what Wittgenstein conveyed by the notion of ‘language 
games’: When building a wall, builder A asks assistant B to pass him the stone. B passes 
the stone to builder A, who inserts it into the wall (Glynos et al, 2009). Both the language 
used (“pass me the stone”) and the actions implied are part of the ‘language-game’. This is 
what discourse theory understands as ‘discourse’. But this is not to deny that things 
(actions, objects, etc) exist outside of discourse. What Laclau and Mouffe deny is that these 
can have meaning outside of discourse: 
 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether 
there is a world external to thought […] An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that 
certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether 
their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the 
wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108) 
 
Likewise, for Laclau and Mouffe, there is no ‘objective truth’ outside of discourse. This has 
led to the accusation that discourse theory “lacks a foundation [and] slides into a bottomless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  However, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 113) “structuralism became a new form of essentialism: a search for the underlying 
structures constituting the inherent law of any possible variation”. 
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relativist gloom, in which opposed discourses or paradigms are left with no common 
reference point, uselessly trading blows” (Geras, 1987: 163:67). Howarth (2000) addresses 
this criticism by saying that Laclau and Mouffe do not deny the truth or falsity of 
statements. Rather, they judge statements in relation to a given order of discourse and its 
own criteria. Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe reject the possibility of an objective point of 
view, since all subjects are located within systems of meanings and values. In this sense, 
when analysing the discourses of the various actors involved in the ProSavannah or the 
ARV factory, I am not interested in finding out which discourse corresponds to the ‘truth’. I 
am, instead, interested in understanding how the discourses construct meanings which 
reinforce hegemonic norms, contest them or pre-empt their contestation. This will be 
clarified and further discussed in this chapter. 
The constitutive instability of a discourse lies mainly in the fact that discourses are, as 
already discussed, differential – rather than a system of signifiers with positive terms – and 
in this sense depend on, and are vulnerable to, a ‘discursive exterior’ to be able to form 
identities and meanings. Hansen (2006: 20) illustrates this point with figure (1) that shows 
the process of linking and differentiating involved in forming meanings:  
 
(Figure 1) 
In Hansen’s example, the signifier ‘woman’ is juxtaposed to the signifier ‘man’. The 
attributes of a woman are meaningful in a differential relation to the attributes of a man. 
That is to say, ‘emotional’ acquires its meaning in opposition to ‘rational’, ‘simple’ in 
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opposition to ‘complex’, and so on. This process of linking an attribute to ‘woman’ and its 
differentiation to an attribute linked to ‘man’ shows the possibility for destabilization. This 
is because a term whose connotation is, for example, negative in a discourse may acquire a 
positive connotation in another discourse. Because the construction of identities depend on 
this ‘discursive exterior’, a change of meaning of one term will destabilize the discursive 
construction of other terms in other discourses.  
To cite an example, in relation to this thesis, SSC is at first discursively constructed as 
opposed to NSC. Linked to SSC is ‘horizontality’ as opposed to ‘verticality’, ‘sovereignty’ 
as opposed to ‘interference’, ‘solidarity’ as opposed to ‘self-interest’, and so on. As will be 
discussed in chapter 3, however, when ‘self-interest’ loses its negative connotation in the 
official discourse on SSC in the 2000s, it no longer opposes ‘solidarity’, but can coexist 
with it. 
This “excess of meaning” which surrounds any structural system makes it impossible to 
think of society as fixed, unitary and intelligible. This is what Laclau meant by the 
“impossibility of society” (Laclau, 1991: 25). In other words, discourses are contingent in 
the sense that they can always be re-articulated, and this re-articulation happens within a 
historical context. What Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call ‘articulatory practices’, that is, the 
construction of ‘nodal points’ (or “privileged discursive points”) through the linking of 
signifying elements17, can only partially fix meanings (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985 in 
Howarth, 2000). The attempt to act over the unstable and precarious social structure and 
partially fix it is what Laclau (1991) calls to ‘hegemonize’ it. This involves the construction 
and stabilization of systems of meanings so that they are socially accepted as natural, taken-
for-granted. For example, the agribusiness discourse that underpinned the ProSavannah 
managed to articulate and stabilize a discursive formation whose elements ‘productivity’ 
and ‘efficiency’ were linked with ‘food production’ so that it became unquestionable that 
large-scale agriculture can feed more people, more efficiently. 
For this thesis, the implications of Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the social as 
constitutively unstable are twofold: First, it allows me to explore how discourses have 
changed and evolved throughout the formulation and implementation of the SSC projects. 
In both projects, the ‘discursive exterior’, or in other words, the competing discourses able 
to rearticulate discursive elements, threatened the ‘truths’ put forward by stakeholders in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology, ‘elements’ are signifiers that are ‘floating’. When these are articulated, they become ‘moments’, 
having a ‘necessary’ character. 
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what became a discursive battle. For example, the instability of discourses becomes very 
clear once the meanings that had been given to the ProSavannah project by Embrapa are 
challenged by the NGOs. Second, and following from the first assumption, the very attempt 
at re-articulation in order to partially fix meanings is a political competition rather than a 
neutral process (Laclau, 1991). The process of signification foregrounds political struggles 
which seek to either hide the contingency of the social or expose it. This represents the 
main focus of my analysis, that is, how social practices related to SSC hide the contingency 
of the social and thus de-politicizes it, or exposes it and thus re-politicizes them. The 
political constructions that I will analyse involve the exercise of power and the construction 
of antagonisms, which will be explored in the next section. 
 
2.3. Antagonism 
Traditional conceptions of social conflict understand antagonism as the clash between 
agents with fixed identities and pre-given interests (Howarth, 2000). In other words, agents 
enter into conflicts with fixed identities and already established interests. For Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), however, social antagonism is precisely the moment when identities are 
constituted; it happens when agents are unable to attain their identities and consequently to 
accomplish their interests. A clear example would be the case of peasants expelled from 
their land by capitalist producers and forced to become urban workers (Howarth 2000). 
They have the identities of peasants ‘blocked’, or, in other words, they are prevented from 
being peasants and pursuing their interests. 
Theoretically, since discourses are always threatened by what is outside their borders, it is 
this ‘discursive exterior’ that represents the antagonistic force, or the ‘Other’. In other 
words, the antagonistic force is what threatens identities and thus discourses, it is “the 
presence of the contingent in the necessary” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 125). It is in times 
of antagonism, thus, that the continuous instability of discourses and its contingency comes 
to the fore. 
The presence of the ‘Other’ (capitalist farmers, for example) prevents agents (peasants) 
from being totally themselves. As a consequence, agents construct an enemy deemed 
responsible for blocking and dislocating their identities (Howarth, 2000). Dislocation is 
precisely “the process by which contingency is made visible” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
2000: 13). This experience is a mutual experience: both peasants and capitalist producers 
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have their identities dislocated to the extent that they are not able to act according to their 
identity and interests in case of antagonism and resistance. Within the context of 
antagonism, as identities are dislocated, “political subjectivities” emerge in order to 
reinforce and reconstruct identities that are threatened (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000). 
The ProSavanna project was marked by crisis and antagonism. The identity that many of 
the peasants had until the reality of ProSavanna – albeit never fixed and always already 
unstable – had taken-for-granted character. With the threat of foreign investors and the 
large-scale agribusiness model, Mozambican peasants experienced further interruption of 
their identity, and this dislocation prompted the emergence of a political subjectivity that 
reaffirmed their identity as peasants (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). At the same time, the 
antagonized force, namely Embrapa, the MRE and the Mozambican Ministry of 
Agriculture, also experienced this blockage of identity because they could not fulfil their 
role and implement the project. As a consequence, the political subjectivity which most 
clearly emerged with the dislocation of Embrapa’s corporate identity attempted to re-
establish and reinforce the identity of a successful institution based on science. This was, as 
will be clear, constructed in opposition to the identity of the peasants as ‘ideological’, 
‘political’, ‘manipulated’. 
In my second case study I argue that the conflict that unfolded was subtler and did not 
constitute antagonistic relations. The ARV factory triggered a crisis that dislocated 
Mozambique’s identity as a donor dependent country. The Government of Mozambique’s 
political response in trying to contest the norms of the Factory, in turn, dislocated Fiocruz’s 
corporate identity as a SSC partner and a counter-hegemonic actor. Fiocruz’s political 
subjectivity, then, drew heavily on SSC norms in order to re-establish their identity as a 
cooperante. This, as I will argue, is the reason why the conflict between governments and 
government agencies was less pronounced and subtler than in the case of the ProSavanna, 
which involved civil society actors. Within the realm of SSC, there was a structural limit 
for the construction of antagonism. This structural limit was precisely the discourse on 
SSC, with principles such as sovereignty and horizontality, which had become consolidated 
amongst Fiocruz’s employees. 
Laclau (2005) notes that even if the aim of contestation is the restoration of previous 
identities, this identity has to be reinvented. In this sense, I will explore how the dislocated 
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identities were reconstructed and reinvented in both cases and what this says about re-
politicization or de-politicization of development.  
In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 I discuss these process, that is, how agents involved in both 
projects (ProSavannah and the ARV Factory) constructed antagonistic/conflicting relations 
and which symbolic resources, or discursive frameworks they appealed to in order to 
oppose each other (albeit in different degrees). For example, what discourses did Embrapa 
draw upon in order to reinforce its identity as a research institution of scientific excellence, 
while at the same time discrediting the opposition? It is this process that reveals whether 
and how SSC has been re/de-politicized. The analysis I offer on the official discourse in 
Chapter 3 also seeks to understand how SSC was constructed in an antagonistic relation 
with NSC at times, while being portrayed as complementary at other times. 
In order to account for the construction of antagonistic relations, Laclau and Mouffe 
(Howarth, 2000) introduce two logics of signification, which designate processes that either 
strengthen social antagonisms or weaken them: The ‘logic of equivalence’ and the ‘logic of 
difference’. Complex societies are characterized by various, heterogeneous, groups whose 
identities are in constant flux. Each of these groups has different demands and different 
identities (blacks, women, working-class etc), and this is what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
named ‘the logic of difference’. In a relationship with governmental institutions, for 
example, if the demands of various groups are not met, and their identities are dislocated, 
the phenomenon changes into the ‘logic of equivalence’. This means that despite their 
singularities, these different demands and identities will be undermined, or will ‘collapse’, 
so that there will be one stronger signifier uniting them, one common characteristic which 
is centred around ‘the Other’ who threatens their identity (Howarth, 2000). For example, in 
the case of ProSavannah, a transnational civil society managed to bring together by 
weakening, albeit temporarily, the differences that separated peasants and civil society 
organizations in order to form a common opposing pole against the ProSavanna. There is, 
thus, a discursive unity amongst the various actors who perceive the ProSavanna as a threat 
to their existence, that is, “something [negative and] identical underlying them all” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 127). By applying this logic, the social movement led by civil society 
organizations divided stakeholders into two antagonistic camps around the ‘No to 
ProSavannah’ x ‘Prosavannah proponents’ dichotomy, the latter constituting the threat 
against the former.  
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By contrast, the logic of difference seeks to weaken antagonism by disrupting the chain of 
equivalence formed. This ‘divide and conquer logic’ is an effort to displace demands that 
unite different agents within one of the poles in the discursive field. To illustrate this point, 
I mention the example of the Mozambican government’s strategy in trying to dissipate the 
demands of the ‘No to ProSavanna’ movement by meeting some – but not all – of the 
demands from specific groups within the pole of opposition against the ProSavanna. By 
meeting the demand of a particular group, this group no longer wanted or needed to be part 
of the ‘No to ProSavannah’ movement. 
It is important to note that both equivalential and differential functions are always present at 
the same time in any system. Any demand or identity acquires its meaning vis-à-vis other 
demands, in a differential process of signification, as already noted. However, a series of 
demands can only be represented in its totality if the equivalential function which unites 
them “in their common opposition to the system” prevails over the differential one (Laclau, 
1996). I will discuss the tension between the logic of equivalence and the logic of 
difference when explaining the role of the empty signifier. 
The construction of antagonisms is a process through which power operates either to bring 
to the fore the contingency of norms and identities – by criticizing the hegemonic norms – 
or to background them, in what has been discussed in this thesis as re-politicization and de-
politicization respectively. This is because drawing a chain of equivalence in order to 
oppose the Other involves the construction of knowledge that exposes the contingency of 
the taken-for-granted norms promoted by the Other, or, on the other hand, masks this 
contingency by reinforcing hegemonic norms. This resonates with Foucault’s idea of the 
power/knowledge nexus, which helps account for the way power operates to reinforce 
certain norms while excluding others in the construction of reality. The way Embrapa 
conceived agricultural development excluded, at least as autonomous entities, the role of 
peasants and the alternative knowledge they promoted about development. And the way the 
government of Mozambique thought about the ARV factory in relation to its economic 
situation also excluded the possibility and the viability of the ARV factory as a public 
good. 
 
2.4. Hegemony, Empty Signifier and Ideology 
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The concept of hegemony refers, generally, to the construction of a dominant discursive 
formation. Neoliberalism, for example, has been hegemonic because it has managed to 
redefine the terms of the political debate – by, for example, unifying a chain of equivalence 
around an empty signifier such as ‘the market – and set the political agenda (Torfing, 
1999). For Laclau and Mouffe (1985) hegemony is a political relation, the very process 
whereby identities are created by inclusion and exclusion, in what has been discussed as 
antagonism.  
Building on – and criticizing – Gramsci’s theory according to which hegemony is the 
expression of a broadly based consent established by leading social forces within the state, 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) challenge Gramsci’s class reductionism by considering the 
contingency and instability of discourse. Discourses, as already mentioned, are transformed 
through articulatory practices, and these are the very condition for hegemonic practices 
(Laclau, 2008). Two further conditions are necessary for there to be hegemonic practices: 
First, “[…] hegemony should emerge in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms and therefore 
suppose phenomena of equivalence and frontier effects” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 135-6). 
Elements, or floating signifiers are, in this context, articulated by opposed political projects 
striving to hegemonize them. This struggle does not happen necessarily between social 
classes, but rather between identities that are constituted around demands in this political 
process. As a “type of political relation [hegemony] cannot be conceived as an irradiation 
of effects from a privileged point” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 141).  Specially because, as 
Laclau (1985) explains: 
 
The relations between […] different [subject] positions is far from being obvious and permanent; 
it is rather the result of complex political constructions which are based on the totality of social 
relations and which cannot be derived unilaterally from the relations of production.  
 
The second condition of hegemony is the presence of ‘empty signifiers’, which is a very 
important category for the analysis of how political struggles are constructed around certain 
terms, and how these terms are disputed between opposing camps. Laclau (1996: 36) 
briefly defines empty signifiers as “a signifier without a signified”.  In other words, in order 
to represent the whole community by eliminating the differences amongst its various 
identities and demands, the empty signifier has to be emptied of its specific signified in 
order to acquire a universal character. Or, as Wullweber (2015: 82) defined it, “[the empty 
	   58	  
signifier is] a signifier which becomes detached from its particular meaning in order to 
provide an empty space that can be filled with universal meanings”, which appeal to the 
community as a common good. 
In this sense, empty signifiers represent the whole chain of equivalence responsible for 
articulating a field of opposition against a common enemy. As such, they constitute a 
common vision of what the collective self is about, while at the same time being part of the 
chain of equivalence (Herschinger, 2012). But empty signifiers do not have a positive 
character. Rather, they are “the absent fullness of the community” or the “signifier of the 
lack” (Laclau: 1996). The empty signifier ‘order’, for example, arises in an environment of 
disorder, and in this sense it represents a universal lack amongst a certain community.  
In this thesis, the signifier ‘ProSavannah’ worked as an empty signifier that represented the 
central term in the political strategies to hegemonize the field of discursivity. As such, 
‘ProSavanna’ provided a universal view of the community that was defending or opposing 
it. This implies that empty signifiers, although mostly having a positive connotation 
(Torffing, 1999), can also become the expression of a threat or evil. In other words, the 
Other is also an empty signifier. ‘Prosavanna’ became the signifier of a common good to its 
proponents, and at the same time the expression of evil to civil society organizations and 
some peasant associations. In the case of the ARV Factory, however, I argue that the 
attempt to hegemonize the discourse around the ARV Factory as an empty signifier failed. 
The ARV factory remained as a floating signifier instead. 
An important question Laclau (1996) raised when discussing the role of the empty signifier 
is: what determines that one rather than another signifier incarnates the universal function 
at particular periods of time? Or, more broadly speaking, what determines that certain 
discourses can hegemonize the field of discursivity? In his own words, Laclau (1996: 43) 
says that: 
 
Not any position in society, not any struggle is equally capable of transforming its own contents 
in a nodal point that becomes an empty signifier […] [However] it is impossible to determine at 
the level of the mere analysis of the form difference/equivalence which particular difference is 
going to become the locus of equivalential effects – this requires the study of a particular 
conjuncture […] 
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This highlights the contingency and instability of discourses and of hegemonic formations, 
which emerge from the political interaction between groups, not according to pre-
determined laws. This interaction happens in particular historical contexts, which allowed 
for certain discourses to become hegemonic. The same rationale applies to SSC as an 
empty signifier throughout Brazil’s foreign policy history. The changing foreign policy 
strategies explored in chapter 3 show the unstable character of the official discourse.   
Hegemony is never, as must be already clear, a permanent status whereby an empty 
signifier manages to represent the universal interest of society indefinitely. The tension 
between the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference is contingent on the instability 
of discourse and renders hegemonic orders temporary. Discourse theory, in this sense, 
allows me to explore the dynamism of hegemonic struggles operating at the local level, in 
Mozambique, where hegemonic discourses had to adjust themselves as they were 
threatened by the Other. In this context, I analyse processes of de-politicization and re-
politicization. 
If hegemony represents the partial filling of an empty signifier, conferring a discourse – or 
in fact a political project – with some stability and fixity; ‘ideology’ is defined as “the 
desire for total closure by political projects and movements” (Howarth, 2000: 122). They 
are two interrelated concepts which work together to confer the illusion of closure to social 
relations. Rather than the Marxist conception of ideology as ‘false consciousness’, which 
depends on an epistemological ground, that is to say, on the supposedly essence and fixity 
of identities that were sometimes ‘misrecognized’ because of ideology, Laclau (1990) 
reconceptualises ideology by challenging some of Marx’s assumptions. The first is the 
concept of misrecognition. For Laclau (1990: 92), if “identity and homogeneity of social 
agents is an illusion” because they are always decentred and dislocated by the play of 
differences, then the idea of a true character with which to recognize oneself is baseless. 
What Laclau (1990: 92) proposed is an inversion of the traditional content of ideology: 
 
The ideological would not consist of the misrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the 
opposite: it would consist of the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of 
the impossibility of any ultimate suture. The ideological would consist of those discursive forms 
through which a society tries to institute itself as such on the basis of closure, of the fixation of 
meaning, of the non-recognition of the infinite play of differences. 
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To the extent that ideology is the non-recognition of the radical contingency of social 
relations, it operates to conceal this contingency and thus the contestation of hegemonic 
norms. The question as to whether SSC re/de-politicizes development is always in relation 
to the reproduction of hegemonic structures produced by the North, I argue. These, as will 
be argued, are hegemonic at least in intent at the local level, in this case in Mozambique. In 
other words, even if the model of large-scale agriculture is still not hegemonic in 
Mozambique itself, there is the intention to make it hegemonic since the government of 
Mozambique as well as most international agencies and development banks have tried to 
invest in large-scale agricultural production as the ideal model of agricultural development.  
A development project such as the ProSavannah, whose main principles are drawn from 
modernization theory, for example, seeks to convey the idea that development is immanent, 
good, inevitable and necessary. And it is this presupposition which tries to close discourse 
around the essentialist idea of ‘development’. This de-politicizes development itself 
because it does not allow for any alternative – it conceals the contingency of discourse. 
Alternatively, I argue that the ARV Factory sought to foreground the contingency of 
discourse by challenging, to some degree, the hegemonic norms sedimented in 
Mozambique by foreign donors. At least in the beginning, the economistic discourse did 
not recognize any alternatives that might have challenged the truth according to which 
Mozambique could not afford such a factory. 
 
2.5. Agency and Structure 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) make an important contribution to the agency/structure debate. 
For discourse theory, structure and agency are contingent and malleable and thus can 
account for social change by explaining how social actors react to crisis and how structures 
may change as a consequence. This involves processes of dislocation and identification, the 
former undermining the “determining capacity of the structure” (Torfing, 1999:148).  
In order to discuss agency/structure, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) introduce two different 
categories: First, the category of ‘subject position’, representing the positioning of subjects 
within a discursive structure (Howarth, 2000). A particular social actor can identify with 
many subject positions, such as that of ‘peasants’, ‘woman’, ‘black’ etc.  Social processes 
such as the arrival of a large-scale agricultural project promote the dislocation of the 
identity of peasants, for example. Within this process, which Howarth (2000:109) calls 
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“failure of the structure”, the structure no longer confers peasants their identities, and as a 
consequence they are compelled to act, recreating different structures which can constitute 
new identities – or re-establish their old identities. It is the attempt to create or re-establish 
an identity through the construction of new discourses that gives rise to what Laclau and 
Mouffe call ‘political subjectivity’ – agents become political in the sense that they are 
politically constructing new structures, or reinforcing old ones. Once their new identities 
are temporarily stabilized, they become subject positions again.  
This does not mean, however, that subjects are able to create new meaningful structures at 
their will, or without limits. As Torfing (1999: 153) explains, dislocation happens within a 
“relative structuration of the social” which may block the advancement of certain 
hegemonic projects. To illustrate this point, Laclau (2005) notes how the American farmers 
failed to form a chain of equivalence around demands of dispossessed groups in the XVIII 
century because of the ‘structural differential limits’ separating blacks and whites. In a 
similar manner, regional rivalries between the North and South of Mozambique have also 
proved to be established enough to prevent a chain of equivalences around a common 
empty signifier.  
Different manifestations of political subjectivities have emerged in both the ProSavanna 
project and in the ARV Factory. To understand how these political actors exercised agency 
it is important to investigate not only the structural differential limits explained above, but 
also which resources and discourses they mobilized in order to form new structures. These 
are the conditions of possibility for the contestation of hegemonic norms and the re-
politicization of development.  
 
2.6. Psychoanalysis and Discourse Theory: The centrality of ‘Jouissance’ 
From its inception, Discourse Theory has been greatly influenced by psychoanalysis, 
especially by Lacan. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to engage with Lacan’s 
work extensively, some explanation of the main concepts of his theory is necessary.  
Drawing on Freud, Lacan tried to reformulate some of psychoanalytic conceptions and 
proposed three other concepts to try to account for how and through which realms human 
experience operates, namely the imaginary, the symbolic and the real.  
In sum, the imaginary is the realm of the ego and represents a pre-linguistic sense in which 
one feels an illusory sense of unity with their mother (Homer, 2005). It is in the transition 
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from the imaginary to the symbolic (language) that this sense of unit is broken. What 
remains is just an illusionary sense of unity. As a result, the ego is perpetually marked by 
conflict and discord; it is a site of continual struggle (Homer, 2005:31). This is what Lacan 
refers to as a ‘lack of being’, that is, this ontological gap or primary loss which not only 
mark our subjectivity but is rather constitutive of subjectivity. The imaginary, however, is 
not just a stage an individual goes through and overcomes. It remains at the core of our 
experience as a site of struggle for the recovery of a sense of unity (Homer, 2005). 
Lacan’s category of the real is that of a realm outside language or image, that is, that which 
cannot be represented by the symbolic or captured by the imaginary. It is the traumatic 
aspect at the core of the subjectivity and the symbolic order. Žižek (1990: 249) notes that 
already in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) reinvented Lacan’s 
notion of the real with the category of ‘social antagonism’, which conceives of the “socio-
symbolic field […] as structured around a certain traumatic impossibility, around a certain 
fissure which cannot be symbolized”. 
Put simply, the Lacanian real is what is impossible to symbolize and to master – unless “in 
terms of disturbances of the imaginary and the symbolic”, in other words through 
dislocations – and is, thus, conceptualised in negative terms, as the limits of signification 
(Stavrakakis, 2007). Discourse theory shares this negative ontology in the sense that 
discourse, and thus society, are also marked by the impossibility to institute itself as a 
closed order due to its constitutive instability and contingency (Laclau, 1991) – something 
which becomes evident through antagonism. As such, not only the Lacanian subject but 
also Laclau’s discourse essentially lack in the sense that they can never be fully represented 
or fixed.  
The discussion of Lacan’s subject and its relationship with discourse theory is essential in 
order to understand certain narratives I explore in the subsequent chapters. Those narratives 
show how subjects (authorities) became implicated and invested in certain ideas. I shall 
further explain this as a manifestation of the attempt of the subject to positivise the 
constitutive ‘lack of being’ and recover the sense of unity. 
But theoretical affinities between Laclau and Lacan are not limited to their negative 
ontology. Both for Lacan and for Laclau the real and the discursive field have a positive 
dimension too. When developing the category of the real, Lacan introduces the concept of 
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jouissance, which is a reconceptualization of Freud’s idea of affect18 and psychic energy. 
For Lacan, jouissance is the positive modality of the real, “a paradoxical enjoyment that 
cannot be fully represented in meaning, […] but, nevertheless, does invest meaning and 
thus makes some sense” (Stavrakakis, 2007: 71). It is, for Lacan’s psychoanalysis, the pre-
symbolic real enjoyment, which was castrated when we entered the socio-symbolic system. 
Although it can be translated as ‘enjoyment’ most texts leave it in French to convey its 
excessive and traumatic character. Jouissance is not only about pleasure; rather it is 
pleasure in pain, or satisfaction in dissatisfaction (Žižek, 2006). More precisely, jouissance 
can be thought of as having two modalities: Fantasy, under the genre of pleasure; and 
symptom, under the genre of displeasure (Stavrakakis, 2007).  
Thus, one of the ways jouissance comes to be experienced and accounted for is through the 
concept of fantasy, which structures jouissance as satisfaction. This ‘positivisation’ of the 
real is necessary so that the social world retains its consistency and appeal (Stavrakakis, 
2007). Here another category resembles one of Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of the empty 
signifier: the object petit a, which embodies both the lack in the Other19, and the promise of 
its filling and the impossible encounter with jouissance (Stavrakakis, 2007). In other words, 
it is the unattainable object of desire, or the object-cause of desire. 
In a similar way, for Laclau and Mouffe, if dislocation is understood as “encounters with 
the Real” that disrupts the field of signification and thus threatens identities, it also 
represents the possibility for social and political (re-) creation through the articulation of 
elements or floating signifiers (Stavrakakis, 2007). As such, dislocations are at the same 
time negative and positive experiences. For Laclau, the positive aspect of this experience is 
realized through the category of the empty signifier and is an essential character of social 
and political life. As Stavrakakis (2007: 75-6) puts it, 
 
If our continuous experiences of dislocation reveal that the full closure of the Other is 
impossible, that the real is ultimately unrepresentable, that lack is an irreducible characteristic of 
socio-political reality, this does not mean that positivisation in terms of closure, fullness or full 
representation disappears from political discourse. Politics comprise all our attempts to fill this 
lack in the Other […] 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The concept can be interpreted as “the memory trace of the first experiences of pleasure and unpleasure, which constitute the germinal 
core of the mind” (Andrade, 2003). 
19 The other is our socio-symbolic reality, or what for Laclau is discourse. 
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Most importantly for this thesis are the ideas of jouissance and fantasy. As will be analysed 
in Chapter 5, the reactions of authorities to the situations of antagonism in the case of 
ProSavannah comprised narratives of ideals and obstacles (fantasy), whereby social actors 
became very implicated and invested. This, as will become clear, is directly related to the 
idea of de-politicization, as fantasies foreground the ideological dimension of discourse. 
Žižek (1990: 254) conceptualizes fantasy as: 
 
[…] an imaginary scenario the function of which is to provide a kind of positive support filling 
out the subject’s constitutive void. And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the social fantasy: 
it is a necessary counterpart to the concept of antagonism, a scenario filling out the voids of the 
social structure, masking its constitutive antagonism by the fullness of enjoyment (racist 
enjoyment, for example). 
 
It is important to note that jouissance is not directly experienced in fantasy. Rather, it is the 
promise of it that is experienced through the empty signifier, the object-cause of desire, or 
put simply, the expression of a desire for fullness (Stavrakakis, 2007), as already discussed.  
As for the second modality of jouissance as being experienced through symptoms, Freud 
had already suggested that displeasure and dissatisfaction can both procure a certain type of 
satisfaction (Stavrakakis, 2007). It is in the sense that the subject is attached to their 
symptom as a mode of jouissance. 
The socio-political relevance of this insight for my thesis lies in the fact that certain 
discourses, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, are clearly underpinned by fantasies which 
structure jouissance. The force of the political response against the opposing civil society in 
the case of ProSavanna, for example, is explained by the fantasy of the Green Revolution, 
which becomes the empty signifier for proponents of ProSavanna. However, in regards to 
the ARV factory, I could not detect elements of fantasy, whereby subjects are highly 
invested. Despite the presence of a neoliberal discourse with ideals of fiscal discipline, 
there was not the construction of antagonism or the establishment of an empty signifier that 
would represent the desire for fullness. This will be further discussed in Chapter 7.  
In the next section I intend to briefly sketch the framework that will operationalize the 
concepts and insights discussed so far in this chapter, and will critically explain the 
dynamics of de-politicization and re-politicization. 
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2.7. The Logics of Critical Explanation Approach 
In Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory, Glynos and Howarth 
(2007) propose an approach that seeks to critically explain the social practices and regimes 
and how they are transformed, maintained and stabilized by the collective actions of 
political subjects. At the same time, the approach tackles some of the main criticisms 
addressed at poststructuralist discourse theory particularly in relation to methodology and 
normativity. Critics say that discourse theory does “not reflect upon the questions of 
method and research strategy” (Torfing, 2005: 25). They also question discourse theory 
about its lack of critical function (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). These will be tackled as I 
sketch out the three logics of critical explanation: The social logics, the political logics and 
the fantasmatic logics. 
Building on Laclau’s understanding of the term ‘logic’, Glynos and Howarth (2007: 136) 
define it as “the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as the conditions which make the 
practice both possible and vulnerable”. In other words, logic comprises of a set of subject 
positions, objects and the system of relations and meanings connecting subjects and 
objects, as well as the conditions of possibility which enable their practices, and what 
makes them vulnerable (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). For Glynos and Howarth (2007), 
‘logics’ is the unity of analysis which draws not only on subjects’ self interpretations, but 
also on “something more” (p.15) that seeks to characterize and explain social and political 
phenomena. This “something more” is the “set of concepts and logics that necessarily 
transcends the particularity of context” (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 162). In this sense, the 
Logics framework allows for particularity and a degree of generalizability, as explained in 
the Methodology section of Chapter1. 
Briefly put, for Glynos and Howarth (2007) ‘social logics’ help characterize a practice or 
regime in terms of their dominant norms, that is, norms that make a practice seem natural 
and uncontested. For example, what norms characterize the logics of agribusiness and the 
logic of drug production being introduced in Mozambique? In the subsequent chapters I 
discuss the ‘logics of agribusiness x family farming’, and the ‘logics of drug production x 
recipient logic’: the subject position of Embrapa and Fiocruz and Mozambique’s Institute 
of Agrarian Investigation (IIAM) and the Ministry of Health, amongst others, norms that 
connect subjects and objects, such as ‘food security’, ‘independent production’, ‘integration 
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of small holders into large scale projects’ etc, as well as which conditions allowed for the 
destabilization/ contestation of both projects.  
The ‘political logic’ helps characterize processes that contest, challenge, defend or 
transform the dominant norms through the logics of equivalence and difference (Glynos et 
al, 2015). The importance of focusing on contestability is that it helps situate the normative 
aspect of the analysis. According to Glynos and Howarth (2007: 121), “the very 
identification of a social norm as worthy of public contestation presupposes some view of 
society and domination”. It also involves questioning what is being contested but should 
not, or what is not being contested but should be. Briefly put, in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 I 
make a normative commitment to the extent that I choose to criticize the agribusiness 
norms that were contested in the case of ProSavanna, while criticizing the contestation of 
norms that ideally should not have been contested in the case of the ARV factory. In this 
way, I address the criticism according to which poststructuralism lacks a normative 
commitment. As already noted, in this thesis I chose to criticize hegemonic norms. 
Finally, the fantasmatic logic draws on the Lacanian conception of the subject as 
fundamentally “lacking” and seeks to explain the imaginary constructs subjects rely on to 
mediate their relation to reality. This will be essential to explain the grip of Embrapa’s 
modernization narrative in the case of ProSavannah. 
Apart from relying on the main ontological assumptions and concepts of discourse theory 
discussed in this chapter, Glynos and Howarth (2007) make further ontological 
commitments in order to support their framework. They separate, for analytical purposes, 
social relations into four dimensions, namely the political and social dimensions, and the 
ideological and ethical dimensions. For the purposes of this thesis, when analysing social, 
political and fantasmatic logics, I will seek to characterize it in relation to their ideological 
or ethical dimension. The social logics of agricultural production advocated and practiced 
by Embrapa, for example, is strongly characterized as ‘ideological’ as it prevents any 
alternative norm of agricultural production from arising. In fact, this is precisely what 
Laclau conceived as ideological: the denial of radical contingency, which to this thesis is 
related to the idea of de-politicization. On the other hand, the social dimension of 
agricultural production promoted by those who opposed ProSavannah already 
acknowledges the radical contingency of social relations by presenting themselves as an 
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alternative to the hegemonic norms of agriculture. In this sense, they can be characterized 
as ‘ethical’. 
Likewise, the political dimension of a practice is ideological to the extent that it pre-empts 
the contestation of norms by applying the logic of difference, or more specifically, 
neutralizing it in a transformist way (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). The concept of 
‘transformism’ as discussed by Gramsci (1971, 58-9) involves the absorption or co-optation 
of “the active elements produced by allied groups – and even those which came from 
antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile”. The discourse articulated by 
Embrapa on agricultural production incorporates small-farming as part of a greater 
agricultural plan whereby both big and small producers reconcile their interests. On the 
other hand, the political dimension of a social practice can be ‘ethical’ if it constructs 
chains of equivalence in order to oppose an antagonistic camp and expose the contingency 
of discourse. Drawing from the ARV project, the way the Brazilian government, Fiocruz 
and the Ministry of Health responded to the dislocation promoted by Mozambique’s 
attempt to privatize the factory was to challenge the norms that underlined Mozambique’s 
discourse, while at the same time trying to reach compromise. As such, the Brazilian 
government articulated signifiers that sought to challenge the Mozambican Ministry of 
Health economistic arguments thus exposing their taken-for-granted status. At the same 
time, however, it reinforced its identity as a SSC partner by accepting Mozambique’s 
choices and political decisions. In both political responses I argue that the ethical dimension 
of social relations were brought to the fore. 
Social practices are then understood, according to the framework proposed, in terms of 
which dimension of social relations is being foregrounded or backgrounded – this helps 
describe, explain and criticise the socio-political world. What is more, it provides a 
grammar to explain the dynamics of re-politicization and de-politicization of social 
practices in the case of the projects I analyse in the context of SSC. 
To briefly conclude, this framework will help explain and understand what the practices of 
agricultural and drug production are, how they were challenged or defended, and why they 
were maintained or transformed. Of course the three logics proposed are intertwined and 
work concomitantly. However, for heuristic purposes, they are treated separately.  
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Chapter 3: A Genealogy of Brazilian South-South Cooperation 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Perhaps one of the most explored aspects in the literature that explores the difference 
between Brazilian SSC and traditional aid is the gap between the official discourse and the 
practices in the field (Gray and Gills, 2016; Cesarino, 2013; Nogueira and Ollinaho, 2013). 
Frequently, the assumption is that the official narrative is what SSC is supposed to be 
versus what it really is in practice. As such, principles such as non-interference, solidarity, 
demand-driven, mutual gains, and horizontality are contrasted with practices on the ground. 
However, and for the purposes of this thesis, in order to understand whether SSC re-
politicizes development, it is important to understand more thoroughly the official 
discourse, rather than taking it for granted. 
This chapter aims to contribute to this discussion by outlining a historical genealogy of 
SSC, particularly focusing on Brazil. To write a genealogy, or the “history of the present”, 
as Foucault (1979) famously put it, is to understand its present structure based on its 
historical transformations. This is not to say that the past repeats itself; rather, it is to 
recognize that “the present is played out, and innovates, utilizing the legacy of the past” 
(Castel, 1994: 238). In this sense, the historical genealogy of SSC aims to understand the 
discourses the Brazilian government drew upon in order to construct SSC as a foreign 
policy strategy. This will allow me to, first, problematize the category’s taken-for-
grantedness and show the drivers, interests and balance of forces behind this discursive 
construction. Second, it will expose the contingency of this construction, or, in other words, 
the political construction of categories thus showing the play of power/knowledge behind 
it. For example, by constructing an identity that would allow Brazil to act as a neutral 
bridge between North and South, the official discourse underplays Brazil’s conflicting 
interests and articulates the discourse around SSC as an empty signifier. 
I will focus on the discursive construction of SSC in two previous periods of Brazil’s 
history before Lula da Silva: during Jânio Quadros and João Goulart’s civil government in 
1961, and Ernesto Geisel’s military government in 1974. Finally I will focus on SSC under 
Lula da Silva’s government, and will ask the question: Does SSC represent the re-
politicization of development in comparison with the Northern development? In discourse 
theory terms, has the PT government constructed SSC as part of a political logic that sought 
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to contest Northern aid principles and bring to the fore their political dimension? Some 
authors have claimed that the new SSC strategy adopted in the 2000s was the 
materialization of the Workers’ Party left-wing politics (Hurrell, 2008; 2010; Almeida, 
2004; Rohter, 2010). If this is the case, was there a discursive rupture between Geisel’s 
right-wing military government and Lula’s centre-left government in relation to SSC? 
Moreover, if Lula’s foreign policy represented PT’s left-wing politics, was there a rupture 
between what many referred to as Lula’s conciliatory agenda at the domestic level and 
SSC? 
I argue that throughout the three periods discussed in this chapter, Brazil has drawn on 
several common discursive elements to construct SSC. Central to this discursive 
construction has been the articulation of Brazil’s conflicting identities as an emerging 
power and as a third-world country around SSC as an empty signifier. These identities have 
been reconciled into the identity of Brazil as a ‘neutral’ mediator, whose interests represent 
both the North and the South. In relation to Lusophone Africa, Brazil’s identity was 
underpinned by the culturalist discourse according to which Brazil and Africa are united by 
a common culture, biology, and historical heritage. Through this discourse, Brazil 
constructed its identity as the harmonious product of European, African and indigenous 
population, constituting what Gilberto Freyre (1933) referred to as ‘racial democracy’. This 
has allowed Brazil to claim its special relationship with Africa based on its ‘Africanness’ 
while at the same time preserving its identification with the West.  
Perhaps the greatest change between the two previous periods and the PT’s government 
was the re-politicization of Brazil-Africa relations by asserting that, rather than a fixed and 
harmonious African essence, “Brazilian society was built on the work, the sweat and the 
blood of Africans”, in the words of Lula (Harsch, 2004). In this sense, by demystifying 
Brazil’s harmonious colonization, this discourse brings to the fore its political dimension 
and exposes how the idea of a ‘racial democracy’ was politically constructed. In the 2000s, 
cooperation was no longer only about solidarity, but also about repaying Brazil’s debt 
towards Africa. On the other hand, despite the re-politicization of the culturalist discourse, I 
suggest that the official discourse found a way of reconciling Brazil’s self-interest as an 
emerging country and a country from the South, again articulating these demands around 
SSC. This resonates with the transformism (Gramsci, 1971) that characterized Lula’s 
conciliatory domestic agenda and governing style, which Singer (2009) described as a 
	   70	  
mixture of right-wing and left-wing ideologies. In this sense, SSC was an extension of 
Brazil’s domestic politics of class compromise.  
With the transition from Lula to Dilma Rousseff, his successor, SSC lost its steam partly 
due to Rousseff’s lack of interest in foreign policy, partly due to the economic crisis that hit 
Brazil. From 2011 to 2016 Rousseff’s discourse in relation to SSC sought to promote a 
more pragmatic view of the relations between Brazil and Africa. However, the main 
principles of SSC remained the same, and despite a change in emphasis, I suggest that the 
discourse articulated by Rousseff had little impact on the way my interviewees promoted 
SSC.  
In sum, by investigating the discourses that constitute SSC, their continuities and changes, I 
conclude that rather than solely representing a political logic of contestation, SSC also 
articulates interests that legitimize cooperation between the North and the South, or NSC. 
After all, Brazil remains perfectly positioned to have relations with both the North and the 
South.  
The chapter is structured as follows. After this introduction, the first section aims to outline 
a brief genealogy of SSC as an international movement and Brazil’s position within it. The 
second section will explore more carefully Brazil’s adoption of SSC for the first time from 
1961 to 1964, during the Quadros’s and Goulart’s government; for the second time between 
1974 and 1979, during Geisel’s military government; and finally for the third time between 
2003 and 2016, during the Workers’ Party government. Another subsection will explore 
SSC during Rousseff’s term.  
 
3.2. SSC as a political logic of contestation and Brazil ’s position in it .  
To tell the history of SSC is to trace it back to the birth of the ‘international development 
project’ launched by Truman’s Point Four Programme in the aftermath of WWII. 
Reinvigorated by the success of the Marshall Plan, ‘development’ in the Cold War context 
was a means to foster progress and strengthen “freedom-loving nations” against 
communism, and to spread liberal political and economic values and norms as a 
fundamental part of US capitalist expansion and hegemonic project (Williams, 2012; 
Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990).  
As such, ‘development’ constituted a strategy, or a whole new way of dealing with the 
newly independent countries which came to be known as ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘third-world’ 
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countries (Escobar, 1995). Consequently, a new discourse was produced that justified, 
legitimized and constructed new relations between the developed countries as providers of 
development, and the underdeveloped ones as their recipients. In this sense, within the 
international development discourse, the self-representation of industrialized countries as 
those who can transfer “[…] the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
[…] for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman, 1949) was 
simultaneous to the “making of the Third World” (Escobar, 1995). The discursive 
construction of the Third World was established by a series of juxtapositions whereby one 
element is valued over its opposite (Derrida, 1976 in Hansen, 2006). In opposition to the 
developed world, then, the Third World was represented as ‘backwards’, ‘child-like’, 
‘lacking’, ‘lazy’ among other constructions which dated back to the anthropological studies 
of the 1920s and 1930s (Doty, 1996).  
While this representation of the Third World, thoroughly explored by the post-development 
critique (notably by Ferguson, 1994 and Escobar, 1995), legitimized the international 
development project in the context of the ideological battle of the Cold War, it also served 
to confer symbolic unity to countries that shared a colonial past but were quite 
heterogeneous. Through a process of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), this unity 
was centred on the articulation of various demands that were brought to the Asia-Africa 
Bandung Conference in 1955, widely known as the birth of the SSC as a global political 
movement. Instead of aligning with the West or East, the SSC discourse framed the world 
in terms of North and South. In this context, the aim of SSC was to challenge the Northern 
political and economic system, ‘the Other’ that prevented the South from achieving its 
fullness. As such, it opposed colonialism by articulating economic and cultural cooperation 
among third world countries, as well as human rights and world peace (Alden et al, 2010; 
Gray and Gills, 2016). Central to the discursive construction of SSC was the challenge to 
the vertical relations between the West and their colonies or the newly independent countries.  
If in the beginning SSC sought to contest the dominant norms of the international development 
project with time it became less clear whether the South could exercise any agency. Despite its 
political significance expressed through the “manifestation of the struggles against exploitation 
and domination”, (Ampiah, 2007: 209-212), the defiance expressed by the participating 
countries did not translate into alternative ideas for the economic development of the newly 
independent countries. Bandung and the participating countries embraced the World Bank’s 
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programme for economic development, and encouraged cooperation with international 
agencies and countries outside the Southern axis (Ampiah, 2007). According to Ampiah (2007: 
209), “the attractiveness of the Western development models made it impossible for these 
countries to disengage themselves from their former colonial masters”. Furthermore, as 
Cesarino (2013) rightly notes, the rapprochement between newly independent nation-states and 
other developing countries unfolded under the auspices of a multilateral system of governance 
which was far from neutral. This was evident in the US-dominated IFIs and the structure of the 
UNSC. 
Yet, the ‘Bandung Spirit’ persisted, and its principles based on South-South solidarity came to 
set the foundations for the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) established in 1961. These 
principles, which Vieira (2012) encapsulates under the notion of ‘distributive justice’, included 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality of nations and peoples, non-
interference, promotion of mutual interests and cooperation, among others. ‘Distributive 
justice’ would represent, in sum, “the expansion of international political representation, social 
equality and economic opportunity to include nations traditionally at the margins of global 
governance mechanisms” (Vieira, 2012: 323). Clearly, all these demands articulated in a chain 
of equivalence were simultaneously constructed, or juxtaposed, through a process of difference 
in relation to elements linked to the identity of the North: self-interest, verticality, interference, 
inequality and so on. In this political battle, SSC became sedimented as the empty signifier 
representing the fullness of the South against the negative pole represented by the North. 
Cesarino (2015) notes that Brazil’s position in relation to Bandung and the NAM reflected the 
country’s ambivalent approach in relation to the rest of the third-world countries. Cesarino 
(2015) says that historically Brazil has most often situated itself within ‘the orbit of the West’, 
including during the Cold War. Indeed, Brazil sided with the US by signing mutual security 
agreements against communism (Soares Leite, 2011), which stopped it from officially joining 
the NAM, other than just as an observer. Furthermore, it was reluctant in playing an assertive 
role in relation to some demands by the Third World, such as economic reforms and 
Portuguese Africa’s decolonization. In fact, Brazil’s relations with the South were never free 
from ambivalences. For example, Hurrell (2013) notes that Brazil’s support for the Third 
World was far from unqualified. Spektor (2004) also notes that even though Brazil adhered to 
the terceiromundista view of the international order, it never adopted a confrontational stance.  
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But in the period between the end of the 1950s until the military coup in 1964, and in the mid 
1970s, Brazil did in fact place greater emphasis on the North-South dialogue rather than on the 
East-West conflict, a phase which characterized the ‘independent foreign policy’ and the 
‘responsible pragmatism’ (Pinheiro, 2004). As an example, Brazil played a protagonistic role in 
relation to trade within the UNCTAD, and was a fierce advocate for the idea of the 
‘developmental state’ in the Group of 77 countries, the G77 (Abdenur, 2014). While Bandung 
and the NAM expressed the political dimensions of SSC, the G77 present at the establishment 
of the new United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) later in the 
1970s demanded the establishment of what seemed to be a real alternative to the status quo, the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Gray and Gills, 2016).  
The arguments promoted by the NIEO were associated with dependency theory, initially 
developed by Latin American economists (Alden et al, 2010). Essentially, dependency theory 
argued that underdevelopment and development were two sides of the same coin. In other 
words, the unequal and exploitative relationships within the global capitalist system between 
the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’ were responsible for the underdevelopment of the Third World 
and the development of the industrialized countries (Gunder Frank, 1966). Within this 
rationale, Prebisch’s argument about the gap between the price of raw material and that of 
manufacturing goods (Hellinger, 2015) informed the NIEO attempt to challenge the unequal 
exchange in trade between the developing and developed world, emphasizing also the 
“sovereignty over natural resources and the right [of governments] to nationalize key 
industries” (Gray and Gills, 2016: 558). The NIEO also demanded the transfer of technology at 
lower costs from the centre to the periphery (Amin, 1982), but ultimately aimed to promote 
cooperation among developing countries based on the notion of ‘collective self-reliance’, which 
implied: 
 
(1) the severance of existing links of dependence operated through the international system by the 
dominant countries, (2) full mobilisation of domestic capabilities and resources, (3) the strengthening 
of collaboration with other underdeveloped countries and (4) the re-orientation of development 
efforts in order to meet the social needs of people in underdeveloped countries (Alden et al, 2010: 
161). 
 
Inspired by both the collective self-reliance doctrine and by the main tenets of dependency 
theory, the idea of forming regional groupings with central government planning gained 
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strength. Within the UN, dependency ideas became mainstream policy thinking both at 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) and at CEPAL, Spanish 
and Portuguese acronym for the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Alden et al, 2010).  
During the period which saw Brazil identify with the issues of the Third World, the country 
played a salient role at the G77, UNCTAD and CEPAL (Abdenur, 2014). As a ‘normative 
agent’, Brazil defended the idea of a ‘collective economic security’, which called for the reform 
of international trade, as well as the above-mentioned defence of the developmental state and 
its strong role in planning economic development (Abdenur, 2014: 1880). Within CEPAL, 
Brazilian social scientists, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Celso Furtado and Anibal 
Pinto were a fundamental part of the commission’s body of researchers who helped to 
formulate dependency theory (Abdenur, 2014).  
Another important landmark in the history of SSC was the 1978 Global South Conference on 
Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC), held in Argentina (Esteves and 
Assunção, 2014). The Conference adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), which 
reinforced principles from the Bandung Conference (Esteves and Assunção, 2014) and the 
NIEO. Moreover, for the first time SSC was linked with concept of ‘horizontal cooperation’, a 
defining characteristic juxtaposed to the verticality of the North-South cooperation (Esteves and 
Assunção, 2014). Held in Latin America, this conference had special purchase in Brazil not 
only because of its geographical proximity, but also because it was fully codified by the UN 
development framework (Cesarino, 2014). As a medium power, Brazil had always emphasized 
the importance of multilateral fora as a way for great powers and developing states alike to play 
by the rules of multilateralism. Thus, despite its oppositional stance, the character of SSC, at 
least to Brazil, would also be shaped by international organizations in accordance with their 
rules and regulations. 
The phase of self-reliance and political strengthening ended with the third-world debt crisis in 
the 1980s, including in Brazil. The room for manoeuvre within the context of superpower 
competition was restricted, the West had rejected the demand for an NIEO (Amin, 1982), and 
the debt crisis worsened the conditions for the implementation of SSC strategies. In this 
context, from the 1980s onwards, the role Southern countries played in the development field 
was mostly as recipients of aid from the North, and the revisionist impetus inherited from 
Bandung lost strength (Esteves and Assunção, 2014). Institutionally, the retreat of third-world 
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solidarity became evident in the 1992 UNCTAD summit in Cartagena, when UNCTAD 
abandoned its confrontational stance in relation to the adjustment of the international patent 
system to the needs of the South and expressed its belief in the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (the GATT) system of Intellectual Property (Gray and Gills, 2016).  
This second phase in the history of SSC is referred to as ‘demobilization’ (Morais de Sá e Silva 
2009). It was marked by the neoliberal counter-revolution in development, which resulted in 
developing countries implementing structural reform adjustments assigned by the IMF and the 
World Bank. The prevailing arguments in favour of free-market gained strength with the 
demise of the Soviet Union, which exposed the failure of state-led development and 
strengthened the legitimacy of Western liberal values (Williams, 2012).  
Throughout the history of SSC, the re-politicization of development through principles that 
sought to promote a different – or counter-hegemonic – model and a fairer international order 
did not translate into any long-lasting policy. However, these principles persisted and were 
revived in the discursive construction of SSC in the 2000s. Despite differences across the 
various emerging states, SSC became again an empty signifier which recovered and articulated 
common principles and ideas such as “economic independence”, “self-reliance”, “solidarity”, 
based on the “historic and political context of developing countries” (UNCTAD, 2010 cited in 
Cesarino, 2013).  
To conclude, this section tried to outline the history of SSC. It has presented SSC as a political 
movement which sought to articulate common demands from the Third World in a logic of 
contestation towards principles of Northern aid. More than political principles, SSC was also 
linked with the NIEO, which sought to employ a political logic of contestation in relation to 
hegemonic economic policies implemented by the North. But the space for mobilization and 
contestation was very limited, and SSC lost steam all over the world. 
Brazil’s ambivalent position in relation to SSC can be understood in relation to how it 
constructed its identities, alongside that of Africa and the North. In the next section I 
explore the main discourses Brazil has drawn upon to constitute SSC as a foreign policy 
strategy in three different periods of its history, including in the 2000s. My focus is on 
Brazil’s relations with African countries, particularly Lusophone Africa. 
 
3.3. SSC as a foreign policy strategy in three periods 
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Brazil adopted SSC as a foreign policy strategy in two previous periods before the 2000s. 
The first period was between 1961 and 1964, in the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart 
(henceforth Quadros-Goulart) civil government, and the second period, between 1974 and 
1979, in the Geisel government under the military dictatorship. These two periods were 
underpinned by what the Brazilian foreign policy literature calls the ‘globalist paradigm’, 
that is, the idea that the diversification of Brazil’s relations, and consequently the 
strengthening of relations with the South through SSC, represented Brazil’s interests in 
promoting domestic development. The focus on the periods when SSC was effectively 
adopted does not mean neglecting the other periods that were also important for the 
construction of SSC. In fact, the construction of SSC as a foreign policy strategy draws 
upon discourses articulated and re-articulated in previous periods when SSC was not 
adopted, as will be clear in the case of the culturalist discourse, for example. 
Until Quadros-Goulart’s government, foreign policy had relied on the ‘pan-americanist’ 
idea of solidarity towards the American continent, introduced in the beginning of the XIX 
century by the father of Brazilian diplomacy, the Baron of Rio Branco (Ricúpero, 1995). 
Pan-americanism was part of the so-called ‘americanist paradigm’, which sought a close 
and unconditional alignment with the US based on Brazil’s perception that both politically 
and economically Brazil’s interests lay in a close alliance with the great power (Pinheiro, 
2004; Gomes Saraiva e Valença, 2012).  
Despite their differences, both paradigms had as their primary objective to promote Brazil’s 
domestic development and its consequent economic and political autonomy, allowing the 
country to play a more prominent role within the international arena. In this sense, they 
both framed Brazil’s identity as a future Great Power, albeit with different emphasis. But to 
globalists, an unconditional alignment with the US restricted Brazil’s international relations 
and deepened its economic dependency on the USA.  
 
3.3.1. The Independent Foreign Policy: 1961-1964 
In 1961, with the election of Jânio Quadros and his vice-president João Goulart, Brazil 
adopted the new globalist paradigm, which underpinned the so-called ‘independent foreign 
policy’. The consensus supporting the globalist paradigm was not new; it had been growing 
since the 1930s among the middle classes, business people and workers’ associations 
(Soares Leite, 2011). It was national-developmentalism, which had become hegemonic in 
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large parts of Latin America and shaped Brazil’s industrialization process since the 1930s 
and helped provide the arguments and support for SSC and the independent foreign policy 
(Pinheiros, 1994).  
Highly influenced by Keynes’s ideas about the state, developmentalism believed a state-led 
industrialization was the best way to overcome poverty and underdevelopment, 
consequently promoting the modernization of the economy and its independence in relation 
to countries from the North, particularly the US (Pereira, 2011; Cervo, 2003). 
Developmentalism was also a response against the protectionism adopted by the 
industrialized countries in the aftermath of the Great Depression and a possible solution for 
the long-term negative impacts on the trade balance of developing countries as a result of 
free-trade espoused by liberalism  (Pereira, 2011). The ‘developmentalist frame of mind’ 
(Bielschowsky, 1995) also coincided with the domestic collapse of the economy based on 
coffee exports and the consequent loss of power by the coffee oligarchies. 
Importantly, developmentalism drew heavily on the structuralist dependency theory 
espoused by Cepal, which saw the unequal power relations underlying the world economic 
system as the roots of underdevelopment. Economists like Celso Furtado and Prebisch also 
provided strong arguments for industrialization as a way to overcome the unequal relations 
that contributed to underdevelopment (Bielschowsky, 1995).  
In Brazil, these ideas translated into the ‘import substitution industrialization’ (ISI) for the 
promotion, initially, of the basic industry through licensing, subsidies, and protection from 
import competition (Harriss, 2014: 40). The developmentalist model carried out in Brazil 
was centred on the idea of nationalism (Bresser Pereira, 2006). That is to say, development 
depended on the strengthening and mobilization of a ‘national awareness’ that would unite 
all classes around a project of development (Pinheiro, 1994). More importantly, this 
development project, its policies and institutions would have to be designed by a national 
strategy, and not by a model imported from abroad (Bresser Pereira, 2006), an idea in line 
with the principle of self-reliance advocated later by the NIEO. 
Thus, based on its own development model, and with the support of the society as well as 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the understanding was that Brazilian foreign policy 
should work as a tool to help promote industrialization by incorporating economic 
diplomacy in its strategy, promoting economic cooperation with other countries (Cervo, 
2003). Since the Brazilian economy had become more diversified, particularly after 
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President Kubitschek’s fast-paced process of industrialization from 1956 to 1961, it was 
necessary, as the argument goes, to find more export markets for Brazil’s new 
manufacturing products (Pinheiro, 1994). In this context, the official discourse managed to 
articulate Brazil’s main interests in a chain of equivalence with SSC and obtain enough 
support around the foreign policy strategy.  
According to Ricúpero (1995), in diversifying Brazil’s relations and promoting its 
economic development, the goal of the ‘independent foreign policy’ was to forge a more 
prominent role for Brazil in the international decision-making arena, particularly at the UN. 
This was a long-standing idea amongst the Brazilian elites, who believed that Brazil, 
because of its continental size, population and GDP was destined to play a greater role 
internationally (Lafer, 2009; Soares de Lima, 2004). 
In this sense, Brazil’s SSC strategy drew both on long-standing discourses that saw Brazil 
as deserving to play a greater role within the international order, and on discourses that 
situated Brazil within the Third World. The very idea underpinning developmentalism, 
according to which underdevelopment and development were two sides of the same coin, 
meant Brazil was critical of the international order and identified itself with issues of the 
Third World, which was called terceiromundismo by critics within and outside the MRE. 
Important principles advocated by developmentalism such as nationalism, self-reliance, and 
independence converged with the principles promoted by the Bandung Conference, and 
later with the UNCTAD’s NIEO. As noted earlier, these were times when Brazil occupied a 
prominent role in the G77 and within the Cepal. Addressing the Parliament in 1961, the 
new minister of foreign affairs Afonso Arinos made his criticism of the world order and 
Brazil’s identification with the South explicit: 
 
We are part of the Southern hemisphere, which I insist, represents a more sensible division than 
the celebrated East-West division. To me, the world is divided into North and South; the North 
detains the technological advances, the capital, all economic and industrial development; while 
the South is abandoned, forgotten, in poverty and until very recently, had slavery (Costa Franco 
(org.), 2007: 138). 
 
In the extract above, the elements linked with the North (‘technological advances’, 
‘capital’, etc) and with the South (‘abandoned’, ‘forgotten’ etc) vary, but this variation 
follows a logic, which ends up constructing the identity of the North and the South. 
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Underlying this logic is the binary opposition of the ‘privileged North’ vs the ‘neglected 
South’. Rather than constructing the identity of the North and the South according to the 
reason/passion binary opposition which has historically structured the discourse of 
colonization and interference (see Said, 1978, and Doty, 1996), this discursive construction 
places responsibility for the South’s underdevelopment on the North. Brazil, in this case, 
positions itself within the category of the South, not as passionate, irrational etc, but as a 
South that has been neglected by the North. 
However, at the same time, Brazil sought to identify itself with the West, or “the Christian-
democrat world” reinforcing one of its own identities, its relations and interests with the 
Western great powers. This identification with both worlds was articulated through the idea 
of Brazil as a ‘bridge’ or a ‘link’ between the North and the South. This was clear in 
another extract from Arinos’s same inaugural speech in 1961: 
 
Our contribution to the Christian-democrat world, to which we undoubtedly belong, will only be 
effective if we […] take on the responsibility to express aspirations and demands [of the 
South][…]. Brazil is in an especially favourable position to be the bond or the link between the 
Afro-Asian world and the Western great powers (Costa Franco, 2007 in Soares Leite, 2011). 
 
Soares de Lima (2005) discusses Brazil’s identities during the ‘independent foreign policy’ 
period and beyond. She draws on Keohane’s (1969) concept of ‘system-affecting-state’ to 
explain how Brazil had reconciled the identities of a third-world country that fights for an 
equal order, and that of an emerging state, who deserves to play a greater role in this order. 
Soares de Lima (2005) argues that while SSC was a space whereby Brazil enacted and 
reinforced its third-world identity; its relations and identification with the West were 
important components of Brazil’s quest for recognition. In fact, during Quadros’s 
government, the adoption of macroeconomic policies to stabilize the economy were crucial 
for the renegotiation of Brazil’s debt with the US, and for the signing of a loan agreement 
with the IMF and Western Europe, among other deals with the West (Soares Leite, 2011).  
In this sense, Brazil’s identity was neither constructed exclusively around demands of the 
Third World, nor only around its perceived proximity with the West. More than that, Brazil 
positioned itself between the underdeveloped and the developed worlds as a bridge. In this 
context, Africa represented an ideal opposite pole in relation to the developed world not 
only because of its indisputable ‘underdevelopment’ which united it with Brazil through 
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common demands, but also because of its cultural, historical and biological commonalities 
both Brazil and particularly Lusophone Africa supposedly shared. This was articulated 
through the ‘culturalist discourse’, as will be discussed.  
Throughout the ‘independent foreign policy’ period Brazil sought to enact its SSC agenda 
underpinned by principles such as the defence of international law, self-determination, non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, disarmament, peaceful coexistence, 
the support for the end of colonization based on solidarity and equality of all races and 
nations, an autonomous formulation of national development plans and the need to fight 
poverty (Vizentini, 1999; Saraiva, 1993). All these demands were articulated around the 
SSC signifier. 
Particularly in relation to Africa, SSC meant stronger commercial, cultural and political 
relations. Brazil showed support for the independence of Algeria and attended the 
celebrations of independence of states such as Senegal and Sierra Leone (Soares Leite, 
2011). Africa also became more important within the MRE, with a special division and 
team allocated to deal exclusively with the continent. New diplomatic representations were 
opened in countries such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Angola, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Rodesia and Congo (Soares Leite, 2011). Commercial missions and 
maritime routes were inaugurated between Africa and Brazil, and African students received 
Brazilian grants to study in Brazil. The implementation of a SSC front was also expressed 
through trade agreements focused on commodities as a way to protect the countries’ infant 
industries (Soares Leite, 2011). 
But the relationship between Brazil and African countries was not free from ambivalences. 
This was particularly evident in two interrelated aspects of their relationship: First, Brazil’s 
position vis-à-vis the independence of Portuguese colonies in Africa, and second, the 
culturalist discourse which legitimized and constructed Brazil’s relationship with its 
“African brothers” (Arinos, 1961 in Costa Franco (org.) 2007).  
While initially Quadros strongly condemned colonialism and tried to distance its 
government from Portugal, he later backed away from his position by succumbing to 
Portuguese pressure. This meant Brazil abstained from the most important UN resolutions 
condemning Portuguese colonialism (Dávila, 2010) in a time when decolonization was 
becoming the norm. According to Dávila (2010) Brazil’s position towards Portuguese 
Africa was shaped by three factors: the influence of the Portuguese community in Brazil, 
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the effectiveness of Portugal’s diplomatic corps, which succeeded in stopping the 
opposition from Brazil, and last but not least, Gilberto Freyre’s interpretation of Brazil as a 
‘racial democracy’, a legacy of the Portuguese. The latter was at the core of what the 
literature calls the ‘culturalist discourse’ (Saraiva, 1993; 1995). 
As one of the most important Brazilian intellectuals in the mid XIX century Freyre’s 
influence in shaping Brazil’s national identity and its foreign policy towards Africa and 
Portugal cannot be overestimated. In his masterpiece The Masters and the Slaves (1933 in 
Dávila, 2010) Freyre sought to portray Brazilian society as the harmonious mixture of 
Portuguese and African peoples, resulting in a ‘racial democracy’ unlike that of the US or 
other British colonies where racism prevailed (Dávila, 2010). According to Freyre (1933, in 
Dávila, 2010), Brazil was the result of a mixture of cultures because of the Portuguese 
natural tendency to mingle not only with Africans but also with indigenous populations, 
absorbing their customs. This is what Freyre coined as ‘lusotropicalism’, which 
characterized Portugal’s special way of colonizing. As a result, “all Brazilians, even the fair 
skinned and blonde ones, bear in their soul if not in their body the shadow or at least the 
hint of indigenous or black […]” (Freyre, 1933 in Dávila, 2010: 14). 
Freyre’s romanticized ideas (Saraiva, 1993) were soon incorporated by Brazilians who 
supported Portugal in its efforts to create “future Brazils” in Africa. Furthermore, the 
military dictatorship under Salazar in Portugal hired Freyre to defend Portuguese 
colonialism in the 1960s and beginning of 1970s, sending him on trips to Portugal’s 
colonies in Africa and Asia, with subsequent declarations to local press and books written 
in favour of lusotropicalism (Dávila, 2010). 
Paradoxically, however, while Freyre’s rationale provided the arguments for those 
defending Portuguese colonialism, it also provided the discourse through which Brazilians 
who opposed Portuguese colonialism saw Africans and themselves (Dávila, 2010). Freyre’s 
main discursive constructions came to constitute the ‘culturalist discourse’ which 
underpinned Brazil’s relations with Africa from 1961 until the 2000s, albeit with some 
important changes. The uncritical culturalist discourse, as Saraiva (1993) puts it, 
emphasized shared cultural and racial identities, shared historical experience as former 
colonies, and common structural problems. Its uncritical character lay in the fact that, as 
Saraiva (1993) argued, it misleadingly represented Brazil as “the major African nation 
outside of Africa” where racial equality was “almost perfect” (Saraiva, 1993: 225). The 
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‘myth’ of a racial democracy, as was later referred to by several critical scholars, was 
strengthened by the silence of intellectuals and diplomats, and in fact of the elites, in 
relation to the legacy of slavery in Brazil.  
Freyre’s hegemonic discourse managed to suture, or fix, the identity of Brazil as an 
uncomplicated construction of harmonious elements, which was the result of a conflict-free 
colonization. Brazil’s identity was just the natural result of the encounter between the 
Portuguese, the African and the indigenous. This is a clear example of what Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) discussed as ‘ideological’, and what I defined as de-politicization in this 
thesis. The role of ideology is to background the radical contingency of discourse, masking 
its political construction and the play of power and knowledge. In this sense, it is quite 
telling that Freyre had insisted that his books were not part of a political project in defence 
of Portuguese colonialism (Dávila, 2010). He sought to portray himself as an objective 
observer, and claimed: “I don’t look at the question [of Portuguese colonisation] from a 
political standpoint, but from a sociological standpoint” (Dávila, 2010: 109).  
In 1964, in a very politically divided domestic context, in which Goulart20 tried to 
implement social and economic reforms against the will of the elites, the independent 
foreign policy and its SSC strategy also began to lose support. Opposition from 
americanists within and outside the MRE mounted, especially given the suspicion that 
Brazil was using SSC as a way to strengthen links with the USSR (Soares Leite, 2011). In 
practice, the independent foreign policy had meant a closer proximity not only with 
countries from the Global South but also from the socialist bloc. Apart from seeing an 
economic opportunity in the socialist states as export markets for Brazil’s products, 
politically Brazil’s position was to respect their sovereignty. Consequently, Brazil refused 
to vote for a resolution that would see Cuba expelled from the Organization of the 
American States (OAS), and vowed to respect its sovereignty against American pressure 
(Vizentini, 1999). This had raised suspicions from the US government, who, in 1964 
supported the ‘anti-communist’ military coup d’état against Goulart (Vizentini, 1999; 
Soares de Lima, 2005). 
In sum, I suggest that the articulation of SSC during the independent foreign policy period 
did not exclusively characterize a political logic of contestation around demands from the 
Third World, and thus a re-politicization of development. While SSC was indeed a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Goulart had taken office after Quadros’s resignation in 1961, but the political system was transformed into a Parliamentary system to 
try to limit Goulart’s powers and left-wing agenda. In 1963, though, he became the full president as presidentialism was resumed.	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discursive space for Brazil as a third-world country to enact its identity and articulate 
demands, it was also a source of identity for Brazil as a future great power. And while these 
two identities seemed to be irreconcilable in the sense that they had conflicting interests – 
one draws on discourses which articulate demands that oppose the unequal international 
order; the other draws on a discourse which sees Brazil playing a greater role within this 
same order – Brazil managed to construct an all-encompassing identity that intended to 
reconcile both identities. SSC became, then, linked with demands from Brazil as a country 
that belongs to the South as well as to the West/North. In other words, SSC was an empty 
signifier which linked demands from the South in a logic of equivalence, but at the same 
time sought to absorb these demands in a logic of transformism, by reconciling them with 
supposedly conflicting interests. The main discourse which constructed Brazil’s identity as 
a mix between a third worl country and a Western country was the culturalist discourse. 
This was highly ideological in the sense that it hid the contingency of social relations, 
masking the political construction of Brazil’s identity, as if it had been the result or a 
natural product of a benevolent colonization.  
As an empty signifier, thus, SSC was about establishing relations with the North too to the 
extent that articulating Southern countries’ demands around SSC would promote a better, 
or more fruitful, relationship with the North (Soares de Lima and Moura, 1982).  
 
3.3.2. Responsible Pragmatism: 1974-1979 
Before discussing the ‘responsible pragmatism’ of the Geisel government, it is important to 
return briefly to the period between the coup d’état and Geisel’s government. The 1964 
military ‘anti-communist’ coup d’état recovered the Americanist paradigm even as the 
developmentalist model and the ISI were still the main development strategies (Pinheiro, 
1994). During this period, Brazil’s relations with Africa were more focused on apartheid 
South Africa and subordinated to Portugal’s refusal to recognize the independence of its 
colonies (Saraiva, 1993). As an anti-communist government, its foreign policy focused 
mostly on security rather than development – even if rhetorically the main concern was still 
development. Although the end of the 1960s saw the growth of a globalist and 
terceiromundista trend again within the MRE and the acknowledgement that an alignment 
with the US was not producing the benefits expected, the americanist paradigm prevailed 
until the beginning of the 1970s (Pinheiro, 1994).  
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In 1974 the military government under President Geisel decided to adopt a more 
‘pragmatic’ foreign policy “free from ideologies” (in response to the previous post-1964 
administrations), focusing again on development (Pinheiro, 1994). Domestically, the main 
concern articulated by the official discourse was that Brazil became immersed in an 
economic and debt crisis triggered by the end of the golden age of capitalism (Soares Leite, 
2011). For the government, this meant Brazil not only had to find more export markets but 
also guarantee the supply of raw material such as oil, especially after the 1973 oil shock 
(Soares Leite, 2011). Influenced by this concern, there was an important shift in attitudes of 
both the military and the economic ministries favouring a more independent foreign policy 
based on diversified relations (Hurrell, 2013). 
Internationally, Brazil saw a more favourable environment to conduct its more “assertive, 
diversified and independent foreign policy” (Hurrell, 2013: 381). First, the policy of détente 
eased tensions between the USA and the USSR (Soares Leite, 2011). Second, the world 
was becoming more multipolar with the decline of the USA due to the devaluation of the 
dollar, the defeat in the Vietnam War, and the rise of Japan and Germany (Williams 2012). 
The idea was that this ‘multipolarity’ meant more possibilities for Brazil to finance its 
industrialization and to establish new partnerships (Soares Leite, 2011). The search for 
other markets was also in large part needed due to the refusal of developed countries to 
open up their markets to products from developing states (Souto Maior, 1999). 
‘Responsible pragmatism’, in this context, was discursively constructed as a foreign policy 
that was guided by political and economic interests as opposed to an automatic alignment 
with the US (Soares de Lima e Moura, 1982; Hurrell, 2013).  
Initially, the return of the focus on the North-South divide seemed to be less about Brazil’s 
terceiromundismo of the ‘independent foreign policy’ than about the idea that Brazil as an 
emerging country needed to diversify its relations and play a more important role in the 
world (Hurrell, 2013; Spektor, 2004; Soares Leite, 2018). According to Soares de Lima and 
Moura (1982), the belief held by foreign policy makers at the time was that better relations 
with the industrialized countries were increasingly dependent on Brazil’s articulation with 
the South. This would increase Brazil’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the industrialized North. 
Furthermore, in the early 1970s, Brazil had shown impressive economic growth, with GDP 
annual growth at an average of 11% (Spektor, 2004). Due to the fast process of 
industrialization, characterizing the so-called “Brazilian miracle” (Azeredo da Silveira, 
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1975 in Moreira Lima, 2018), Brazil had diversified and increased its exports of 
manufacturing products (Soares Leite, 2011). This positioned the country as the 10th biggest 
economy in the world and reinforced the feeling that Brazil was finally an emerging 
country (Moreira Lima, 2018). Despite fading away at the end of Geisel’s government, the 
emphasis on Brazil as a future Great Power was fundamental in shaping Brazil’s foreign 
policy in this period (Hurrell, 2013). SSC was, in this context, linked more strongly with 
Brazil’s demands as a future Great Power country, than as a country from the South.  
In his inaugural speech, the new chancellor Azeredo da Silveira said that Brazil would no 
longer accept an “unclear destiny” within a Western alliance, but would instead chart its 
own path with “self-confidence” based on its “national greatness” (Souto Maior, 1999). 
The following year, Silveira said in a speech at Chatham House in the UK that: 
 
[…] the extraordinary growth of the past decades was bound to have a considerable impact on 
the intensity and on the quality of our presence on the international scene… a pragmatic and 
ecumenical approach to foreign policy is, to a large extent, a direct product of economic 
developments both within and without our boundaries (Hurrell, 2013: 384) 
 
At the ESG (Brazil’s Superior War College), Azeredo da Silveira (1974 in Moreira Lima, 
2018:154) justified the new SSC policy by stating that: “Today, [considering] the stage of 
economic development and political maturity that we have achieved, it is legitimate to 
conclude that our diplomatic efforts will prioritize [relationships with] Latin America and 
Africa […]”. Internationally too, the discursive construction of Brazil as an emerging 
power, a medium power and a regional power (Spektor, 2004) reverberated domestic 
feelings. 
Alongside an increased sense of importance, Brazil under Geisel was highly critical of the 
power imbalance that characterized the international order. As Azeredo da Silveira put it, 
“Brazil can no longer accept that very few states determine the political fate of the world” 
(Seixas Corrêa, in Moreira Lima, 2018: 110). Although the dependentista rationale which 
criticized the international order continued to shape Brazil’s domestic development, like in 
the previous period, Brazil saw itself playing a greater role within the same order it 
criticized.  
It was in this context that Brazil attempted to strengthen again relations with African 
countries. But despite an increased focus on Brazil’s emerging country’s identity and 
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economic achievements, like in the ‘independent foreign policy’, the discourse legitimizing 
relations with “African brothers” also recovered principles promoted by Bandung, 
especially regarding Brazil’s support for African states’ liberation movements, drawing on 
the terceiromundismo of previous times. Both president Geisel and his chancellor Azeredo 
da Silveira reinforced Brazil’s commitment to self-determination, non-interference and 
sovereignty in their official speeches when siding with African states against colonialism, 
even if the new states had a socialist regime. Explaining the reasons why Brazil forged 
stronger relations with Africa, particularly Lusophone countries, Azeredo da Silveira said: 
 
In the case of Africa, our feeling of solidarity towards the peoples who strive for independence 
and national self-determination, indispensable for progress and peace, are the main reason for 
our political proximity. [Another reason is] our outrage towards racial discrimination, which is 
still practiced in a vile way in large parts of Africa. Brazil, for its own history, identifies 
particularly with all those peoples who wish to govern their own destiny, free from foreign 
interference, even if well intentioned (Azeredo da Silveira, 1974, in Moreira Lima, 2018: 159). 
 
Unlike in the previous period, however, this time the context of Brazil’s support and 
recognition of Lusophone Africa’s independence, particularly Guinea Bissau, Mozambique 
and Angola, was characterized not only by the détente, but also by the April 25th Revolution 
in Portugal, which brought to an end the Portuguese colonial regime in Africa (Souto 
Maior, 1999). In this sense, although Brazil’s stance was to oppose colonialism before the 
April Revolution, the context was more conducive for Brazil’s support for Africa. 
If in the speeches addressed to domestic audiences Brazil’s government representatives 
placed greater emphasis on Brazil’s future Great Power status, as the 1970s progressed 
Brazil’s identification with the Third World became more visible in international fora. 
Against the backdrop of the proposal of the NIEO, Brazil reinforced its position within the 
Third World, and was fierce in its criticism of the developed world’s attitude towards the 
NIEO (Hurrell, 2013). In 1976, in a visit to Tokyo, Geisel said unequivocally that: 
 
Brazil truly belongs to the Group of 77 […] our per capita income is very low and it is this fact 
which differentiates us essentially from the highly developed industrialized or developed 
countries […] in reality, Brazil is in the group of underdeveloped countries. (Hurrell, 2013: 423) 
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Instead of aligning with the Third World as a political movement, however, Brazil’s 
position continued to be ‘on the fence’ and non-confrontational in relation to several issues 
(Hurrell, 2013; Spektor, 2004). Thus, in terms of economic reforms proposed by various 
third-world countries, such as the reform of the international monetary system, Brazil 
seemed a lot more moderate (Hurrell, 2013). The Third World, according to Hurrell (2013), 
was just one option amongst many for Brazil’s ‘responsible pragmatism’. This meant that 
SSC was not the alternative to an automatic alignment with the US, but rather one of the 
alternatives (Hurrell, 2013). As Vizentini (1999: 149) put it, during the responsible 
pragmatism, “the North-South verticality started to coexist with the South-South 
horizontality and the diagonal South-East”. Although the ‘independent foreign policy’ had 
also sought to construct SSC as one more relationship, during the responsible pragmatism 
this construction was emphasized. Perhaps the most important example is Brazil’s 
establishment of relations with socialist countries such as China (Vizentini, 1999). 
If ‘responsible pragmatism’ was about following Brazil’s economic and political interests 
regardless, the culturalist discourse underlined again Brazil’s relations with Lusophone 
Africa. As such, the cultural, historical and ethnical affinities discursively constructed in 
the 1960s were revived by Brazil in the 1970s (Saraiva, 1993). Reinforcing the similar 
roots both regions shared, a Brazilian diplomat said that “Africa is not strange to Brazil, it 
is not just a market, but one of the main sources of our nation-building” (Saraiva, 1993: 
232). Even with African countries’ independence from Portugal, Freyre’s discourse 
continued to show its strength and to structure Brazil’s view of Lusophone Africa. Freyre 
had referred to Guinea, Angola and Mozambique as the “new Brazils”, with a “tendency to 
be a racial democracy in contrast to a world so divided by race hatred” (Freyre, 1974 in 
Dávila, 2010: 175). Furthermore, Freyre sought to construct a Portuguese world unified by 
a common language, which was “a bearer of culture that sustained miscegenation and racial 
equality” (Dávila, 2010: 175). 
Underlined by this discourse, and proud of its fast economic growth, Brazil’s SSC with 
Africa was not only about trade, but also technical cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure 
engineering, housing and education (Dávila, 2010). While Brazil remained moderate in 
relation to demands of the Third World, it was in the discourse on technical cooperation 
that the oppositional stance in relation to the North was emphasized. According to Azaredo 
da Silveira (Soares Leite, 2011: 150),  
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[a]s a developing country, Brazil offers to share with other developing nations in the world its 
technology. We do not wish to privilege methods or models, systems or forms of action. Rather, 
we make ourselves available to these friendly countries so that together we can examine and 
implement programmes that are mutually advantageous. 
 
In this way, the rejection of a ‘one-size fits all’ model of development promoted by the 
North and the principle of ‘mutual gains’ were already present in Brazil’s discourse about 
development cooperation with Africa. This will be recovered in the 2000s by Lula’s SSC.  
Overall, during the ‘responsible pragmatism’ period Brazil expanded its diplomatic 
representations in black Africa, and its exports rose from US 417 million in 1974 to US 651 
million in 1979 (Hurrell, 2013). Brazil’s most important import from Africa, especially 
Nigeria, was oil, accounting for 70% of Brazil’s imports in 1978 (Hurrell, 2013). Despite 
the expansion in economic ties, later in the 1980s, the perception that relations with African 
countries were not living up to Brazil’s expectations grew stronger. For Brazil, Africa’s 
economic and political instability meant that it did not constitute a good market for 
Brazilian products (Saraiva, 1993; Lechini, 2008). This belief translated into a change of 
focus from African countries to Latin America, more specifically the Mercosur (Lechini, 
2008). 
To conclude, it is safe to say that the main discourses deployed during the ‘independent 
foreign policy’ were recovered during the ‘responsible pragmatism’, albeit in different 
international and domestic contexts. To some extent, then, Brazil re-politicized SSC by 
effectively contesting norms and principles of the North, such as in its support for 
Lusophone Africa’s independence, helped by a more favourable context. On the other hand, 
as an emerging country, it sought to adopt a more ambivalent, or less confrontational stance 
regarding other issues of the Third World. SSC was just another relation Brazil as a future 
Great Power would cultivate. Rather than attached to any specific type of relationship, the 
idea of ‘pragmatism’ meant Brazil should enjoy relations with any country according to its 
political and economic interests. 
Brazil recovered and reinforced the identity of a harmonious product of Portuguese 
colonization. The idea of a racial democracy still legitimized relations with Lusophone 
Africa, although criticism against the myth of racial democracy and the uncritical and de-
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politicized character of the culturalist discourse started to gain strength both in Brazil and in 
Africa (Saraiva, 1993).  
Like in the previous period, SSC was not articulated in a clear cut political logic of 
confrontation. Rather, it was an empty signifier that sought to articulate both demands from 
the Third World as well as demands from the future great power who wanted to strengthen 
relations with the North. I suggest that, during the responsible pragmatism, the process of 
transformism with the absorption of demands from the South seemed stronger as the 
identity of Brazil as an emerging country also became more sedimented. 
Before SSC was revived again in the 2000s, there was a period of roughly 22 years during 
which Africa was neglected in Brazil’s foreign policy. In the next section I will discuss this 
period before turning my attention to the re-emergence of SSC under Lula da Silva. 
 
3.3.3. Collor de Mello’s return to Americanism, the Crisis of Paradigm and Cardoso’s 
‘pragmatic institutionalism’ 
The first civilian president after the military dictatorship, Fernando Collor de Mello, was 
elected in 1989. The international context was characterized by the rise of neoliberalism, 
whose central tenet was that markets, not governments, could provide socially desirable 
outcomes (Payne and Philips, 2010). This was encapsulated by the 1989 Washington 
Consensus, a blue print for countries around the world to “[s]tabilize, privatize and 
liberalize” their economies (Rodrik, 2006: 973).  
Domestically, the neoliberal consensus grew stronger with the failure of the ISI and the 
economic crisis characterized by hyperinflation. The goal of the new government was to try 
to stabilize the currency, liberalize the economy and “integrate Brazil within the first 
world” (Sallum Jr., 2011: 262).  
In terms of foreign policy, both Collor and parts of the MRE saw the globalist paradigm as 
being responsible for Brazil’s vulnerable situation in the 1980s and 1990s (Vieira, 2001). 
The vulnerability and weakness of developing countries’ markets had not, according to 
them, benefitted Brazil’s exports (Vieira, 2001). Furthermore, there was a growing 
consensus within the MRE that the end of the Cold War represented an opportunity for a 
‘medium power’ like Brazil to help build the new world order (Lafer e Fonseca, 1997). 
This meant Brazil should abandon the ‘defensive nationalism’ behind much of its 
developmentalist strategy adopted during the Cold War, and become a global player. The 
	   90	  
rationale was that Brazil would only become a global player by strengthening relations with 
the hegemon and the West in general and participating in the debate of global issues.  
The following years were characterized by what the Brazilian foreign policy literature calls 
the ‘crisis of paradigms’, with measures of economic liberalism coupled with a certain 
degree of autonomy in the international scenario, but not a clear strategy of SSC or an 
alignment with the US (Pinheiro, 1994).  
In 1998, the co-founder of Brazil’s Social Democratic Party (PSDB), Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, was elected. His priority was to stabilize the economy, which led him to adopt the 
neoliberal agenda espoused by the Washington Consensus (Cammack, 1997; Power, 2001). 
The view was that in a globalized world, Brazil needed to send the right message to foreign 
investors and governments (Cunningham, 1999). According to Cervo (2002), during 
Cardoso’s government, the MRE’s long established foreign policy goal of promoting 
domestic development was no longer pursued. Instead, the opening up of the economy was 
the ultimate goal of Cardoso and his economic team (Cervo, 2002).  
In order to counter the negative effects of globalization while promoting the ‘integration’ of 
Brazil into the world economy, one of the aims of Cardoso’s foreign policy was to foster 
multilateralism in order to promote a more rules-based world order and to show Brazil’s 
commitment to democracy after a long period of dictatorship (Vizentini, 2005). As such, 
Cardoso tried to promote a greater integration of Brazil in international fora such as the UN 
and specifically the WTO, which characterized a new foreign policy paradigm in Brazil, 
called by the literature ‘pragmatic institutionalism’ (Pinheiro, 1994). Through the principle 
of multilateralism, Cardoso’s government also sought to forge new bilateral relations with 
countries from the South, such as India and Malaysia (Vizentini, 2005). However, as 
Vizentini further notes, this commitment did not translate in the strengthening of relations 
with the South, and much less in a combative approach in relation to US hegemony. 
Cardoso remained committed to the strengthening of relations with industrialized countries 
based on the view that Brazil’s interests would be better suited in aligning its foreign policy 
with Western interests (Vizentini, 2005). In this sense, despite the consolidation of the 
‘Portuguese Commonwealth’ CPLP (Portuguese acronym for the Community of 
Portuguese Language Countries), Cardoso’s government excluded Africa from its list of 
priorities and focused on the West (Mendonça Junior and Faria, 2015).  
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The neoliberal consensus started to wane in the second term of Cardoso’s administration 
against the background of the failure of neoliberal policies not only in Brazil but also in 
Latin America, especially Argentina.  
 
3.3.4. The re-emergence of SSC under PT’s Government 
The Workers’ Party (PT) Lula da Silva’s presidential campaign and consequent triumph 
were based on a promise for change against the status quo. While most would claim Lula’s 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy represented more continuity than change, few would 
disagree that in terms of foreign policy, there was a major change in direction and 
emphasis.  
Indeed, during Lula’s eight years in office, Brazil would more than double its diplomatic 
presence in African countries, going from 17 to 37 embassies, and trade would increase 
sixfold (Stolte, 2012). The interest was reciprocated: During Lula’s mandate, seventeen 
African embassies were opened in Brasilia (World Bank/IPEA, 2011). Furthermore, 
through the use of presidential diplomacy, Lula visited 29 African countries, in a total of 12 
journeys during his mandate, something unprecedented amongst Brazil’s past leaders, and 
an indication of the new commitment to Africa (World Bank/IPEA, 2011).  
In terms of technical cooperation, even though Brazil had been involved as a provider since 
the 1960s, under Lula’s mandate the country’s operations went from 23 projects of 
technical cooperation in 2003 to 413 in 2009 under the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, 
(or ABC - Portuguese acronym for Brazilian Cooperation Agency) (World Bank/IPEA, 
2011). The priority Africa had in Brazil’s SSC was clear:  More than 50% of the resources 
and of the number of projects were destined to Africa, particularly Lusophone countries 
(World Bank/IPEA, 2011). Development projects in African countries mostly fell under 
five key categories: Agriculture, health, vocational training to support industrial production, 
energy and social protection (World Bank/IPEA, 2011). 
As a result of this shift and considering Brazil strengthened relations with pro-socialist 
neighbouring countries, the general perception among analysts and commentators was that 
Lula’s foreign policy compensated for “the absence of radicalism at home” (Hurrell, 2008), 
or that Brazil was “talking left abroad, and acting right at home” (Rohter, 2010: 233). Some 
claimed that Brazilian foreign policy under Lula was the most faithful to the Workers’ 
Party ideology and historical positions (Almeida, 2004; Burges, 2013), or to the ideology of 
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those at the heart of its foreign policy making (Hurrell, 2010; Burges, 2013). In this sense, 
SSC would be, according to the argument, a rupture or change in relation to the neoliberal 
order.  
However, I suggest in this section that the discursive construction of SSC was as much 
about change as it was about continuity with the two previous periods, including that of the 
right-wing military government. The changes that have been incorporated, such as the re-
politicization of Brazil-Africa relations, drew on an existing discourse encapsulating a 
growing consensus against the myth of Brazil as a racial democracy. At the same time, the 
very act of repeating a discourse in a new context incorporates something new to it 
(Panizza, 2004). In this sense, despite Brazil’s continued reliance on both its Southern 
identity and emerging country’s identity, this has invariably incorporated a more 
progressive character. A second point worth making is that, rather than representing a 
rupture with the ideology and interests behind Lula’s domestic policies, SSC was also 
characterized by the class compromise that underlined the domestic context (Westhuizen, 
2012; Nogueira et al, 2017). 
The PT administration revived previously held interpretations of the international order as 
well as Brazil’s role in this order. In other words, it drew on the long-standing Southern 
view that the international order was characterized by an unjust, core-periphery structure 
(Vieira, 2012). Within this context, like in the two previous periods of SSC, especially 
during the ‘responsible pragmatism’, the belief was that an emerging power like Brazil, 
with its continental size, population, and GDP, should play an assertive and autonomous 
role in forging new relations. The sense of importance emanating from Brazil’s emerging 
country identity was conveyed by Lula’s speech to diplomats in 2003: 
 
The government has made a political decision to insert Brazil into the world as a major country 
[...] We will not accept any more participating in international politics as if we were the poor 
little ones of Latin America, a ‘little country’ of the Third World [...]. (Hurrell, 2010: 2) 
 
The official discourse also recovered the third-world revisionist impetus that characterized 
the international emergence of SSC and came to constitute Brazil’s official discourse in the 
two previous phases of SSC. Although the government, as a way to counter the domestic 
media’s criticisms against Brazil’s proximity with Africa, had made it clear that the “South-
South dimension of our diplomacy […] has not been an attempt to restore the 
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terceiromundismo of the past […]” (MRE, 2014 in Pickup, 2016), the language used 
recovered much of the old discourse. As such, important SSC initiatives such as the IBSA 
Fund – described by Lula as “our response to an unequal and unjust social order incapable 
of resolving old problems”(MRE, 2010 quoted in Pickup, 2016) – drew heavily on the 
ideology of South-South solidarism that dates back to the Bandung Conference (Vieira, 
2012). For example, Vieira (2012: 324) notes that “the understanding of ‘distributive 
justice’ has been one of the foundational principles of the IBSA partnership”. Indeed, the 
2003 Brasilia Declaration, which formalized the IBSA Dialogue Forum and served as a 
framework for further development initiatives promoted by the IBSA countries individually 
(Vieira, 2012), called for “development for developing countries”, “social justice”, “a fair 
globalization”, and “multilateralism of global governance” 21, among other ideas that date 
back to SSC during its first phase of self-reliance and political strengthening. 
In the 2000s, within a more favourable international scenario, from the point of view of the 
government SSC served the purpose of challenging power imbalances and contributing to a 
more democratic world order, “without any type of hegemony” (Lula, 2003 in MRE 2008). 
SSC would mean developing countries – including Brazil – have the autonomy and 
sovereignty to construct a model of development according to the interests of the South, 
against a model that produced economic stagnation and instability affecting especially 
countries from the South (MRE, 2003). In this sense, SSC was linked to norms that seemed 
to contest the Northern norms by highlighting a possible alternative to the status quo. 
Alongside this view was Brazil’s sense of importance, which was reinforced by its 
economic growth and successful social policies. Internationally, Brazil, Russia, India and 
China had been named the world’s fastest growing emerging economies, being coined as 
the ‘BRICs’ by Goldman Sachs’s chairman Jim O’Neill. But Brazil still positioned itself 
clearly within the South. As Lula put it himself in his inaugural speech at the National 
Congress: “As a colony, then as a politically independent country, we have suffered, for 
centuries, the constraints that conditioned the experiences of peripheral countries (MRE, 
2008: 43). Addressing the Africa-South America Summit held in 2006, Lula said: “We are 
going to forge a strong alliance between two continents who resent the exclusion we have 
been submitted to for such a long time” (MRE 2008).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 http://ibsa.nic.in/brasil_declaration.htm [accessed January 10 2017] 
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To a large extent, thus, Brazil under PT drew on sedimented discourses – including those 
articulated by the military government – reinforcing the terceiromundista revisionist 
impetus and its oppositional stance in relation to the industrialized North, while also 
behaving as an emerging country, which would finally play a greater role in international 
relations. But these discourses were incorporated within a new context, and in fact 
articulated new elements or signifiers. How was this played out in the discursive 
construction of SSC? 
It was clear that, like in previous periods, SSC was as much about strengthening relations 
with the South as it was about strengthening relations with the North and redefining its 
status of a great power country. As many of my interviewees at Embrapa and indeed the 
MRE mentioned, the political interest behind SSC with Africa was to get Africa’s support 
for Brazil’s much wanted permanent seat at the UNSC. As Cesarino (2013: 28) rightly 
noted: 
 
Brazil’s recent foreign policy shift towards the global South may be also regarded as part of this 
age-old expectation: by becoming a provider of international cooperation, Brazil is addressing as 
much its Southern counterparts as Northern powers, from whom it seeks recognition as a major 
global player (Cesarino, 2013: 28). 
 
In their analysis of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula, scholars including Hurrell (2006, 
2008), Soares de Lima (2004) and Lima and Hirst (2006), argued that there was a conflict 
between Brazil’s identity as a third-world country, which predisposed it to playing an 
international role that defended the redistribution of power and wealth, and its identity as an 
emerging country, which influenced it to play a more self-interested role in international 
affairs.  
In the two previous periods of SSC, Brazil sought to reconcile both identities so that it 
could act as a ‘bridge’. Under Lula, Brazil reinforced this identity. In his first month in 
government, Lula attended both the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre and the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, as a sign that the country could articulate the agendas of both 
the developed and the developing countries (Soares Leite, 2011). Moreover, Brazil 
positioned itself as the leader of the negotiations between developed and developing 
countries in the G20 coalition (Soares Leite, 2011).  
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However, more specifically in relation to African countries, while in the previous periods 
the reconciliation of the identities of Brazil as a third world and a Western country was 
rooted in the uncritical and de-politicized culturalist discourse, in the 2000s, this discourse 
is reformulated and re-politicized. The emphasis of this discourse, which Saraiva and 
Coelho (2004) analyse in the context of the first Brazil-Africa meeting, is on the 
recognition that Brazil had a historical debt towards Africa as a result of the slave labour 
during colonial times and beyond. In this sense, rather than focusing only on shared 
historical experiences, geographic similarities and cultural affinities which unite Brazil and 
Africa, particularly Lusophone Africa, the official discourse acknowledges that Brazil was 
built by the work of African slaves (Saraiva and Coelho, 2004). In this context, SSC is 
linked with a new element. It is not just about forging stronger relations between similar 
countries and promoting their emancipation based on solidarity, but about repaying a debt 
that is long overdue.  The signifier ‘historical debt’ is thus articulated by the discourse on 
SSC is the 2000s. 
Importantly, Brazil’s view in relation to Africa was legitimized by its progressive domestic 
policies, structured around a public system that sought to tackle racism and achieve racial 
equality (Ribeiro, 2015). For this purpose, in 2003 the government created the Secretaria 
Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial (SEPPIR), an agency under the 
Presidency, which later acquired the status of Ministry and was in charge of formulating 
and coordinating policies that addressed racial inequality. New laws, conferences and 
policies were created and implemented, notably an array of affirmative policies that 
addressed racial inequality within public universities and the civil service. For the first 
time, the MRE, considered by president Lula as the “headquarters of aristocracy”, reserved 
a percentage of its vacancies to Brazilians of African descend (Rocha, 2010).  Furthermore, 
in 2003, a new law (L.10.639/03) made it mandatory the teaching of African-Brazilian 
culture and history, both in the public as well as in the private education systems (Ribeiro, 
2015). In this context, thus, the presence of Africa in Brazil is reframed in a way to 
recognize its unequal position in society, and its importance in the construction of the 
country is recognized and reinforced. 
At the international realm, Brazil was an active actor in fighting against racism and racial 
inequality. It organized and hosted several international conferences, such as the ‘Regional 
Conference for the Americas about the Advances and Challenges for the Action Plan 
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against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerances’ (CRA, in 
Portuguese) (my translation)22, which counted on the participation of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Cepal in Portuguese), the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), and more than 20 countries (Ribeiro, 2015). 
In this sense Brazil’s views towards racism and racial inequality were important in 
legitimizing and renewing its relations with African countries. As a result of this new 
commitment and attitude towards racial equality SSC acquired a much more progressive 
character than in previous period, particularly during Quadro’s/Goulart term. The new 
discourse on SSC re-politicized Brazil-Africa relations by exposing and challenging its 
political construction based on the myth of racial democracy and recognizing Brazil’s 
structural racism. Building on the 1980s and 1990s discourses that increasingly criticized 
Freyre’s view, the identity of Brazil was not linked with the idea of a harmonious product 
of Portuguese colonization anymore. Rather, it unmasked the contradictions of its domestic 
development based on African slave labour and its legacies. 
But Brazil still needed a strategy to reconcile its supposedly conflicting identities and the 
accusations that SSC was just a tool for Brazil to ‘get a seat at the table’. Acknowledging 
Brazil’s self-interest for a more prominent position in the world, Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim said, in his article for the Brazilian Journal of International Politics (Revista 
Brasileira de Política Internacional):  
 
South-South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an authentic desire to 
exercise solidarity toward poorer countries. At the same time, it helps expand Brazil’s 
participation in world affairs (Amorim, 2010: 231). 
 
In this sense, as a general strategy, SSC was linked with historical debt, solidarity, self-
interest, the North and the South, and its third-world principles. It came to represent an 
empty signifier that reconciled several – and sometimes contradictory – elements, like in 
previous times. The way it reconciled Brazil’s self-interests and the interests of the South 
was to claim that both were the same, or to claim that SSC was based on ‘mutual interests’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Conferência Regional das Américas Sobre os Avanços e Desafios para o Plano de Ação Contra o Racismo, a Discriminação Racial, a 
Xenofobia e as Intolerâncias Correlatas (CRA) in Portuguese. 
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The reform of the UNSC, with Brazil occupying a seat, would be favourable for Southern 
countries in general, not only for Brazil, as the argument goes (Amorim, 2010). 
With regards to ‘technical cooperation’, defined by ABC as “the transfer and sharing of 
knowledge, experiences, and good practices […]”23, there seemed to be less ambiguity in 
relation to its principles and its political logics of contestation. Like in the responsible 
pragmatism, the principles that have been linked with technical cooperation in the 2000s 
constituted an oppositional stance towards the North. These were repeatedly mentioned to 
me during interviews in Brazil: solidarity, horizontality, non-interference, non-imposition, 
demand-driven, mutual gains, and sovereignty.  
Interestingly, while Brazil deployed a political logic of contestation in relation to the 
Northern principles in the beginning, with time it became necessary that this political logic 
also contested other emerging countries’ cooperation. It was very common, during 
interviews with diplomats and the ABC staff to hear that Brazilian SSC was not like that of 
India, or especially China. In an interview with a diplomat, s/he contrasted Brazilian SSC 
not only with the OECD’s DAC, but also with other emerging countries’ SSC:  
 
The OECD normally elaborates their projects according to their own conceptions, to their own 
training, not necessarily with the technologies and techniques that are adequate to the 
environment where they are going to operate. [These projects] are not necessarily what is 
demanded, and they arrive there and say, ‘let’s build a hospital for 300 patients per day, in this 
area, in this region’. But this is not necessarily what [the recipient country] wants. […] There is 
also the problem of the interference in domestic affairs, which affects [the recipient country’s] 
sovereignty. The Europeans, or rather the OECD, have the issue of the policies, ‘you must adopt 
Human Rights policies in this area’, there is a certain political interference, ‘otherwise you will 
not have cooperation, you will not have the budget to develop certain activities’. China has a 
modality that is slightly different, but it also interferes. ‘Look, you will receive a hospital, or a 
theatre, we will build a ministry, or the presidential palace, and in exchange you will open up 
your market to Chinese products, and will grant us the exploitation of manganese, copper, coal, 
in exchange for this “cooperation”’…It is a highly biding model, with conditionalities, unlike 
ours. (Interview 18, Brazil, 2017) 
 
Yet, during the same interview, and in fact in other interviews with diplomats, Embrapa 
staff, Fiocruz staff, and ABC employees, my interviewees acknowledged that Brazil did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 http://www.abc.gov.br/CooperacaoTecnica/Conceito [accessed on December 13 2018] 
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have a political interest behind SSC. The election of Roberto Azevedo to the WTO and 
José Graziano to the FAO happened thanks to the vote of African countries. This involved 
an intense diplomatic campaign in which SSC projects were displayed as a disinterested 
type of development unlike that of China. According to one of my interviewees, “Roberto 
Azevedo won the election in Africa. It was in Africa!” (Interview 18, Brazil, 2017). 
With changes and continuities, thus, SSC in the 2000s recovered the discourses deployed in 
the two previous periods analysed, and incorporated new elements within new contexts. 
Like in previous times, this new discourse was based on a reconciliation between two 
identities, that of a third-world country, and that of a future great power. Most importantly, 
however, is that this new reconciliation was based on a re-politicized, progressive 
discourse. At times, SSC was articulated within a political logic of contestation, both in 
relation to the North and in relation to the other emerging countries. At others, it was about 
reinforcing Brazil’s sense of importance and desire to play a protagonist role. In terms of 
development model, however, was there a rupture between Lula’s neoliberal measures in 
the domestic sphere and SSC? Or, like in the two previous periods when developmentalism 
provided the rationale for the choice of foreign policy strategy, did the development model 
adopted domestically also constitute the discourse on SSC? 
Differently from PT’s radical image and Lula’s trajectory of struggle as a trade union 
leader, Lula’s governing style came to be characterized by “an ideological configuration 
that mixes left-wing and right-wing elements”, or what André Singer (2009: 83) coined as 
‘Lulismo’. Domestically, this meant a continuation with Cardoso’s orthodox 
macroeconomic policies such as high interest rates, cuts in government spending, and the 
liberalization of capital accounts to control inflation (Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006), coupled 
with redistributive measures such as a rise in the minimum wage and social programmes 
such as bolsa família (family grant).  
But while some claim that Lula’s SSC was a rupture with the orthodox economic policies 
domestically, I argue that like in previous periods, the development model adopted 
provided the rational for the foreign policy, or rather reflected the same dynamics operating 
domestically. The same class compromise, which sought to reconcile the interests of the 
domestic capital as well as those of social movements and PT’s own popular base, 
underlined foreign policy and more precisely SSC. As Westhuizen (2012: 89) put it,  
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While the PT-led cabinet ‘had the best connections to the export orienting elite of any recent 
Brazilian government’ (Cason and Power 2009: 129), the progressive South–South agenda 
perfectly dovetailed the outward-oriented business interests of the latter, underwriting Lula’s 
many trade missions to Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 
 
SSC as an empty signifier embodied the interests of opposing constituencies within Brazil. 
Perhaps the most illustrative example is agriculture, which echoed the same reconciliation, 
or transformism as will be argued in chapter 4, operating within Brazil. Brazil’s ministerial 
structure under PT’s administration was divided into two different ministries in charge of 
agricultural development: the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA, Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Agrário,), and the Ministry of Agriculture (or MAPA, Ministério da 
Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento) (Cabral et al, 2016). The former was in charge of 
promoting family farming, while the latter defended the interests of the agribusiness, 
although the Workers’ Party narrative has always emphasized the complementarity between 
the two models. In the same manner, the ProSavannah project tried to incorporate the 
interests of the peasants within a large scale agricultural project, as if both shared the same 
interests. And while the ARV factory was thought of as a State pharmaceutical company 
for the production of essential medicine, it received funds from Brazil’s large mining 
company Vale, whose operations in Mozambique needed positive social publicity. Despite 
no involvement or imposition by Vale in the factory’s operations, it was a project that 
served the interests of Vale as well. This will be explored in chapter 6. 
Thus, Lulismo, which operates according to Gramsci’s idea of transformism, also came to 
characterize Brazilian foreign policy and SSC specifically. While SSC was about social 
programmes such as the PAA (Purchase from Africans for Africa), which encouraged local 
producers and family farming, it was also about large-scale agricultural promotion, which 
involved private investors’ interests. By reconciling different identities and interests, this 
discourse ends up backgrounding the political dimension of development, hiding its 
conflicts and the political construction of categories such as SSC. 
 
3.3.5. Dilma Rousseff: A Retreat from SSC as a Foreign Policy Strategy 
In 2010, Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, was elected president. According to most of my 
interviewees and many analysts of Brazilian foreign policy, the period between 2011 and 
2016 was characterized by Rousseff’s lack of interest in foreign policy and to some extent 
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Brazil’s retreat from SSC initiatives. While Lula had visited 27 African countries, Rousseff 
had only visited 6. By 2015, the ABC’s budget suffered a 25% reduction in comparison to 
2012, and the number of projects went from 253 in 2010 to 161 in 2014 (Marcondes and 
Mawdsley, 2017).  
Apart from Rousseff’s preferences for domestic policies and politics, many argue that the 
new president lacked the charisma and diplomatic skills, which conferred Lula the status of 
“the most popular politician on Earth”, as Obama called him. 24  Furthermore, the 
commodities boom that had benefited Lula’s years had come to an end during Rousseff’s 
term. Combined with a political and economic crisis, the context was not favourable for 
Brazil’s engagement in SSC.  
Overall, however, the perception was that “development cooperation continue[d], albeit 
articulated less in high-minded terms of South–South solidarity and more in the ‘pragmatic’ 
language of economic interests” (Marcondes and Mawdsley, 2017: 682). Indeed, Rousseff 
threatened to move the ABC from the MRE to the Ministry of Industry and give the agency 
a more commercial profile (Paraguassu, 2013). Although Rousseff backtracked later on, 
this illustrates her view of and attitude towards SSC from 2011 to 2016.  
However, in relation to the two case studies analysed in this thesis, apart from the economic 
impacts of budget cuts during Rousseff’s term, it is hard to claim that a more economic and 
pragmatic discourse underlined the two projects after Rousseff became the president, or 
that there was a different discourse shaping SSC. First, the affirmative policies that were 
implemented during Lula’s years were extended during Rousseff’s, meaning that the view 
and commitment towards racial equality still legitimized Brazil’s relations with Africa. 
Second, and concurring with Marcondes and Mawdsley (2017: 688), during Rousseff’s 
term: 
 
[…] the rhetoric of solidarity, non-interference and mutual benefit that had characterized the 
Lula-Amorim period was not absent. During her participation in the events commemorating the 
50th anniversary of the African Union in May 2013, Rousseff stated: ‘Brazil is not only 
interested in establishing commercial relations, investing here, selling to the country, but also in 
setting a South–South standard of cooperation. What is this standard? It is a non-oppressive 
cooperation, based on mutual advantages and shared values (Rousseff, 2013). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  https://www.newsweek.com/brazils-lula-most-popular-politician-earth-79355 [accessed 14 June 2019].	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Others (see Suyama, 2016) corroborate this view and claim that the priorities for SSC 
established in the previous government were still in the new government’s agenda. The 
elections of Roberto Azevedo as Director-General of the WTO and José Graziano at FAO 
were accomplished during Dilma’s years, for example (Suyama, 2016).  
Third, during my interviews with MRE and the ABC’s staff, the perception I had was that 
the SSC discourse, with the principles discussed, came from the discourse promoted Lula’s 
years. Perhaps to some degree, this discourse had become sedimented before Rousseff took 
over from Lula.  
Finally, as suggested by several studies (see, for example, Esteves and Assunção, 2017) and 
corroborated by my own fieldwork, Brazilian development cooperation is rooted in the 
diverse experiences of its own specialized agencies and communities of experts, such as 
Embrapa and Fiocruz, and more broadly the Health Community, which involves other 
organizations. As such, the discourses are very much shaped by their own experiences, and 
not only by SSC principles. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter outlined a historical genealogy of Brazilian SSC. Focusing on three periods of 
the adoption of a foreign policy that strengthened relations with the South, it sought to 
reconstruct SSC as continuity and change, rather than a radical rupture. This continuity was 
based on the discursive construction of SSC as an empty signifier, which articulated 
demands from the South, the emerging country, and the mix between both (that of a 
‘mediator’), in a new international context that was very favourable to Brazil. Thus, at 
times, SSC was linked with demands from the Third World against the international order 
and the development model of the North. At others, SSC was articulated with demands to 
strengthen relations with the North, thus promoting Brazil as an emerging country. This, as 
I argued, had old and new elements. 
Importantly, SSC discourse sought to foreground the political dimension of the culturalist 
discourse. This was legitimized by Brazil’s view of racism, the legacy of slavery, its debt 
towards Africa, and the several policies it adopted to promote racial equality.  But SSC 
under Lula – and in fact under Rousseff – was also about reconciliation, not only between 
Brazil’s self-interest and the interests of the South, but also the reconciliation that 
characterized the dynamics of transformism at home. In this sense, SSC, as an empty 
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signifier came to embody a whole set of demands, which were not exclusively related to the 
South, and sometimes were combined in the same SSC project, as will be seen in the case 
of ProSavannah, for example. In other words, SSC as an official discourse re-politicizes 
and contests the Northern norms of development but at the same time promotes the de-
politicization of development. Indeed, as Esteves and Assunção (2014: 1780) put it, the 
distinguishing feature of SSC in the XXI century is “the tension between the revision of the 
international order and the adaptation to a hegemonic model of development”. 
This chapter sought to respond to my research question by problematizing Brazil’s 
construction of SSC since its first adoption as a foreign policy strategy in the 1960s. The 
next four chapters will change the focus and will look at the local dynamics of the 
implementation of the two projects: first, the ProSavannah, then the ARV Factory. By 
exploring the political dynamics that shaped each case, the next chapters will also discuss 
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Chapter 4: Contrasting Social Logics of Agricultural Production: 
Mozambique and the ProSavannah’s first Master Plan 
	  
 
4.1.  Introduction 
From a landmark of Brazilian South-South cooperation in Africa to the most contested 
project under the Workers’ Party foreign policy strategy, the ProSavannah is perhaps the 
clearest example of how the process of de-politicization and re-politicization operated 
through discourse. Signed in 2009 by Japan, Brazil and Mozambique, when Brazil’s 
influence in terms of agriculture “was at its peak” (Interview 7, Brazil, 2017), the project 
was initially designed to replicate in Mozambique Brazil’s green revolution by transferring 
Embrapa’s 25  technical expertise with financial support by JICA (Japan International 
Cooperation Agency). 
However, before implementation even began, the project triggered a political process of 
dislocation and antagonism, whereby critics of the project represented by national and 
transnational civil society organizations (henceforth the opposition) articulated their 
grievances in a chain of equivalence to oppose the ProSavannah. The contestation of the 
norms contained in the Master Plan (the project’s blue print) sought to bring to the fore the 
radical contingency of social structures, while the response by the institutions involved in 
the design and implementation of the project (henceforth the proponents) sought to de-
contest them by foregrounding their ideological dimension, in what this thesis calls de-
politicization. 
Before discussing the antagonistic relations that unfolded as a result of the ‘threat’ of the 
ProSavannah (Chapter 5), this chapter will explore the social logics of agricultural 
production in Mozambique, and the contrasting logics of agricultural production promoted 
in the first blueprint of the ProSavannah, the ‘Master Plan’. Social logics characterize 
relatively stable patterns in practices and subjects’ self-interpretations, which appear 
uncontested and ‘natural’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). I will explore not only the existing 
norms, but also the projected norms (Glynos et al, 2015), i.e., those norms that although not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Portuguese acronym for the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, Embrapa was the State corporation in charge of spearheading 
the transformation of the Cerrado in Brazil in the 1970s.	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materialized in practices, have been the subject of discussions in society and in policy 
documents.  
Explaining the social logics of agricultural production in Mozambique involves 
characterizing a particular set of subject positions (peasants, the state, foreign and domestic 
investors and international donors), as well as objects (land and agricultural input, the 
domestic and foreign markets), and the relationship between them. It also involves 
institutions that regulate their relations, such as the legislation on land use and the 
customary practices of rural communities as well as the policies related to the sector. In 
other words, one can also think in terms of the norms associated to land, labour, capital and 
the market in the realm of agricultural production.  
Briefly speaking, in a context characterized by rural poverty, peasants rely on the logics of 
‘conservation agriculture’ whose norms include ‘local knowledge’, ‘organic input’, ‘crop 
rotation’, ‘minimum mechanical disturbance of the soil’, amongst others. But the model of 
agricultural development is still very much disputed in Mozambique, and I identify two sets 
of projected social norms: one advocated by the Peasants’ National Union (UNAC), which 
I call the logics of ‘food sovereignty’, and a contrasting logic based on the green revolution, 
and advocated by the Mozambican government and international donors such as USAID 
(US Agency for International Development). The former is linked with signifiers such as 
‘peasants rights’, ‘autonomy’, ‘local knowledge and culture’, ‘local markets’, amongst 
others. The latter is linked with signifiers such as ‘intensive agriculture’, ‘high yielding 
practices’, ‘integration’, ‘export markets’, ‘fertilizers’, amongst others. 
ProSavannah’s social norms of agricultural production was contained in the first blueprint 
or Master Plan. Despite being later dismissed by part of the Brazilian and Mozambican 
authorities as ‘unofficial’, the first Master Plan was for a long time the subject of 
contestation by the opponents and indeed the first idea of what the ProSavannah should be 
like, according to my interviewees at Embrapa. I call the logics promoted by it as the social 
logics of transformism, according to which all categories of agricultural producers have 
compatible interests and goals. 
My intention is not only to characterize the existing or projected norms of agricultural 
production, but also to understand them in their historical context and to bring to the fore 
their histories so that different understandings of the political struggle over the 
ProSavannah will emerge. Importantly, most of Mozambique’s civil society organizations’ 
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views about large-scale agricultural projects are rooted in peasants’ historical experience 
during colonialism or in more recent experiences of foreign investment. Likewise, 
Embrapa’s view of agricultural production was highly influenced by its cooperation with 
US scientists, institutions, agricultural experts and businessmen.  
After this introduction, the second section of this chapter will explore the existing social 
logics of agricultural production in Mozambique, based mainly on the idea of 
‘Conservation Agriculture’. The third section will explore the projected norms of 
agricultural production (‘food sovereignty’ and ‘green revolution’) as mentioned above. 
Section four will discuss the social logics of transformism. This narrative, alongside other 
narratives that have shaped Brazil’s agricultural development will be explored in section 
six.  
Thus, this chapter discusses norms of agricultural production that can either depoliticize or 
re-politicize development. It sets the ground for the discussion offered in chapter 5, in 
which I explore how contrasting norms promoted by the ProSavannah triggered the 
antagonism between civil society organizations and the government and institutions of 
Mozambique, Japan and Brazil. 
 
4.2. The Existing Social Logics of Agricultural Production in 
Mozambique 
Agriculture is the main economic activity in Mozambique, accounting for approximately 
24% of the GDP and employing 80% of the working population. Mozambique’s total 
population is estimated to be 28,861,863 (UNESCO, 2017), of which almost 70% live in 
rural areas. The population density is low, with 36 inhabitants per Km2 but there are 
substantive variations among provinces, with most people (45%) living in the Northern 
provinces of Nampula and Zambezi (Silici et al 2015). 
Smallholder farmers26 who practice family farming27 account for 95% of the agricultural 
production, while commercial farmers produce the remaining 5% (FAO, 2018). Although 
Mozambique managed to increase food production, especially maize and cassava over the 
last ten years, food insecurity still persists throughout the country (Silici et al, 2015). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  I will use the term ‘peasant’ and ‘smallholder farmer’ interchangeably although I am aware not all peasants posses land.	  
27	  The definition of family-farming which Mozambican specialists and activists use is: “Small-scale agricultural producers whose 
production is labour intensive, particularly familiar, not well integrated in the market for input, machines, capital, land or non-agricultural 
wage labour. They produce essentially for the family as an economic and social unit, and do not have the market as the only or most 
important reference for their productivity. They do not necessarily aim at profit and whenever possible, complement their income with 
other sources, within or outside the agricultural sector” [my translation] (Mosca, 2017: 69).  
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Mozambique has one of the highest levels of rural extreme poverty, occupying the 181st 
position out of 187 countries in the UN’s 2016 Human Development Index. Over 40% of 
children under the age of 5 suffer from malnutrition.  
Despite agricultural growth driven largely by land expansion, only 10% of 36 mi hectares 
of land are used for agriculture, 90% of which are used by smallholder farmers (República 
de Mozambique, 2011). With low productivity and little diversity, Mozambique is still a 
net importer of food from the SADC region (República de Mozambique 2011), while 
agricultural exports include tobacco, cotton, sugar cane, cashew and tea, which are 
controlled by large-scale producers and foreign investment.  
Nampula Province is the most populous province in Mozambique with 85% of the 
population living off the land (Sabaratnam 2017). Peasants are in this context key actors in 
the development of agriculture. But the category of ‘peasants’ or ‘peasantry’ is a contested 
one both in the academy and amongst activists, with some referring to ‘peasantry’ as a 
socio-economic class, while others claim the term does not account for the heterogeneity of 
the peasants and their economic activities (see Edelman, 2013). Within the political logics 
of the ProSavannah, both the proponents and the opponents of the ProSavannah constructed 
the term to their own benefit, as will be explored in the next section. More precisely, the 
Peasants’ National Union (UNAC) – which in large part joined the opponents – uses the 
umbrella organization Via Campesina’s definition in their declaration of peasants’ rights: 
 
A peasant is a man or woman of the land, who has a direct and special relationship with the land 
and nature through the production of food and/or other agricultural products. Peasants work the 
land themselves, rely[ing] above all on family labour and other small-scale forms of organizing 
labour. Peasants are traditionally embedded in their local communities and they take care of 
local landscapes and of agro-ecological systems. The term peasant can apply to any person 
engaged in agriculture, cattle-raising, pastoralism, handicrafts-related to agriculture or a related 
occupation in a rural area. This includes indigenous people working on the land. (Declaration on 
Peasants’ Rights, 2009, in Edelman, 2013). 
 
Thus, according to this definition, against a more predatory system peasants are those who 
respect the land and cultivate it based on agro-ecological practices, or conservation 
agriculture. The government of Mozambique has also relied on a simplistic dichotomy, 
which classified the peasants as those who engage in traditional subsistence-oriented 
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agriculture versus modern large-scale commercial agriculture, a classification which 
ignores the regional complexities of the peasants, as Newitt (2017) argues. But in this 
section, without trying to homogenise the category, I refer to peasants in the same way they 
understand themselves: as those who depend on the land for survival. In the context of 
Mozambique, most of them practice conservation agriculture, as will be discussed. 
It is not difficult to understand the considerable political importance of the peasantry to the 
political establishment in Mozambique. First, as already noted, by 2018 the rural population 
comprised 70% of the total population of Mozambique. At the time of independence in 
1975, this figure represented 89% (World Bank, 2018). Second, the struggle for 
independence against Portuguese rule was framed as a struggle for “freeing the land and the 
man”, and in this sense, symbolically Mozambique has seen itself as a land of liberated 
peasants (Sabaratnam, 2017). Furthermore, the civil war which ensued after independence 
between the leading party Frelimo and its opposition Renamo was also a struggle for the 
support of the peasantry. With peasants feeling neglected by Frelimo (Portuguese acronym 
for Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), Renamo (Portuguese acronym for 
Mozambican National Resistance) was able to gain the support of large areas of central and 
northern Mozambique (Newitt, 2017).  
Perhaps more clearly, the political force of the peasants is reflected in the land legislation. 
Even against external pressure to privatize land during the liberalization period led by the 
IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s, Frelimo kept its “deep seated” stance for 
keeping land and peasants’ rights as enshrined in the constitution and the 1997 land law 
(Renzio and Hanlon, 2007). Article 98 of the country’s constitution states that: 
 
Natural resources in the soil and the subsoil, in inland waters, in the territorial sea, on the 
continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone shall be the property of the State. (Ruchti, 
2011) 
 
In the post war period, under the pressure of pro-peasant organizations like the National 
Union of Peasants (UNAC) and the Organization for Rural Mutual Assistance (ORAM), 
the government approved the 1997 Land Law Legislation, which states that “[t]he land is 
the property of the State and cannot be sold or otherwise alienated, mortgaged or 
encumbered”(Frey, 2004). It also sought to guarantee that communities could claim 
perpetual rights to the land that has been used for at least ten years by obtaining the land 
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usage title called DUAT (Portuguese acronym). Since then, foreign or domestic investors 
who are interested in their land have to negotiate directly with communities (Newitt, 2017).  
The pressure from donors for land privatization has again come back in the beginning of 
the 2000s, especially from USAID and the IFIs. The IMF, for example, proposed in the 
2005 Letter of Intent to undertake a study on “rural land tenure negotiations” (Renzio and 
Hanlon, 2007). Apart from a few instances when the government has expressed the 
possibility of land privatization, such as in the Poverty Reduction Paper (PARPA), the 
balance has been tipped in favour of peasants, with the government reaffirming to donors 
and reassuring to peasants that land would not be privatized (Renzio and Hanlon, 2007). 
Indeed, as one of my interviewees at Embrapa told me, when the vice-president of Brazil, 
Michel Temer, was in Mozambique, he put pressure on President Guebuza to “sort out the 
problem of land”. Guebuza’s answer was a firm rejection of privatization, stating that he 
would be ousted from the presidency if he privatized land (Interview 1, Brazil, 2017). 
Yet, even with the legislation in place, the growing international interest in coal mining and 
large-scale agricultural businesses in Mozambique forced the government to provide further 
guarantee to peasants’ rights while allocating land to mining and agriculture (Newitt, 2017). 
This was done through a resettlement decree, which gave the local communities the right to 
be resettled in an area where they can engage in their agricultural activities.  
In practice, however, often resettlements have allocated peasants to infertile land further 
away from their villages, thus disrespecting their rights (Newitt, 2017). This has been part 
of what many call the phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’, which beyond Mozambique seems 
to have become a norm in Africa after the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis. As an essential 
aspect of civil society organizations’ fight for peasant rights in Mozambique, ‘land 
grabbing’ has become a nodal point in their discourses, around which signifiers such as 
‘agribusiness’, ‘land theft’ and ‘environmental devastation’ were ordered. It has gained 
political traction through an international campaign against land grabbing around the world, 
but particularly in Africa28.  Moreover, Mozambique’s well connected and materially 
funded network of organizations (Sabaratnam 2017) and the very political importance of 
the peasantry helped sediment ‘land grabbing’ as a particularly sensitive topic and signifier.  
The literature on land grabbing in Mozambique is quite extensive (see Mosca, 2017; Serra, 
2013; Hermele, 1986; Twomey, 2014; Clements and Fernandes, 2013; Milgroom, 2015; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See the website for the campaign against land grabbing in Africa: http://www.stopafricalandgrab.com 
	   109	  
Hanlon, 2014). During my fieldwork cases of land grabbing were also a common topic of 
conversation with civil society organizations but also mentioned by some of Embrapa’s 
personnel. For example, one of my interviewees at Embrapa mentioned the case of the 
agricultural project at ‘Regadio of Limpopo’ as an experience that had shaped 
communities’ views of the ProSavannah (Interview 13, Brazil, 2017). This was the case of 
Chinese investment, which was granted 20,000 hectares for the production of rice, driving 
communities out of their land against promises that were not fulfilled.  Another infamous 
case mentioned during interviews with both sides was that of the Brazilian mining company 
Vale. Vale had established itself in the same northern region of Mozambique, the Nacala 
Corridor, where the ProSavannah was meant to occupy an important area. Vale invested 
heavily in the infrastructure of the region, both in a railway which connects the Moatize 
coal mine to the Nacala port, and in the port itself. During 2009 and 2010, Vale resettled 
1,365 households, under conditions that attracted attention of organizations such as the 
Human Rights Watch (2013). Also in Nampula province, in 2014 a thousand peasants were 
reported to have been reallocated from their lands to give way to a large soya plantation 
owned by domestic and foreign investors (Hanlon, 2014). 
Against this background, the greatest majority of smallholder farmers practice rain-fed 
subsistence production in what represents 99% of the total number of farming units (Silici 
et al, 2015). They are limitedly connected to markets, and hardly use external input such as 
fertilizers, mechanical implements or animal traction (Silici et al, 2015). Traditional 
farming involves practices such as intercropping whereby cereals and leguminous are 
grown in proximity; agroforestry, with the combination of agriculture and forestry for the 
preservation of the soil and increased biodiversity; and crop-livestock integration (Silici et 
al, 2015). Furthermore, according to one of my interviewees from UNAC, there is a long-
lasting tradition of letting the land rest during fallow periods while the soil recover its 
fertility, rotating crops from one year to the next (Interview 33, Mozambique, 2018). These 
practices characterize what my interviewees called ‘conservation agriculture’, which is 
based on three principles: minimum or no mechanical soil disturbance; permanent organic 
soil cover; crop mixing and crop rotations. 
With very low yields, however, farmers find it very hard to increase productivity and make 
a profit out of agriculture. Furthermore, they are vulnerable to climate shocks such as 
drought and floods, have almost no access to extension services from the government, 
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making agriculture a highly risky and poorly remunerated business (Silici et al, 2015). A 
very common complaint I heard from my interviewees was the limited or no access to 
machinery such as tractors. When asked whether technology and machinery promised by 
ProSavannah would not help them increase their productivity, they expressed disbelief by 
telling me anecdotes about government programmes whereby tractors and other 
machineries supposedly destined to peasants got stuck in government buildings due to 
corruption. 
Against this background, the peasants’ union and civil society organizations in 
Mozambique have put pressure on the government for the promotion of an agrarian reform 
which had as one of its pillars the National Plan for the Support of Peasants’ Agriculture. 
The campaign reinforced long standing demands based on peasants’ needs and modes of 
production, such as the agro-ecological techniques mentioned above with the cultivation of 
native seeds for ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘land rights’.  
Despite these demands overall there is a consensus amongst development specialists in 
Mozambique that “there has never been any agrarian policy in Mozambique” (Caldeira, 
2016) or that policies have been inconsistent or never put into practice (Mosca, 2017; 
Mosca and Abbas 2016; Mosca, 2018; Castel-Branco, 2008b; Castel-Branco, 2013). Civil 
society organizations working with rural development also noted that government policies 
and programmes, such as the Programme for Agriculture (PROAGRI), the Strategy for the 
Green Revolution (República de Moçambique, 2007), the Plan for Nutritional and Food 
Security (ESAN 2007-2015, República de Moçambique, 2007b), and the Strategic Plan for 
Agricultural Development (PEDSA 2011-2020 – República de Moçambique, 2011) have 
had little or no positive impact on peasants’ lives or in fact any rural development because 
they have either not been implemented or have been uncoordinated and discontinued 
(UNAC, 2017). Others noted that the Frelimo government has since independence 
marginalized peasants and family farming, which resulted in no structural change in the 
rural sector (Mosca, 2017; Sabaratnam, 2017).  
In a similar way, international donors are accused of implementing programmes that have 
been largely non-transformative and constrained, or not adequate to peasants’ socio-
economic situation and views (Sabaratnam, 2017). Sabaratnam (2017: 99) talks about “a 
specific ideological firewall against sustained and direct state support for the family sector 
[…]” by donors. She goes on to argue that international donors have to a large extent 
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contributed to the fragmentation and weakening of the state apparatus in agriculture due to 
the range of political conflicts between programmes from several donors and the 
government. 
The lack of consistent policy or programmes means that many of the norms of agricultural 
production discussed in the next section have not, in large part, been materialized in 
concrete practices in Mozambique. However, they are important to the extent that they 
represent the norms available in society when it comes to agriculture and agricultural 
production. In this sense, it is these norms/signifiers amongst others that were mobilized in 
constructing the antagonism triggered by the ProSavannah. I will refer to these norms as 
‘projected norms’ (Glynos et al, 2015). 
 
4.3. Projected Norms of Agricultural Production: The Logics of Food 
Sovereignty versus  The Logics of the Green Revolution  
The National Plan for the Support of Peasants’ Agriculture was the result of a 25-year 
discussion among UNAC members and civil society organizations for a sustainable model 
of development. The main concern of UNAC and other civil society organizations is the 
promotion of ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘land rights’ against a model of development that 
focuses on commodities for export based on an intensive type of agriculture. As a nodal 
point, ‘food sovereignty’ articulated many other signifiers which gave meaning to it and 
helped define an alternative model of development. These were ‘autonomy’, 
‘independence’, rights of peasants’, ‘technology and extension based on local values, 
knowledge and culture’, ‘local markets’, ‘economic, social and environmental 
sustainability’, ‘and ‘non-intensive agricultural practices’(UNAC, 2014; Farmlandgrab, 
2013b).  
Even though the discourse on ‘food sovereignty’ failed to become hegemonic as 
Sabaratnam (2017) noted, the pressure led by UNAC sought to challenge the government’s 
discourse articulated around ‘food security’ and ‘sustainability’ in its agricultural plans. In 
them, ‘food security’ meant a model of development whereby the ‘[international] market’, 
‘the state’, ‘private investment’, and ‘the peasant’ were articulated in an integrated and thus 
harmonious way, as will become clear (República de Moçambique, 2007b; 2011; CAADP, 
2003). 
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The view and norms defended by the Mozambican government for the agricultural sector 
have been to a large extent in line with international donors such as USAID and the World 
Bank and with initiatives such as the NEPAD’s (New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development) CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme), the 
idea of the Green Revolution and the G-8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. 
As a member of the African Union, Mozambique signed in 2003 the Maputo Declaration, 
which launched the CAADP. The document sought to promote agricultural growth in the 
continent by determining that each country commit 10% of its national budget to the 
agricultural sector. The aim was to achieve a minimum of 6% annual growth in the sector 
alone (Mogues and Rosario, 2016). It identified agriculture as a pathway for poverty 
reduction, focusing on four foundation pillars of development: 
 
i) Extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems; ii) 
improving rural infrastructure and trade related capacities for market access; iii) increasing food 
supply and reducing hunger; iv) and agricultural research, technology dissemination, and 
adoption (CAADP, 2003). 
 
According to the report, the four pillars would serve as the basis to promote sustainable 
agricultural development. This would be achieved through investment in infrastructure: 
“roads, storage, processing and market facilities […]”  “that will be required to support the 
anticipated growth in agricultural production and improve the competitiveness of 
production […]” (CAADP, 2003: 13). Apart from boosting exports, the CAADP was also 
concerned with the domestic and regional markets. In terms of legislation, it mentioned the 
need to tackle the “uncertain policy environments” and promote “regulatory institutions 
such as laws regarding market conduct and the enforcement of contracts, ownership rules 
and property rights, and grades and standards” (CAADP, 2003: 14; 79). For the 
development of the infrastructure, the report suggests “the apportionment of funding among 
the private and public, internal and external sources” (CAADP, 2003: 14). Despite a large 
proportion of private foreign investment needed for large-scale production destined for 
export markets, the report also focuses on the rural poor and their food security. It proposes 
programmes that increase productivity of small farmers and their integration into contract 
farming schemes, cooperatives, farmers’ associations, credit clubs, amongst others, all 
integrated into value chains. 
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Further in 2006, the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for the African Green Revolution 
stated that:  
 
[R]egarding food security in Africa, farmers will need to shift from low yielding, extensive land 
practices to more intensive, higher-yielding practices, with increased use of improved seeds, 
fertilizers and irrigation.29 
 
However, the enthusiasm with the CAADP faded away and the Mozambican government 
failed to adopt any consistent agricultural policies or initiatives for years. From 2001 to 
2010, the government spent 2.68% of the national budget in agriculture, rather than the 
10% suggested by the Maputo Declaration (Mosca and Abbas, 2016). Of this, 23% went to 
small-scale farmers, while 67% went to medium and large-scale producers (Cassamo et al, 
2013 in Mosca and Abbas, 2016).  
In this sense, the CAADP remained as “projected norms”, that is, norms that have not been 
implemented or materialized in concrete practices (Glynos et al, 2015). Against the 
backdrop of the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on food prices, the government of 
Mozambique decided to commit to the ‘Green Revolution Strategy’ in 2007, reviving at the 
same time the CAADP. Based on the 2003 document, the Green Revolution Strategy 
sought to establish the guidelines for the transformation of subsistence agriculture into 
commercial agriculture (PEDSA, 2010 – Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture 
Mozambique, 2010). This would involve a holistic view of agricultural development, from 
research to commercialization and processing (Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture, 
2011). 
The idea of ‘Green Revolution’ has been at the core of the debate on agriculture in 
Mozambique since then. Nuno Castel-Branco (2008b) maps out the main discourses and 
contestations around it in “Notas de Reflexão sobre a Revolução Verde”. Castel-Branco 
says that the inspiration for the Green Revolution in African countries comes from the 
Indian and Latin American experiences in the 1960s and 1970s, and focuses on the 
intensive use of technology and consequent fast-paced increase in production, productivity 
and income (Castel-Branco, 2008b) based on the integration of the peasants in value chains 
through contract farming (Mosca, 2017).  
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Indeed, a commonly repeated theme in my interviews with Embrapa researchers was that 
African government officials and diplomats frequently expressed a desire to replicate 
Brazil’s green revolution while in meetings with Embrapa’s staff. This has also been 
confirmed by other studies on SSC projects between Brazil and Mozambique, according to 
which the Mozambican government expressed the desire to develop its agriculture based on 
Brazil’s agribusiness model (Cabral et al, 2016). 
But the signifier ‘green revolution’ has also been linked to other more negative elements: 
agri-business commercial interests, pesticides, genetic modified organisms (GMO), 
monoculture, environmental unsustainability, and marginalization of local knowledge 
(Castel-Branco, 2008b). Peasant associations and other non-governmental organizations 
usually link the signifier with land grabbing, worsening of social inequality, 
marginalization of small farmers, relationship of dependency between small farmers and 
international agribusiness corporations, as well as marginalization of local alternative 
technologies that could be more accessible and sustainable (Castel-Branco, 2008b). In 
2008, in the V International Conference of Via Campesina, the president of UNAC 
condemned the ‘modernization’ of the agriculture under the green revolution, claiming that  
 
[t]he green revolution has happened in various countries and has only created environmental and 
social destruction, migration from rural to urban spaces, contamination of food. The green 
revolution is a failure from the point of view of food sovereignty […]30 
 
As an instrument for implementing the Green Revolution Strategy, the government 
launched the first ‘Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development’ (PEDSA) in 2010, 
replacing it a year later with the PEDSA 2011-2020. In line with the CAADP, the plan also 
followed several calls for the Mozambican government to invest more in agriculture and to 
direct more aid to boost agricultural productivity (UNCTAD, 2008). The plan was built on 
four pillars, or central objectives, in a reminder of the CAADP’s four pillars:   
 
Pillar I: Agrarian productivity – Increase in productivity, production and agricultural 
competitiveness, contributing to an adequate diet; Pillar II: Access to the markets – Services and 
Infrastructure for greater access to the market and guidelines that are conducive to agrarian 
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investment; Pillar III: Natural resources – sustainable use of land, water, forests and fauna; Pillar 
IV: Institutions – Strong agrarian institutions. (República de Mozambique, 2011). 
 
Based on these, the plan sets out major shifts in policies, with a much greater role for the 
state in promoting investment with a focus on small and medium commercial farmers 
(Hanlon, 2011). It makes the case for the role of agriculture in reducing poverty, and 
reverses farm policies of the World Bank, the IMF and other donors, promoting the 
expansion of rural extension and agricultural research (Hanlon, 2011). It also reintroduces 
domestic seed production and the reestablishment of the Mozambique Cereal Institute 
(ICM) as a buyer of last resort.  
Despite no consultation with civil society organizations, the PEDSA did focus on 
smallholder and medium farmers to strengthen agriculture. This would be done within the 
six identified ‘Development Corridors’, among them the Nacala Corridor. The development 
of the ‘corridors’ is based on the development of two central concepts: ‘value chains’ and 
‘clusters’. Although not clearly defined, these concepts involve the transformation of 
products from farmers to consumers, and the integration of the key identified actors: the 
public sector, the private sector, cooperatives, civil society organizations and public-private 
partnerships, which according to the plan should be privileged where best fit (Ministry of 
Agriculture Mozambique, 2011).  
Despite its focus on small and medium farmers, for the operationalization of the PEDSA 
the Mozambican government created the agribusiness-friendly National Agriculture and 
Food Security Investment Plan (PNISA), which drew heavy criticism from the UNAC 
(Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016) and other civil society organizations, such as Livaningo, 
Justiça Ambiental e Adecru. 
The PNISA reflected, according to Shankland and Gonçalves (2016: 37), “the way in which 
capital-intensive agribusiness has come to be imagined by the Mozambican policy elite as a 
powerful alternative agricultural development approach”.  Others have noted that like in 
Brazil, large-scale agribusiness producers were acquiring an increasingly important role in 
the government’s agricultural agenda (Mosca and Abbas, 2016; Castel-Branco, 2013).  
But the view of large mechanized plantations as a solution for Mozambique’s economic 
and social problems is not new and can be traced back to Frelimo’s view of development 
after independence, which rejected not only capitalism but also the idea of the ‘traditional 
man’. The modernity sought by Frelimo found its expression in the idea of the ‘New Man’, 
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who was above all scientific, rejecting the traditional past and embracing a socialist future 
(Mahoney, 2003). In a recent article, Hanlon (2017) noted that “[n]o new plantation has 
succeeded since independence […] But it has not stopped Frelimo leaders since Samora 
Machel from dreaming of giant mechanised farms funded by hundreds of millions of 
dollars from abroad”. 
The PNISA was born as a response to the growing interest of international capital in 
acquiring land in Mozambique for large-scale agribusiness production.  At the same time 
Mozambique joined the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which consists 
of an alliance between the G8, ten African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D’Ivoir, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawai, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania), and 227 
companies such as Syngenta and Yara International (Monjane, 2017). The New Alliance 
sought to “[a]ccelerate implementation of key components of the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)” by promoting private investment.31  
In this context, PNISA sought to operationalize the CAADP, the PEDSA and the New 
Alliance by providing a blueprint for the development of the agricultural sector in which 
the role of foreign private investment was central. Therefore, PNISA’s main focus and 
norms were in line with the CAADP and what the Mozambican government expected from 
the green revolution. It thus sought to bring private foreign investment, transform the 
agricultural production into capital-intensive production for both the domestic and the 
export markets by integrating the peasant into value chains that would allow them to 
become more competitive and productive, as the argument goes. 
In sum, what all these plans and policies have in common is the signifier ‘food security’ as 
a nodal point, linked with high productivity, mechanization, sustainability, and the main 
actors, namely the State, private/foreign investment, the peasant, co-existing in harmony 
alongside a national and international market.  
In the next section, I suggest that in line with the logics of agribusiness, the first ‘Master 
Plan’ of the ProSavannah rearticulates the above mentioned signifiers around the signifier 
‘cluster’ as a nodal point. 
 
4.4. The ProSavannah Project and the Logics of Transformism 
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Inspired by Brazil’s experience in agricultural development and tropical technology, the 
ProSavannah meant to increase agricultural production and transform the region of the 
Nacala corridor in Northern Mozambique into the country’s breadbasket. The programme 
comprises three stages. The first one, the ProSavannah PI consists of research and 
technology transfer capacity, involving the strengthening of the Mozambican Institute for 
Agrarian Investigation, the IIAM. It was the only component that had the direct 
participation of Embrapa to date. At the time of my fieldwork, this stage of the project had 
already finished. The third stage, the PEM (Extension and Models), aims at transferring the 
technology developed into the hands of producers.  
The second and most controversial stage was called ProSavannah PD, a ‘Master Plan’ 
whose first inception meant “to promote significant private-sector investment in 
commercial agriculture and agro-processing in [an estimated 14 million hectares of]32 the 
Nacala Corridor” (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016). Although Embrapa, the MRE and the 
Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture (MASA) have frequently denied or downplayed the 
private-investment component of the project, in 2012 the consultancy arm of the Brazilian 
Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), the FGV Agro, was chosen to design the Master Plan 
which meant to create a system based on the use of intensive technological capital for the 
promotion of monocultures of commodities, especially soya and corn, for the export 
markets (Mosca and Bruna, 2015). In order to capture and encourage foreign investment, 
FGV Agro’s sister company FGV Projetos established the Nacala Fund, expected to attract 
USD 2 bi especially from Brazilian and Japanese agribusiness33.  
In this section I focus the analysis mostly on the first Master Plan, which illustrates a set of 
themes and norms that cut across a wide range of other related documents. I supplement my 
analysis with interviews conducted during my fieldwork in Brazil and Mozambique, media 
publications, institutional website information and public statements by Brazilian, Japanese 
and Mozambican authorities in regards to the ProSavannah as well as with references to 
secondary literature. Finally, it is important to note that the Master Plan was one of the 
triggers of the antagonism constructed by opponents and the proponents of ProSavannah, 
and thus a contested object itself. 
In the first years of ProSavannah’s inception the main arguments supporting the 
cooperation project were based on the biophysical similarities between the central region of 
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the Cerrado, where Japan and Brazil had developed the Prodecer (Cooperation Program for 
the Development of the Cerrado), and the Mozambican savannah. This was widely 
explored by all parts of the trilateral project, including media publications in the three 
countries (see Classen 2013; Hanlon and Smart, 2013). In 2013, speaking to a media outlet 
Dinheiro Rural (Rural Money) the director of the ABC stated: “Brazil’s commitment to this 
project is due to the similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and the Nacala Corridor’s 
soil and climate” (Hanlon and Smart, 2013). This similarity implied that the region of the 
Nacala Corridor, like the Cerrado in Brazil before the Prodecer, had vast unused, 
unproductive land (Classen, 2013). As the project developed, Embrapa, the MRE and the 
Mozambican government discourse changed to acknowledge differences between the two 
regions. This was indeed one of the strategies to pre-empt and de-contest the norms against 
the ProSavannah, as will become clear in Chapter 5. 
The first blue print for the development of the ProSavannah, the Master Plan, was 
conducted without consultation with Mozambique’s local communities. The 2013 PD 
Report was a 204-page study which proposed a project that was meant to be highly 
ambitious and transformative. It consisted of 32 “component projects” whose main 
objective was to “promote economic and social development through agricultural 
development in the Nacala Corridor” (Master Plan, 2013: 11). For this purpose, it makes an 
extensive analysis of the potential for agricultural development of the Nacala Corridor, 
which was divided into 6 zones according to their topographic characteristics, human 
resource potential, farmland access, and management type that should be applied, with 
“suitable areas” being distributed among family farming, entrepreneurial production 
(medium scale farmers), and corporate production (large-scale production). This division 
and classification already represented an attempt to fix identities and signifiers, and thus to 
hegemonize the knowledge about the Nacala region, functioning as a pre-requisite for the 
actual control of the physical space. Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) explore how FGV 
Agro deployed a “map-based digital presentation package”, designed to show its “profound 
knowledge of the landscape of Northern Mozambique” and “evidence of the technical 
suitability and economic viability of the sites chosen for the ‘agribusiness clusters’” 
(Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016:40). This, as the authors argued, was part of a strategy to 
discursively construct a “landscape imaginary” whose function was to draw similarities 
between the Brazilian cerrado and the Mozambican savannah. 
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More importantly, three interrelated key aspects in this report are worth noting. The first 
one is the development model proposed and how it is supposed to evolve over time through 
three phases. As a matter of “urgency”, the report states that “there must be transition from 
shifting cultivation to settled farming” (Master Plan, 2013: 61), so that there is 
“transformation of extensive farming to intensive and market-oriented farming […]” 
(Master Plan, 2013: 63). In order to obtain this transformation, the plan argues, there must 
be intensive agricultural technology transfer and a key role for private actors and private 
capital. Phase I (2014-20), II (2021-25) and III (2026-30) are described as steps to achieve 
the specific goals of each project and the overall goals of the Master Plan as a whole. Each 
of these phases encompasses small to medium-scale farmers, farmers’ organizations and 
agribusiness.   
See table 1 below (Master Plan, 2013: 2/12):
 
 
The final common objective in the table that describes the development of each of the 
zones is, as described below, “[s]urplus of major food crops [which] fulfils the demand 
from processing and livestock industries, as well as [an increase in] the exported amount of 
the crops [..]” (Master Plan, 2013: 2/12): 
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Both the development model and the steps to get there are, then, defined by the Master Plan 
in a reminder of the evolutionary process and developmental path disseminated by 
modernization theory. Unlike Brazil itself, though, Mozambique could “skip 40 or 50 years 
in the developmental stages because what Mozambicans need is ready in Brazil”, said an 
Embrapa interviewee about the leading technology Embrapa provides (Interview 3, Brazil, 
September 2017).  
A second key aspect of the report is how it constructs the subjects and objects within this 
model of development. It does so by constructing an equivalential chain connecting 
“stakeholders” of the project around the idea of production through ‘clusters’. “Cotton 
clusters”, “vegetable clusters”, “potato clusters”, “agricultural clusters” amongst others are 
defined as:  
 
[…] strategic approaches to accelerate development within a specified territory. The central line 
of development of these strategies is to design one or more value chains, with synergic potential 
and in appropriate context regarding the territory, in order to channel efforts for its realization 
within a period lower than that which could be achieved without integrated and specific actions. 
All producers, companies and institutions that are correlated with the central value chain, such as 
input suppliers, machinery suppliers, specialized infrastructure or competing entities, represent 
the constitutional elements of a Cluster (Master Plan, 2013: 2/14). 
 
Further to this definition, the Master Plan goes on to say that clusters also involve other 
actors such as “consumers”, “producers of complementary products”, “companies”, 
“governmental institutions”, “universities”, “training centres and commerce”, “corporate 
domestic and foreign producers”, and “Mozambican smallholders”. These are meant to 
work together “in synergy” to promote a common interest: the “political, social and 
especially economic development of [the] Nacala Corridor” (Master Plan 2013: 2/14). 
As such, ‘cluster’ assumes the role of a nodal point around which all the actors (or 
‘stakeholders’) converge. It promises an ideal of development which unites all the actors: 
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big, small, government, private, consumers, providers etc. The linking together of these 
signifiers erases all potential differences they may have: differences of capacity, interests, 
and goals, in order to occupy one common subject position: that of the actor who will 
benefit from the model proposed by the cluster. This reconciliatory strategy, which I regard 
as a strategy of transformism, is at the core of the discourse on, and indeed constitutes the 
institutional identity of the ProSavannah. Drawing on Gramsci (1971), transformism 
involves the absorption of elements (or demands) that seemed irreconcilable so that 
relations of difference are created and the antagonistic potential of the excluded elements is 
weakened. Rather than clashing, the supposedly irreconcilable demands now have the same 
goal. Indeed, according to the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, the coordinator of the 
ProSavannah, Calisto Bias, argued that the project represented a ‘win-win’ situation for all 
parties (Fama and Anesi, 2013), thus refuting the potential hierarchical relationship 
between the large-scale producer and the small farmer in the ProSavannah project. 
The “small-scale farmer” or “family sector farmer” in the overall picture painted by the 
Master Plan were meant to be integrated in clusters through contract farming arrangements, 
“which would result in increased productivity and better market access for small-scale 
farmers” (Master Plan, 2013: 3/33). Although one would imagine this relationship to be 
vertical, the plan only uses the term ‘vertical’ once, and with the expression “at first”:  
 
At first, a single corporation shall be responsible for managing all operation of the cluster, acting 
in a vertical way, with activities that involve the acquisition of necessary inputs until the 
production and processing of raw material (Master Plan, 2013: 2/17). 
 
A third aspect worth noting is that the plan predicts an era of abundance to all involved. 
“Increased productivity”, “effective use of land”, “surplus”, “expansion of businesses”, 
“revitalization”, “boost in production”, “modernization”, which should resolve the problem 
of rural poverty and food insecurity (Master Plan, 2013). 
In sum, by following the path for development proposed in the Master Plan, and having as 
a pillar the idea of integration between all kinds of actors, amongst them private capital, the 
ProSavannah promises to deliver abundance and prosperity to all parts. The necessary 
character of the social logics of the ProSavannah has been reinforced by most of my 
interviewees, who argued Mozambique’s development depended on ProSavannah’s 
implementation.  
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But the reconciliation proposed by the ProSavannah is not new and is at the core of Brazil’s 
agricultural domestic policies.  In the next section I aim to trace back the origins of this 
model. 
 
4.5. Contested Agricultural Development in Brazil and Embrapa’s 
Institutional Identity.  
The transformist strategy operationalized in the Master Plan 2013 reflects in large part the 
view the Workers’ Party government had of agricultural development in Brazil. On the one 
hand, ‘family-farming’ received more attention under the PT government than in any other 
government after the re-democratization in the mid 1980s. On the other, agribusiness 
groups became even more economically and politically powerful.  
The implementation of the 2006 Law 11.326 established the guidelines for the elaboration 
of the National Policy for Family Farming and Rural Family Enterprise.34 According to 
this law, the definition of ‘family farming’ was based on four criteria:  
 
i) the land should not exceed four fiscal modules,35 ii) the farm should mainly rely on family 
labour, iii) a minimum percentage of family income must be derived from the agricultural 
establishment or enterprise, iv) the farm has to be administered/managed by the farmer or his or 
her family. (Schmitt et al, 2015). 
 
Based on this definition, the Workers’ Party sought to strengthen family-farming through 
social policies such as ‘Fome Zero’ (Zero Hunger) and agricultural credit, while at the same 
time promoting the narrative according to which both development models should coexist 
and complement each other. When criticized by a representative of Via Campesina about 
the “irreconcilable interests of both models of agriculture”, Lula argued that: “Family 
farming is very important, and I repeat myself here: It is not incompatible with commercial 
agriculture. Blessed is Brazil, who has two extraordinary production capacities in 
agriculture […]” (Lopes, 2006). 
This rationale was reflected in the ministerial structure under the PT government, with two 
different ministries in charge of agricultural development: the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (MDA, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário,), and the Ministry of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2006/Lei/L11326.htm [accessed 17 July 2019]. 
35	  “The fiscal module is an agrarian measurement unit representing the minimum area for rural properties to be considered economically 
viable. A fiscal module can vary between 5 and 110 hectares, depending on the region” (Schmitt et al, 2015).	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Agriculture (or MAPA, Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento) (Cabral et al, 
2016). The former was in charge of promoting family farming, while the latter defended the 
interests of the agribusiness.  
Critics of this ‘conciliatory model’ have usually looked at agricultural development in a 
dualist way (Cabral et al, 2016). For them, there are two divergent paradigms of 
agricultural development, namely the ‘agrarian question’, to which they subscribe, and the 
‘agrarian capitalism’, which they criticize (Fernandes, 2016). The ‘agrarian question’ sees 
the problems derived from agrarian development as the product of capitalism (Fernandes, 
2016). According to this paradigm, the peasantry (as an unproblematic category) must 
engage in a (class) struggle against agrarian capitalism and its agribusiness-based model in 
order to build an alternative society which gives the peasantry autonomy (Fernandes, 2016). 
This is because the model of agribusiness promoted by agrarian capitalism and that of 
family farming are irreconcilable. This view is held by the National Confederation of 
Agricultural Workers (CONTAG), the Family Farming Workers Federation (FETRAF), 
and found adherents in parts of the now extinct MDA (Cabral et al, 2016). It is also the 
view held by the great majority of Brazil’s CSOs who opposed the ProSavannah project. 
For the paradigm of the ‘agrarian capitalism’, on the other hand, the conflicts and 
inequalities produced by capitalism are a consequence of wrong economic policies which 
should be replaced by policies that promote the integration of family farmers into the 
market (Fernandes, 2016). According to Abramovay, (1992, in Fernandes 2016: 50), “[t]his 
logic sees the peasantry and capital as components of a single political space, part of a 
single whole (capitalist society), making no distinction between them because the class 
struggle is not an element of this paradigm”. The separation between these two segments, 
as the argument goes, is artificial because family farming supports agribusiness by 
providing raw material in many cases, such as in the case of poultry farming (Valente, 
2008). This was the view of the great majority of my Embrapa interviewees, for whom it 
made no sense to talk about two distinct categories of agricultural producers. 
At the core of different views on agricultural development is the category of ‘family 
farming’, which is itself a contested category within Brazil. Some authors (see Valente, 
2008; Navarro and Pedroso 2011; Cabral et al, 2016) note that family farming is a highly 
heterogeneous group, encompassing families or groups with different socio-economic 
development levels. These may range from poor producers in underdeveloped parts of the 
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country to family farmers who adopt high input technologies such as machineries and are 
well integrated into the global market (Cabral et al, 2016). As a contested category, ‘family 
farming’ can be understood as a floating signifier whose various meanings reflect “Brazil’s 
historical socio-political struggle and complex agricultural system” (Cabral et al, 2016: 56).  
Based on this understanding, Cabral et al (2016) problematize the ‘dualism argument’ 
according to which Brazilian agriculture is divided into agribusiness x family farming. 
What is more, Cabral (2019) argues that when the dualism narrative is applied abroad by 
actors outside the socio-political and economic context where these categories were 
constructed, it loses its legitimacy. This will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
Against the accusation that the dualism argument oversimplifies the category of family 
farming, some of my interviewees from the Brazilian civil society that opposed the 
ProSavannah claimed that their view of family farming was in line with the Landless 
Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) and the Via 
Campesina. These are stricter in their definition of family farming, which excludes those 
who have relied on technological modernization and market integration (Cabral et al, 
2016). As many of my interviewers said, the latter were called “mini agribusiness” 
(Interviews 25, 26, 27, 47, Brazil, 2017). 
The dualist view and the struggles that co-constituted it can be traced back to Brazil’s green 
revolution and the consequent strengthening of the agrarian capitalist paradigm. While 
agricultural research promoted by the Brazilian state has privileged the needs of the large-
scale producers since the establishment of the first research institute at the end of the XIX 
century (Castro, 2016), it was not until the 1960s with the ‘Green Revolution’ which 
modernized the agricultural sector that the paradigm of agrarian capitalism became 
hegemonic. The political and economic context as well as domestic and international 
interests shaped the consensus around agrarian policies that promoted a capital-intensive 
monoculture export production system with the replacement of work force by technology 
and the intensive use of fertilizers and pesticides (Castro, 2016).  
Politically, the 1964 military coup d’etat marked the abandonment of redistributive agrarian 
reforms advocated by the Peasant Leagues, which meant to challenge the highly 
concentrated agrarian structure of the Brazilian territory and the labour relations established 
as a consequence. The military government believed the focus of the economy should be 
the modernization of agriculture and the promotion of an industrial sector that produced 
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input for this capital-intensive commodity producer agriculture (Castro, 2016). This 
integration between the agricultural sector and the industry and of both sectors with the 
international markets was the primary goal of the economy under the military government 
as a response to the growing demand for food from the urban centres and the international 
markets (Delgado, 2005). 
If domestic interests played a crucial role in shaping government policies that benefitted 
large-scale producers in what was called the ‘conservative agrarian modernization’, or the 
‘agrarian modernization without agrarian reform’ (Delgado, 2005), international interests 
also played a major role in shaping the conservative thinking and policies of the time.  
Indeed, Nehring (2016) situates the origin of Embrapa within the geopolitical context of the 
Cold War and argues that its establishment emanated from a long established relationship 
between politically-motivated US scientists, institutions, agricultural experts and 
businessmen such as Nelson Rockefeller and the Brazilian governmental bodies. Through 
profit and non-profit organizations whose “activities consisted of agricultural extension 
services, licensing businesses, establishing stock markets and the exportation and 
development of scientific knowledge all based on US models and experiences” (Nehring, 
2016: 209), Rockefeller had great influence in shaping Brazilian science and scientific 
rationale for the modernization of agriculture and development of the Cerrado based on 
imported US inputs (Nehring, 2016).  
Furthermore, the US government exercised direct influence through USAID, which 
provided US$106,123,0009 between 1961 to 1969 to finance activities related to surveys 
and training of Brazilian scientists (Adams, 1970 in Nehring, 2016). Local practices such as 
the use of steamed bone meal as agricultural input were discouraged by USAID in favour 
of modern inputs available at the global market in order to enable large-scale commodity 
production (Nehring, 2016). 
Thus, Nehring (2016) argues that, unlike the official narrative according to which 
Embrapa’s agricultural technology was a product of Brazil’s own scientific innovation and 
political will, decades of close US-Brazil agricultural partnership based on corporate and 
political interests within the context of the Cold War helped pave the way for the 
modernization of the Cerrado. The scientific rationale behind it was embedded in the 
assumption that US technological superiority in agriculture should be used to transform and 
‘civilize’ the region. This is not to say, however, that Brazil simply adopted scientific 
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expertise coming from the US (Nehring, 2016). The author sees the modernization of 
Brazil’s agriculture as the product of an ongoing process of US-Brazil cooperation which 
resulted in the institutionalization and nationalization of this rationale by the establishment 
of Embrapa (Nehring, 2016: 207). 
The modernization of agriculture brought about by the Green Revolution meant family 
farming and small-scale producers became unimportant and neglected by rural policies 
(Delgado, 2005). As Nehring (2016: 13) explains, “[t]his bias [in favour of large-scale 
agriculture] was apparent not only in the scientific assumptions of agricultural 
modernization […] but also in the distribution of government credit as farm size and crop 
type significantly determined credit distribution”. Furthermore, the integration between a 
modernized agriculture and various industrial activities (such as oilseed processing, sugar 
cane mills, alcohol, paper, tobacco, textile industries etc) paved the way for the 
predominance of agribusiness conglomerates in the government agenda for agrarian policy 
(Delgado, 2005).  
With the end of the repressive military regime, social movements gained space in the 
political scenario and the debate on agrarian reform was revived. The Landless Movement 
(MST) was born and became one of the main actors in the fight for land reform (Delgado, 
2005), reviving the Peasant League’s struggle from the 1950s and 1960s. The 1988 
Constitution established that land should fulfil a social function, which meant unproductive 
land used for speculative activity should be expropriated and redistributed. However, in 
practice, and against the backdrop of the debt crisis, the political establishment saw an 
important role for the agribusiness in promoting a positive balance of trade, which would 
help service the debt (Delgado, 2005). 
With the adoption of neoliberal policies and the opening up of the economy to the outside 
world, the 1990s saw a sharp fall on agricultural income and land prices. For family 
farming, the withdrawal of the state from agricultural policy meant alternative rural 
development continued to be neglected.  
It was only in the end of the 1990s that the government revived the positive balance of 
trade policy, consequently implementing policies that would promote agribusiness 
(Delgado, 2005). In this context, Embrapa, and other agencies conducting publicly-financed 
research, were encouraged to work closely with multinational agribusiness companies 
(Castro, 2016; Nehring, 2016). As a consequence, family farming remained neglected.  
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In the 2000s, despite advances in promoting family farming as an alternative development 
model institutionalized by Law 11.326, the Workers’ Party government further supported 
the agribusiness sector, which became stronger (Fernandes, 2016). As a sign of their 
strength, the agribusiness caucus became the main interest group in Congress, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture controlled 85% of the agricultural budget from 2006 to 2016 
(Fernandes, 2016). Furthermore, since the 1990s Embrapa had become increasingly 
dependent on private investment in order to conduct research (Castro, 2016). 
In large part, SSC drew its legitimacy from Brazil’s successful social policies and 
programmes, which lifted tens of thousands of people out of extreme poverty (World 
Bank)36. Agriculture, as one of the “areas in which Brazil has developed technical 
expertise” (Rossi, 2013), was seen as the engine for this transformation, and one of the 
main areas on which SSC should focus. The Workers’ Party conciliatory approach to 
agricultural development was seen as a success story, and consequently something to be 
replicated in Africa. In a 2011 address on ‘Brazilian Technical Cooperation’, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota, said:  
 
[…] we knew how to combine the competitiveness of agribusiness with the solidity of family 
farming. We understand that both forms of organizing agricultural production are 
complementary and not mutually exclusive. We understand that each of these modalities adapts 
better to a certain type of culture or market. This synergy between agribusiness and family 
farming developed in Brazil is a result of the multiple geographical and social contexts within 
the country. In the face of such diverse problems, we need to always find creative and 
conciliatory solutions [emphasis added] (MRE, 2011). 
 
In this context, Embrapa represented an institution that could provide technology to both 
large and small producers, as most of my interviewees would emphasize, especially in the 
context of tropical climates. During Lula’s years, Embrapa became a key actor in SSC 
projects, with offices in Ghana, Venezuela and Panama, and laboratories in the US, France, 
South Korea, China and Japan (forthcoming).  
Thus, the implementation of the ProSavannah meant to promote Embrapa’s state of the art 
technology in Africa and transform Mozambique’s agriculture based on what had been 
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/EXTLACREGTOPEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:21447054~
menuPK:444477~pagePK:2865114~piPK:2865167~theSitePK:444459,00.html (accessed 19 January 2019).	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done in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s. In order to do this, ProSavannah’s main norms 
promoted in the Master Plan reproduced the hegemonic norms of agricultural production in 
Brazil. 
As noted, virtually all my interviewees at Embrapa promoted the view that agricultural 
development involves only one category, which they call ‘agribusiness’, and therefore it 
does not make sense to differentiate between ‘family farmers’ as opposed to ‘agribusiness’. 
However, it is important to note that Embrapa is not a monolith. With its headquarters in 
Brasilia, Embrapa has seventeen decentralized units and offices throughout Brazil, each 
dedicated to a region, expertise and agricultural practice. As such, amongst these there are 
units such as ‘Embrapa Coffee’, ‘Embrapa Cotton’, ‘Embrapa Cattle’, and also a unit 
specialized in agroecology. In this sense, opinions of agricultural development change, and 
by no means I argue that the personnel involved in the ProSavannah represent 100% of the 
view held by others at Embrapa. 
What did become clear through my interviews was that virtually everyone, as part of 
Embrapa, identified strongly with a series of attributes. Signifiers such as ‘scientific 
excellence’, ‘professional’, ‘efficient’, ‘hard-working’ and ‘apolitical’ were constantly 
articulated and linked with Embrapa. These signifiers, I argue, constituted Embrapa’s 
institutional identity. Importantly, since for many of them SSC was ‘political’ or 
‘ideological’ (“It was a wrong strategy, because it was eminently political” – Interview 6, 
Brazil, 2017) there was an effort on the part of some to delink Embrapa’s identity from 
SSC as a foreign policy strategy.  
Thus, although on the part of most of my interviewees, there was a concern, as Cesarino 
(2013) also remarked, with sustainability and ownership of projects, this was not 
particularly related to SSC principles of horizontality, sovereignty and non-interference. 
Embrapa’s institutional identity was much more linked with science and technology, while 
politics was more often than not rejected. Even the establishment of the Secretaria de 
Relações Internacionais (Secretariat of International Relations – Portuguese acronym SRI) 
with professionals whose background was in International Relations in order to plan and 
coordinate with ABC cooperation projects was seen with scepticism. When I asked about 
the importance of the SRI and International Relations professionals within Embrapa, one of 
my interviewees said: 
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[…] I may be rude with my colleagues from International Relations, which I don’t want to. But 
there is a difference between a professional from Agricultural Engineering and a professional 
from International Relations. In order to do technical cooperation in farming, I prefer an 
agricultural engineer. Because this guy, I tell him to study a language, I teach him a few things 
etc, he will do it. The part that concerns the International Relations profession, I can do it 
[myself]. The opposite, you cannot do (Interview 8, Brazil, 2017).  
 
Despite the creation of the SRI, there was never a broad political strategy uniting the 
institution around SSC (Interview 2, Brazil, 2017), as was the case of Fiocruz. Furthermore, 
the view of most of my interviewees that were involved with the ProSavannah 
implementation was that politics interfered with the natural progress of the project. They 
frequently remarked that Embrapa was in charge of the technical part, not politics. 
Embrapa’s response to conflict was itself part of their view of the development process, 
which should be managed by science without the interference of politics. This will be 
further explored in the next chapter. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the existing social logics of agricultural production in Mozambique, 
based on ‘conservation agriculture’ and characterized by poverty and food scarcity. It also 
explored the projected logics advocated on the one hand by the Peasants’ Union (UNAC) 
under the signifier ‘food sovereignty’, and the logics advocated by the government and 
international donors under the signifier ‘green revolution’. By historicizing these norms this 
chapter brings to the fore the long-standing dispute between two divergent logics of 
agricultural production within Mozambican society. In other words, the struggle between 
different models of development already existed in Mozambique. 
The chapter also explored the social logics of agricultural production contained in the 
Master Plan of the ProSavannah. When the Mozambican civil society organizations learn of 
the existence of the project, they mobilize projected norms and draw on other discursive 
resources in other to oppose the ProSavannah, as will be clear in the next chapter. The 
conflict and antagonism between the pro-peasant civil society network and the 
ProSavannah proponents that shaped the project reverberated the long-standing antagonism 
between two development paradigms in Brazil too.  However, while under the Workers’ 
Party this antagonism was weakened by the logics of transformism produced by Lula’s own 
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political style (coined as lulismo by André Singer) and policies, in Mozambique the radical 
contingency of social structures was exposed through the antagonism that involved several 
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Chapter 5: The Political Logics of the ProSavannah 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Hailed as a transformative agricultural project by its proponents and as “the biggest land-
grab in Africa” by its critics (see Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016: 36), the ProSavannah 
triggered a political struggle that mobilized several actors in Brazil, Mozambique and 
Japan. 
This chapter will explore the political logics of contestation against the ProSavannah, and 
the logics of de-contestation by the proponents of the ProSavannah. The former was 
mobilized by a transnational network of civil society organizations, and was based not only 
on discourses that linked the ProSavannah to Brazil’s experience with the Prodecer, but 
importantly, to Mozambique’s own experience with large scale projects during colonial 
times and beyond. The signifier ‘dependence’, for example, framed the peasants’ 
experience with large-scale projects and opposed the signifier ‘integration’ articulated by 
the social logics of transformism promoted by the Master Plan (cf. Chapter 4). Likewise, 
the signifier ‘land-grabbing’, for example, proved to be a fundamental nodal point in the 
articulation of this struggle.  
As a response, the ProSavannah proponents both in Mozambique and in Brazil applied 
political logics that sought to pre-empt this contestation. I call these the political logics of 
denial, differentiation and marginalization as it relies mostly on discourses that seek to deny 
the opponents’ agency, differentiate Mozambique from Brazil, and marginalize alternative 
forms of agricultural development.  
I argue that the civil society organizations engaged in the ‘No to ProSavannah’ campaign 
managed to partially re-politicize development because they exposed the political and 
ethical dimensions of the project. However, they could not fully re-politicize it since they 
failed to hegemonize the field of discursivity with their own empty signifier representing 
the collective good. 
Finally, I will explore the ideological fantasy underpinning the political logics articulated 
by the ProSavannah proponents. This fantasmatic narrative explains the grip of the political 
logics of de-contestation and relies on the narrative of the transformation of the Brazilian 
savannah, the cerrado, into Brazil’s breadbasket. As will become clear, this narrative has a 
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necessary character as it sees the modernization of agriculture into highly productive and 
technologically intensive practices as the only path to development. 
This chapter is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section will explore 
the political logic of contestation employed by the civil society organizations that formed 
the opposition to the ProSavannah. The third section will explore the strategies shaped by 
the political logics of denial, differentiation and marginalization, applied by the government 
of Mozambique, particularly the MASA, and the IIAM, and by the government of Brazil, 
namely Embrapa and the MRE. The political logics reveal how contested norms are 
challenged or maintained through the logics of equivalence and difference.  Finally, the last 
section before the conclusion will explore the fantasmatic logics, which I call ‘the logics of 
the Green Revolution’. 
 
5.2. Civil Society’s Contestation of the ProSavannah 
On August 14, 2011, the largest Brazilian newspaper, Folha de São Paulo, published an 
article entitled “Mozambique offers land for Brazilian soya” (Mello, 2011, my translation). 
In it, the president of the Association of Cotton Producers from the state of Mato Grosso, 
the largest agricultural commodities exporter in Brazil, asked a rhetorical question: “Who is 
going to take care of Africa? The Chinese, the European, or the Americans? The Brazilians, 
who have knowledge of the Cerrado” (Mello, 2011, my translation). According to the 
article, the government of Mozambique was offering Brazilian producers an area of 6 
million hectares in the African savannah. 
The memorandum for the replication into Northern Mozambique of the Brazil-Japan 
PRODECER had been signed between ABC and JICA (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency) in 2009, but it was through this piece of news that my interviewees from 
Mozambican civil society heard about the trilateral project for the first time. 
From the signing of the memorandum between Brazil and Japan in September 2009 until 
UNAC’s first official declaration against the ProSavannah in October 201237, there had 
been several joint missions between the three governments, meetings in Brazil and Tokyo, 
and a visit by government officials and agribusiness investos to the Mozambican Northern 
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region of the Nacala Corridor for, among other things, the “promotion of foreign 
investment”.38  
In the meantime, in Mozambique several NGOs started articulating a campaign against the 
ProSavannah. Apart from UNAC, these included organizations that had been working with 
rural communities, sustainable development and environmental issues, such as Justiça 
Ambiental, Livaningo, Rural Association for Mutual Aid (ORAM), Academic Action for 
the Development of Rural Communities (ADECRU), the Provincial Platform of NGOs of 
Nampula (PPOSC-N) Action Aid and OXFAM, among others39. Furthermore, since it had 
become clear that the ProSavannah, according to the official discourse, was supposed to 
replicate the Prodecer, Mozambican organizations contacted Brazilian and Japanese 
partners in order to articulate a network of like-minded organizations, especially after the 
first version of Master Plan, the so-called Draft Zero, leaked and ended up in the hands of 
the opponents of the ProSavannah. Their main concern was the lack of transparency and 
social participation and the model of agricultural development mirrored in the Prodecer. 
As a consequence, a political logic was mobilized around ‘ProSavannah’ as an empty 
signifier that represented a threat to peasants’ identity and to the sustainable development 
of Mozambique. United against the same enemy, i.e., the ‘ProSavannah’, these 
organizations sought to challenge the fundamentals of the hegemonic discourse promoted 
by the project. They drew on discourses that had long been established in Mozambique and 
in Brazil, but also more broadly in the colonial world, thus resonating not only with the 
actors involved in the ProSavannah, but also with public opinion in Mozambique, Brazil, 
and mainly in Japan, whose government accountability to civil society prevented it from 
brushing criticisms aside. 
Discourses on the colonial experience, land grabbing, and the Brazilian experience of the 
Prodecer articulated a political logic whose main nodal points were ‘dependency’, 
‘poverty’, and ‘food insecurity’. These sought to contest the main norms promoted by the 
ProSavannah, namely ‘integration’, ‘productivity’, and ‘development’. In this way, 
ProSavannah was accused of promoting a model of development based on large 
plantations, resource extraction, mining and transportation as part of development corridors 
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that recreated the locals’ experience under colonial times.  As one of my interviewees 
argued:  
 
[…] we are talking about ProSavannah, but there is a much larger strategy of development of the 
[Nacala] Corridor, which was based on the logics of colonial times, on the logics of development 
corridors which lead to the port, not for our [own] development, but in order to ship 
[commodities abroad]. Thus, we understand this [project] as following a rationale from colonial 
times […] Mozambican corridors were designed in colonial times, and now they are being 
revived as if they are a solution to the problem of development. But they are not, and they won’t 
be […]. (Interview 35, Mozambique, 2018) 
 
This “new form of colonialism” (Interview 27, Mozambique, 2018), whereby peasants are 
exploited in their work and the price of their produce by transnational corporations 
(Farmlandgrab, 2013) challenged the idea of ‘integration’ and ‘development’ promoted by 
the Master Plan. In fact, the idea of integration was constantly challenged by the Plan’s 
opponents, both in written communications, such as the open letter from the civil society to 
the presidents of Brazil, Mozambique and the Prime Minister of Japan (Farmlandgrab, 
2013) criticizing the ProSavannah, and in interviews I conducted. Rather than ‘integration’, 
the idea of ‘dependency’ was articulated to ‘ProSavannah’, and drawn from Mozambique’s 
experience with large-scale agricultural development, when peasants had to produce, 
especially during colonial times, “tobacco and sisal by contract” (Interview 30, 
Mozambique, 2018). According to one of my interviewees, “the experience of large-scale 
agriculture in Mozambique is not new, we already grow sugar cane, cotton, tobacco, tea, 
and we know what megaprojects do”, when referring to peasants’ situation of poverty and 
dependency in relation to large plantations whose main actors were transnational 
corporations (Interview 30, Mozambique, February 2018).  
The experience of Mozambican peasants throughout colonial and post-colonial history is 
also repeatedly linked to the idea of ‘land grabbing’ in the opponents’ discourse. This 
proved to be a very effective signifier as it speaks directly not only to Mozambican 
peasants’ experience, but to the general phenomenon of land grabbing in Africa in the last 
ten years. This was also the most contested norm by the proponents of ProSavannah, as will 
be seen.  
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The articulation of the political logics around the ‘ProSavannah’ as a threat to peasants and 
the environment also drew on the Brazilian experience of the transformation of the 
Cerrado, since ProSavannah itself was meant to replicate the Prodecer. In this sense, 
Prodecer also received a negative connotation within this discourse, and linked with it the 
idea of ‘conservative modernization’, ‘land-grabbing’, ‘environmental devastation’, and a 
model of ‘monoculture of commodities for export’ rather than the ‘promotion of food 
security’. In interviews and in publications by civil society organizations (see Aguiar and 
Pacheco, 2016; Adecru, 2013) Prodecer and the model of large-scale agriculture were 
criticized for having relied on pesticides and monocultures that contributed to 
environmental devastation. Moreover, rather than promoting food security, the model is 
accused of producing commodities (especially soya) for export rather than food for 
domestic consumption. A frequently cited figure in these publications (see Schlesinger, 
2013) is the fact that 70% of the food consumed by Brazilians come from family-farming, 
challenging the link between agribusiness and food security. As one of my interviewees 
argued: 
 
     […] they say it is necessary to modernize agriculture, but will the mechanization of 
agriculture solve the problem of food insecurity in Mozambique? Take Brazil’s case: Brazil 
mechanized its agriculture in the 1970s, and how long after that was Brazil removed from the 
[UN World] Hunger Map?40 (Interview 29, Mozambique, February, 2018). 
 
Although parallels were drawn with Brazil’s experience of the Prodecer, which partakes in 
the political logic articulated by the campaign later called ‘No to ProSavannah’, I suggest 
that peasants and their representatives sought to recover discourses from Mozambique’s 
historical experiences and in this way reinforced sedimented discourses responsible for re-
affirming their subject position as peasants, threatened by the ProSavannah. The 
ProSavannah was not a new experience: it was more of the same experience that has 
relegated the peasant to the condition of an “assistant”, of someone to be “used”, rather 
than a protagonist in the development process (Interview 32, Mozambique, 2018).  
In this sense, I disagree with Cabral’s (2019: 127) argument according to which “[…] when 
Mozambican social movements criticize agribusiness and embrace the family farming 
narrative, they are borrowing someone else’s struggle and by so doing undermining their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Brazil was removed from the UN Hunger Map in 2014, which was mostly attributed to social policies such as Fome Zero. 
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own legitimate causes”. While both Mozambique and Brazil’s civil society organizations 
articulated similar discourses, these were based on the argument that the model against 
which they were fighting (the ‘Other’) was the same. This was a key argument 
Mozambican organizations put forward against the accusation that the fight against 
agribusiness was not their fight. 
In fact, the political logics articulated around the empty signifier ‘ProSavannah’ 
successfully built a chain of equivalence between the demands of different groups – 
Brazilian and Mozambican as well as Japanese civil society. The first contact between the 
Mozambican civil society and the Brazilian civil society to discuss the ProSavannah was 
established by UNAC itself (Interviews 28, 35, Mozambique, 2018). This happened after 
meetings between UNAC’s regional offices in Nampula in order to articulate advocacy 
strategies and start working on what later was published as the ‘open letter’ to the three 
governments. From these meetings, as my interviewees told me: 
 
[…] UNAC and ORAM understood based on the official discourse [on Prosavannah] that 
indicated that ProSavannah was supposed to be a replica of Prodecer, that it was important to 
have a direct contact with the reality of Mato Grosso [in Brazil, where part of the Prodecer was 
developed). In this context, they visited Brazil […] and noted that after all there was no 
‘Brazilian miracle’. Rather, there were many problem […]. (Interview 28, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
Two aspects are important emphasizing from the accounts I heard from civil society 
organizations and movements in both countries. First, the contact between Brazilian 
organizations such as FASE (Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional 
– Federation of Organizations for Social and Educational Assistance) and MPA 
(Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores – Movement of Small Farmers) and UNAC and 
ORAM, was established by the initiative of the latter, and not by Brazilian organizations. 
Second, the common chain of equivalence that connected these organizations’ demands – 
and in fact Japanese organizations too – did not start from scratch. UNAC and MPA 
already had a relationship based on the interchange of technology for agro-ecological 
systems (Interview 35, Mozambique, 2018). They were, in fact, likeminded organizations 
promoting agricultural systems based on similar principles. It became clear that this was not 
an artificial partnership, built through manipulation.  
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Within Mozambique, when questioned about how representative of the peasantry the 
campaign was, one of my interviewees from one of the leading Mozambican NGOs said, 
“our campaign is not dissociated from the peasants, we are part of the same group and 
interested in the same model of development” (Interview 27, Mozambique, February, 
2018). As a caveat, I did hear from some researchers and civil society organizations that 
were not part of the campaign against the ProSavannah that peasants’ opinions of the 
project varied. Thus, as argued in Chapter 1, I do not aim to disregard the complexity of 
opinions. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the UNAC was my main point of reference 
as the legitimate representative of the peasantry. 
The appeal to long-standing sedimented discourses proved successful in contesting the 
hegemonic norms of the ProSavannah by bringing to the fore their contingency and 
exposing their necessary character. In this sense, the political logics employed managed to 
break down the equivalence between the actors in a ‘cluster’, particularly the ‘peasant’ or 
‘small holder farmer’ and ‘large-scale producers’, and challenged the concept of 
‘integration’. 
Both sides of the political field in both countries acknowledged that the ‘No to 
ProSavannah’ campaign was successful in shaping the programme after the initial 
dislocation and disruption unfolded. The government of Japan, Brazil and Mozambique 
decided to stop the project until public hearings were put in place. Most of those involved 
directly with the ProSavannah on the Brazilian side were more categorical in stating that “ 
civil society was the great villain of the ProSavannah” (Interview 7, Brazil, 2017) when 
explaining why the project did not succeed.  
While the proponents’ response did not satisfy the opponent’s main demands, at least the 
campaign managed to slow down the implementation of the programme, and a dialogue 
between the Government of Mozambique and the opponents – as superficial and 
problematic as it may have been – started. This is a strong indication that the political 
logics of the opponents established and partially fixed a hegemonic chain of equivalence 
that gained traction in Mozambique and abroad. 
However, I argue that two problems in the opponents’ strategy were responsible for the 
failure in hegemonizing the field of discursivity for a longer period. The first one is 
inherent to every hegemonic process. Laclau (1996) explains that the more a chain of 
equivalence expands, the less concrete becomes the empty signifier. What happened in the 
case analysed here is that as the chain of equivalences uniting all elements around the 
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‘ProSavannah’ expanded, the more contexts it incorporated and the more elusive it became. 
This is what almost every interviewee, on both sides of the political struggle, told me: the 
ProSavannah as a signifier was indiscriminately linked to projects that had nothing to do 
with the trilateral programme.  
Indeed, a very recurrent complaint during my interviews was that the peasants in the Nacala 
Corridor were attributing land grabbing in the region to the ProSavannah, which had not 
been implemented yet. The ‘overstretching’ of the signifier ‘ProSavannah’ became clearer 
when I spoke with one of the representatives of UNAC. The following dialogue illustrates 
this: 
 
- Has anyone lost their land because of the project [ProSavannah]? 
- Well, […] many investors have come in because of the opening that the Mozambican 
government promoted by saying that there is a lot of abandoned land […] so the peasants are 
losing their land. 
- So they are already losing land? 
- They are already losing land. But because we say ‘no’ to this programme [ProSavannah], 
they do not say they are from ProSavannah, they use other names […] 
- Can you give me an example? 
- To say that there is for sure company “X” within the context of ProSavannah is difficult 
[…] But yes, there are many investors who came in and are grabbing land, and we did not use to 
have this problem […]. (Interview 33, Mozambique, 2018) 
 
He later referred to a few companies that were “in the context of ProSavannah” and had 
promoted land grabbing: Agromoz, Mozaco, Matharia Empreendimentos. None of them 
were part of the trilateral programme.  
The second problem in the campaign was the fact that they were less successful in pushing 
forward their own model of development than they were in contesting the norms promoted 
by the ProSavannah. I suggest that this was due to a failure in replacing the ‘ProSavannah’ 
with a positive signifier that articulated a chain of equivalence linking together more 
positive elements, representing the ‘common good’, the ‘universal interest’ of those 
fighting against the ProSavannah. As Laclau (1996: 43) noted, for there to be hegemony, 
there must be antagonism and an empty signifier which “becomes the signifier of the absent 
communitarian fullness […]”. The articulation of a chain of equivalence around an empty 
signifier is also a process whereby identities are constituted. As such, the construction of 
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the ‘we’ depends on advancing conceptualizations of the empty signifier that represent the 
common good (Torfin, 1999). 
But if the same organizations behind the campaign against the ProSavannah had long 
fought in Mozambique for a model of development based on agro-ecological practices, why 
did they not succeed in articulating a chain of equivalence around an empty signifier that 
would represent the absent fullness of the rural communities of Mozambique? Interestingly, 
the discourse on agro-ecology, family farming and food sovereignty is present throughout 
the documents produced by the civil society organizations contesting the ProSavannah (see 
Farmlandgrab, 2013; Adecru, 2013; Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016). In the “Open Letter”, 
signifiers such as ‘independence’, ‘autonomy’, ‘sustainable alternatives’, ‘food 
sovereignty’ and ‘adequate support for the peasants’ are all linked to ‘family farming’. 
Other documents, such as publications by organizations’ websites and books produced by 
the ‘No to ProSavannah’ campaign (see UNAC, 2012; Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016) have 
these same signifiers linked to ‘agro-ecology’.  
There may be two reasons for this failure. First, this model of development, as noted 
before, has not been able to become hegemonic (Sabaratnam, 2017). Second, the practices 
advocated by the campaign have long been established among the rural communities. As 
such, they do not represent a ‘new promise’, or ‘fullness’. Although the ‘No to 
ProSavannah’ campaign insisted that what they needed was government support to develop 
their agriculture properly, I argue that there was no empty signifier which managed to 
organize this demand. This became clear in the interview with the main opposing NGOs. 
The extract below shows that the signifier ‘agro-ecology’, which could have united the 
peasants’ demands around it, for example, did not translate into anything new for the rural 
communities: 
      
They [the peasants] have historically worked the land based on experiences we call today 
‘alternative agriculture’, as if it was something we were drawing from the concept of ‘agro-
ecology’ […]. But these people already live off these practices, controlling, treating, choosing 
the seeds to sow, knowing which piece of land is fertile, which piece of land is good for manioc, 
corn, which crops can grow together […]. People know this, but if you come with the language 
of ‘agro-ecology’, its patterns and training, the peasants won’t understand anything […]. 
(Interviews 27, Mozambique, 2018). 
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Further in the same interview, I was told, “[…] we do not bring them [peasant 
communities] the answers, we simply raise awareness” based on their long established 
experiences. In this sense, the political logic of the opponents failed to introduce an empty 
signifier which would bring change, and with it, fullness. The establishment of a 
hegemonic narrative through political mobilization was further complicated by the fact that 
the rural communities in the Nacala Corridor are very diverse and speak eight or nine 
different languages (Interview 27 and 30, Mozambique, 2018). 
In sum, the civil society mobilized political logics that successfully contested the main 
norms contained in the Master Plan and in the discourse on the ProSavannah. It did so by 
linking negative elements that were part of the peasants’ historical experience to the 
ProSavannah. The logic of transformism of the ProSavannah, which meant the demands of 
the peasants were incorporated alongside the demands of large-scale agriculture, was 
challenged by the relationship of dependency that the campaign successfully brought to the 
fore. While the ProSavannah logics underpinned by modernization ideas masked the radical 
contingency of social relations, the logics of contestation foregrounded it by resourcing to 
sedimented discourses that gave meaning to the identity of the peasants. It is in this sense 
that the civil society managed, to some extent, to re-politicize development.  
Finally, it is important to note that the agency exercised against the ProSavannah was 
collective and politically strong. There was a strong civil society involved with land issues 
and connected with other organizations around the world through Via Campesina.  
 
5.3. The Logics of Denial,  Differentiation and Marginalization 
This section aims to critically explain the logics mobilized by the ProSavannah proponents 
in responding to the ‘No to ProSavannah’ campaign. To do this analysis, I drew mostly on 
primary sources collected during fieldwork in Brazil from October 2017 to December 2017, 
in a context of political-economic crisis and above all a feeling of frustration in relation to 
Brazil’s (as yet) undelivered (or failed) biggest agricultural project. The interviews 
conducted with the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations (MRE) and its Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), centred on the 
contestation of ProSavannah by national and transnational civil society networks. I also 
drew on interviews conducted during the second phase of my fieldwork in Mozambique 
with representatives and staff from the MASA, the IIAM, and civil society organizations.  
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ProSavannah proponents responded to the opposition by deploying a set of political logics 
of their own. These sought to pre-empt the contestation of the project’s main norms (or to 
de-contest them) and marginalize the alternative model proposed by the civil society, and 
deny them agency.  In order to do so, it became a sine qua non condition to erase the 
negative signifiers associated with ProSavannah and replace them with positive ones. 
Consequently, it was imperative to marginalize and discredit the ProSavannah campaign 
and its leaders. A hegemonic battle for the re-redefinition of the signifier ProSavannah then 
started. 
At the core of this strategy was the attempt to construct the identity of the ProSavannah 
opponents as ‘misguided’, ‘manipulated’, ‘political’, but also ‘manipulative’, ‘liars’, ‘not 
willing to listen or understand’. These were frequently repeated signifiers linked with the 
opposition, with a more or less emphatic tone. To many of the ProSavannah proponents, 
Mozambican civil society had been manipulated by Brazilian civil society. To corroborate 
this view, a very common narrative told by Embrapa and the MRE was that the letter 
written by UNAC against the ProSavannah had actually been written by Brazilian civil 
society organizations, particularly the Via Campesina and the Landless Movements (MST) 
in an attempt to push forward their own agenda (Interviews 7, 11, 18, 19, Brazil, 2017). 
Apart from the denial of agency of the Mozambican civil society actors, “who had been 
manipulated by Brazilian civil society against their own interest” (Interview 18, Brazil, 
2017), a commonly repeated theme across institutions was that of the socio and political 
differences between Brazil and Mozambique. At Embrapa this difference was recognized in 
relation to the state, capital, rural structure, land, labour and political and social relations. 
While the culturalist discourse at the official level and the biophysical similarities discourse 
at Embrapa and the ABC had sought to initially legitimize Brazilian SSC and more 
specifically the ProSavannah, this new discourse was based on differences. As one of my 
interviewees argued, “[…] transferring a capitalist development model into a completely 
different social structure …this has been the first obstacle [to the success of ProSavannah]” 
(Interview 1, Brazil, 2017).  
On the one hand, some of my interviewees saw these differences as evidence that there is 
no ‘one size fits all’ model of development, and that Embrapa should not engage in 
transferring large-scale agriculture into Mozambique. Most, however, saw these socio-
political differences as aspects that needed to be understood in order for the ProSavannah to 
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succeed. In this sense, these differences could be tamed, transformed, and even respected, 
but also changed in order for the ProSavannah to prosper. For those, “[i]f Mozambique 
wants to develop, they will have to implement the ProSavannah” (Interview 11, Brazil, 
2017). 
Mozambican institutions such as the IIAM but mostly the MASA also explored the 
discourse on differences. What was emphasized in this case was the contextual differences 
between Brazil in the 1970s, when the Prodecer was implemented, and Mozambique at 
present. I often heard that “Mozambique is very different from Brazil” (Interviews 23, 24, 
25, 26, Mozambique, 2017), and “[…] we do not aim to copy Prodecer, we will get what is 
good from it, what worked out, and develop our own project […]” (Interview 24, 
Mozambique, 2018). There was clearly a strategy that sought to delink the Prodecer and the 
negative signifiers attached to it from the ProSavannah. It was also an attempt to reclaim 
the ProSavannah as a “Mozambican project”, in line with the PEDSA – which appears as 
one of the first items in the new draft zero of the Master Plan (2016) –, and not a project 
that is reminiscent of colonialism or imperialism. This was also a common strategy applied 
by my Brazilian interviewees from both Embrapa and the MRE. They articulated the 
signifier ‘sovereignty’ to claim that the ProSavannah was Mozambique’s choice, not 
Brazil’s. Mozambique, after all, was an independent country.  
In fact, it became very clear to me during fieldwork that the signifier ‘independence’ was 
very important to Mozambicans, and frequently voiced in the context of both projects, from 
all sides. In the case of ProSavannah, while the civil society explored the relationship of 
dependency that the ProSavannah would mean for the peasant, its proponents sought to 
represent ProSavannah as being a national project, made for the peasant. In this sense, by 
reclaiming Mozambican’s agency this discourse tried to tap into Mozambicans’ longing for 
independence not only from the old colonial power, but from the reins and impositions of 
the IFIs and traditional international donors.  
Exploring differences between Brazil and Mozambique – and the Prodecer and 
ProSavannah – also constituted a logic of difference whereby the ProSavannah proponents 
tried to break the chain of equivalence that united the social movements and civil society 
organizations of the three countries against the ProSavannah, as if their struggle was not 
against the same model of development. An important difference emphasized was the issue 
of land legislation. This was a recurrent theme in my interviews, and one that seemed to 
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have bothered the government the most in relation to criticisms received. They frequently 
and emphatically denied the phenomenon of land grabbing linked with the ProSavannah 
and took advantage of the indiscriminate use of the ‘ProSavannah’ signifier as linked with 
other investments in order to discredit the opposition. The discourse of differences 
contributed to the representation of the opponents as misguided, since the ProSavannah had 
nothing in common with the Prodecer. 
Furthermore, like their opponents, the ProSavannah proponents drew on discourses that had 
become sedimented through Mozambique’s history, but this time in order to break down 
the equivalential chain between civil society organizations and weaken the antagonism. 
This logic of difference meant to satisfy the demands (for money and protagonism) of 
organizations from the north of Mozambique and tap into the old rivalry and differential 
limits between the north and the south. Uneven development between the more developed 
South and less developed north, which dates back to colonial times, and the feeling that the 
central government in Maputo has always neglected Northerners (Newitt, 2017) had also 
manifested itself politically, paving the way for a division fomented by the ProSavannah 
proponents, particularly the MASA and JICA.  
This was materialized in the consultation process established by the MASA and JICA 
which meant to “listen to the communities’ concerns and promote their participation in the 
programme” (Interview 33, Mozambique, 2018). The creation of the Civil Society 
Mechanism for the Development of the Nacala Corridor (MCSC) in 2016 was seen with 
suspicion by the organizations from the South, who accused the MCSC of co-opting 
organizations of the Northern region, such as the Forum of Organizations based in Niassa 
(PPOSC-N) and Zambézia (FONGZA), where the ProSavannah was meant to be 
implemented. In the first letter addressed to JICA, the ‘No to ProSavannah’ organizations 
led by Justiça Ambiental (JA!) accused JICA of hiring a consultancy company called Majol 
“to interfere with the Mozambican civil society, especially in the North, to create and 
reinforce a division [between civil society organizations] and isolate those who oppose the 
programme” (Adecru, 2017). They also accused JICA of paying a civil society organization 
called Solidariedade over 200 thousand dollars in an attempt to further manipulate civil 
society in their favour.  
As a result, different positions vis-à-vis the ProSavannah were materialized between these 
two segments of civil society, with the South in favour of the total scrapping of the 
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programme and the North in favour of revising it. The resentment from the North towards 
the South became clear in an interview with a member of the MSCS, in which the 
organizations of the south were called ‘arrogant’, ‘bossy’ and ‘in search of protagonism’ 
(Interview 37, Mozambique, 2018).  
Another common narrative put forward by the MRE and the MASA, but not by Embrapa, 
was the denial of any participation of private investment, the implementation of 
monocultures, and the use of pesticides in the project. When I mentioned the ‘leaked’ Draft 
Zero of the Master Plan alongside the Nacala Fund, my interviewers were adamant in 
denying the importance of the documents by saying they had not been discussed by the 
governments of Brazil, Mozambique and Japan, and therefore were never part of the 
project. By doing this, they pre-empted all the criticism raised by the civil society in 
relation to the model of development based on the leaked document.  
 
5.4. The Fantasmatic Logics of the Green Revolution 
What accounts for the force of the political logics of denial and differentiation explored in 
this chapter is the fantasmatic logics of agribusiness/green revolution, particularly present 
in the narrative about the Prodecer and the modernization long desired by Frelimo. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, fantasy is a narrative which structures jouissance, and promises an 
ideal ‘fullness’ once the obstacle identified is removed or overcome (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007). In this sense, it promises a ‘beatific dimension’ in case this fullness is achieved, or, 
on the contrary, a ‘horrific dimension’ in case the obstacle persists. In order to identify a 
fantasmatic object within a discourse, Glynos and Howarth (2007) argue that this discourse 
must resist public-official disclosure, as well as resource to contradictory features, or 
incompatible positions in relation to, for example, subjects.  
This was evident throughout my fieldwork, in both countries. Particularly at Embrapa, the 
MRE, and the MASA, I heard several ‘off-the-record’ accounts of how the opponents of 
the ProSavannah were ‘manipulated’, ‘ignorant’, ‘functionally illiterate’ and ‘incapable of 
reasoning’. On the Brazilian side, a few times this attack extended to Mozambicans in 
general, based on a very racialized discourse underpinned by binaries such as 
civilized/barbarian, adult/child, and the like. They were constructed as the obstacle to the 
possibility of fullness, i.e., the ‘ProSavannah’, which was the only possibility for 
development. But this fantasmatic narrative also imputed to the opponents contradictory 
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characteristics. For example, while they were ‘manipulated’ and ‘incapable of 
understanding and reading’, they were also ‘self-interested’, ‘political’ and ‘ideological’.  
In the same way, jouissance was apparent through the construction of the opponents 
(especially their leaders) as subjects who enjoyed (fame, trips, money) excessively at the 
expense of the country’s development. The theft of enjoyment was clear in a common 
account I heard in Mozambique, according to which the sole purpose of the opposition to 
the ProSavannah was the self-interest of the leaders, as exemplified by the following 
extract: 
 
[P]eople [leaders of the opposition] make money, it is clear they have a salary, a very clear 
programme, fame...in this context [of opposition] they start to make their name, start to have a 
good position, opportunities […] they have the opportunity to go to Brazil, they want to do their 
master’s, PhD, and all; they want to do their master’s in Japan […] (Interview 25, Mozambique, 
2018). 
 
Several times I heard, particularly in Mozambique, that the opponents had perks such as 
trips to Brazil and Japan, while the government was trying to promote the development of 
Mozambique.  
While the logic of difference between the ProSavannah and the Prodecer was employed 
later in response to the contestation, the beatific scenario mobilized drew heavily on the 
transformation of the Brazilian Cerrado by the Prodecer. This scenario was in line with the 
modernization ideology long embraced by Frelimo, which rejected the traditional rural 
culture in favour of a ‘modern’ society based on science and technology (Newitt, 2017).  
The beatific scenario also recovered the main norms exhibited in the original Master Plan, 
that is, ‘integration’, ‘productivity’, and the idea of development as linear, ‘in stages’. 
Although the new draft zero of the Master Plan (2016) contains substantial changes in 
relation to the 2013 document, such as the smallholder farmer as the main beneficiary 
alongside local markets (rather than a focus on export oriented commodities and foreign 
investors), during the interviews, the main proponents of the ProSavannah in Mozambique 
framed it around elements such as ‘mixed model’, ‘coexistence between all interests’, ‘all 
sizes and needs’. However, by not addressing this in the 2016 Master Plan, they pre-empted 
the contestation of these norms. 
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The new draft zero, I suggest, became just one stage in a larger project. In fact, although 
not always explicitly, many of my interviewees in Mozambique talked about development 
as in stages towards large-scale production. One of my interviewees who did not participate 
in the project but was a researcher at one of the institutions said that the ProSavannah: “was 
based on [t]he idea of transforming the peasant from small to medium, then to large 
producers” (Interview 20, Mozambique, 2018). Even though this may not be the 
proponents’ explicit idea, what is interesting to note is how many see the development of 
agriculture in stages, representing linear progress towards a goal: that of large-scale 
production.  
The opponents of the ProSavannah argued that the government of Mozambique had in fact 
incorporated many of their complaints and concerns into the new draft zero of the Master 
Plan (2016), but they also argued that the new document did not contain any “structural and 
functional changes”. Based on this claim, they decided to keep their campaign against the 
ProSavannah alive. 
As a consequence, within this fantasmatic narrative, the peasants and the civil society who 
opposed the project were considered the obstacles to the ideal of agricultural development. 
In several interviews, they were described as the culprits or “villains” of the ProSavannah 
(Interview 7, 11 Brazil, 2017). It became clear that they were “blocking” Mozambique’s 
development. When asked about the model the opponents were trying to promote, in other 
words, agroecology, most of my interviewees dismissed it as ‘ideological’, or 
‘impracticable’. The fullness promised by the ProSavannah was, in this context, the only 
possibility for development. The other scenario was poverty and hunger. 
In contrast to the civil society identity was the institutional identity of Embrapa. 
Constructed mainly by Brazilians but also by Mozambicans involved in the project, 
Embrapa’s institutional identity was that of a scientific, rather than ideological, productive, 
rather than unproductive, efficient, rather than wasteful, honest and hard-working rather 
than self-interested. Embrapa was neutral and interested in development. It was also the 
world’s leading tropical agriculture technology producer, who transformed Brazil into a 
breadbasket through the Prodecer and could have done the same in Mozambique, had 
Mozambicans been interested in development. 
To summarize, exploring the fantasmatic logics of the Green Revolution helps to account 
for the grip of both the social logics that constituted the ProSavannah, and the political 
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logics that sought to demobilize the opposition. This fantasmatic logics drew on the 
experience of the Prodecer, in which integration, productivity and development would 
promote the transformation of Mozambique had the opponents understood what was at 
stake. At the horrific end, though, poverty and hunger marked the alternative to the 
ProSavannah. Although the logics of difference between the Prodecer and the ProSavannah 
was emphasized to weaken the opposition, the Prodecer was still very much a role model 
for the ProSavannah, particularly according to Embrapa’s view.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to critically explain and discuss the processes of re-politicization and 
de-politicization that animated the biggest SSC agricultural project between Brazil and 
Mozambique. In order to do this, I applied the critical logics of explanation framework, 
which sought to operationalize essential concepts of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
discourse.  
The political logics mobilized by the opponents sought to contest these norms by forming a 
chain of equivalence between demands from organizations from Brazil, Mozambique and 
Japan. As a response, the political logics of the proponents sought to demobilize the 
campaign by drawing on structural differences between organizations from the North and 
the South, and between the Prodecer and the ProSavannah. It also sought to discredit the 
opponents by denying them agency and marginalizing their model of development. 
Underpinning the political logics applied by the proponents was a fantasmatic narrative that 
proposed a vision of the future moulded in the transformation of Brazil into a breadbasket 
through the Prodecer. Converging with this fantasmatic logic was an imaginary that 
reproduced the modernization ideals held by the Frelimo government since independence. 
This has helped explain the grip of the political logics applied by the proponents, and how 
the ideological dimension of this political logic is foregrounded, consequently hiding the 
contingency of social structures, or, in other words, any possibility of accepting different 
models of development. 
To conclude, the opponents of the project successfully exposed the ideological dimension 
of the social and political logics of the ProSavannah. They did so by drawing on 
sedimented discourses sensitive to Mozambicans, such as the issue of colonization and 
independence. However, they have been less successful in mobilizing a propositive agenda 
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centred on an empty signifier that would replace the ‘ProSavannah’ as the common good 
and be the identity source for the community. Yet, this has been a successful transnational 
movement because it managed to stop the project and forced the government to recognize 
their voice. It has, in this sense, partially re-politicized agricultural development. 
In Chapter 6 and 7 I will explore the de-politicization and re-politicization of the ARV 
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Chapter 6: The Social Logics of the Antiretroviral Treatment 
  
6.1. Introduction 
While the ProSavanna was Brazil’s most ambitious agricultural project within the context 
of SSC, the ‘ARV factory’ was the most ambitious project in the health sector.  Like the 
ProSavanna, the ARV factory proved to be much more complex than initially thought. At 
the centre of these complexities is the conflict that unfolded between the Brazilian and the 
Mozambican governments and institutions. The conflict was characterized by a contestation 
of the original norms of the ARV factory by the Mozambican government, followed by a 
re-negotiation of norms between Brazil and Mozambique. It is against this background that 
I will seek to respond to the question as to whether SSC was re-politicized. In other words, 
did Brazil/Mozambique authorities and experts recognize the radical contingency of social 
structures (cf. Chapters 1 and 2)?  
Before discussing the conflict that shaped the relationship between the two countries in 
regards to the factory (Chapter 6), this chapter is dedicated to discussing the social logics of 
Anti Retroviral Treatment (ART) in Mozambique and the contrasting logics of ART in 
Brazil, which shaped the ARV factory. It will do so not only by characterizing the norms of 
ART, but also by understanding them in their historical context. This will allow for a more 
in-depth understanding of the political struggles that unfolded between the two 
governments and how they impacted South-South relations. 
Explaining the social logics of ART in Mozambique involves characterizing a particular set 
of subject positions such as the Ministry of Health (MISAU), other public institutions such 
as the Conselho Nacional de Combate ao HIV-SIDA (National AIDS Council – Portuguese 
acronym CNCS), and key international actors, such as civil society organizations, 
international donors and institutions, such as vertical funds, development agencies such as 
USAID, or the UN Programme of HIV-AIDS, the UNAIDS, amongst others. It also 
involves understanding norms and practices of Anti-Retroviral Treatment (ART), the 
institutions that regulate it (such as the National Strategic Plan and international 
commitments), and the norms that regulate the relationship between the various 
actors/institutions. I argue that the main logics of ART, namely ‘AIDS securitization’ and 
‘vertical approach’ restricted political debate and fragmented the health sector.  
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But before exploring the social logics of ART in Mozambique, I will briefly sketch a 
historical overview of Mozambique’s health sector, aiming to explore not only norms, 
narratives and practices that have constituted the Mozambique’s health system but also the 
effects of these as extensively explored by the literature and also described by some of my 
interviewees. These are ‘fragmentation’ of state institutions,  ‘aid dependency’, and ‘brain 
drain’. These effects have also become sedimented in the practices and discourse of the 
various actors, be they Mozambican or international institutions. In fact, several studies 
(see Pfeiffer, 2003; Pfeiffer et al, 2010; Sabaratnam, 2017) drew on the self-interpretations 
of subjects engaged in the practices of the health sector in order to describe these effects.  
Likewise, when exploring the social logics of ART in Brazil, I characterize the main 
subjects, i.e., the Ministry of Health, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), and the civil 
society organizations who formed a particularly influential movement called Sanitarist 
movement. I trace their history back to the 1970s and 1980s, when the main principles 
guiding Brazil’s health system were emerging, namely the principle of ‘universal access to 
healthcare’, and the idea of the ‘State as a health provider’. Alongside Fiocruz’s importance 
for the national health system, its international presence has also come to influence the way 
it cooperated with Mozambique. Drawing from this experience, Fiocruz promoted norms 
such as ‘structuring cooperation’, ‘horizontality’, which were very much aligned with the 
view of SSC held by the PT government. In this sense, there was a convergence between 
Fiocruz and the principles promoted by the SSC official discourse.  
In order to understand the norms that have shaped the ARV factory as a SSC project, this 
chapter also highlights Brazil’s role as a norm challenger in the realm of drug patents at the 
World Trade Organization. As such, Brazil was able to challenge the hegemony of the 
pharmaceutical industry and developed countries in relation to drug provision. One of the 
main logics shaping the ARV factory was, as a result of this challenge, domestic drug 
production as a matter of sovereignty. 
Thus, this chapter discusses norms that can either depoliticize or re-politicize development. 
It sets the ground for the discussion offered in chapter 6, in which I explore how contrasting 
norms such as ‘State as health provider’ vs ‘privatization’ clash and are re-negotiated.  
 
6.2. A Historical Overview of Mozambique’s Public Health Sector: The 
Social logics of Foreign Aid x the Social logics of Public Health Care 
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With 90% of the public administration in the hands of Europeans, after independence in 
1975, Mozambique was left with only 80 trained doctors for 10 million people 
(Sabaratnam, 2017). Despite difficulties in building a socialist state against the backdrop of 
the Cold War, Frelimo managed to establish a primary health care (PHC) system cited by 
the WHO as a model for developing countries (Pfeiffer, 2003) and based on the 1978 
Declaration of the Alma-Ata (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2015), which stated that: 
 
[H]ealth, which is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity, is a fundamental human right and […] the attainment of the 
highest possible level of health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realization 
requires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector. 
(Alma-Ata 1978) 
 
Before subscribing to the Alma-Ata Declaration, in the 1975 Constitution, Mozambique 
had already established the role of the State in promoting public health for all: “[a]ll 
citizens have the right to medical and health care, pursuant to the Law, as well as the duty 
to promote and defend public health” (Art.89, in Sachy et al, 2018: 2279). In sum, the 
social logics of the Mozambican PHC embodied norms such as ‘State provision’, ‘universal 
access’, ‘multi-sectoriality’ (meaning that health was determined by various socio-
economic factors), ‘health as a human right’, and ‘social participation as a citizen’s duty’. 
But the 15-year civil war between the socialist government and the rebel group Renamo, 
supported by apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia and the US, had devastating effects for the 
country and its health services and infrastructure (Renzio and Hanlon 2007). Under the 
pressure of the civil war and foreign institutions, by the mid 1980s Frelimo started to 
promote changes by adopting some principles of market economy and dismantling the one 
party Marxist-Leninist state and the command economy. Mozambique joined the IMF and 
the World Bank in 1983, and in 1987 it agreed to the IMF/ World Bank-promoted 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
(Newitt, 2017).  
Typical norms of IMF austerity programmes followed: ‘currency devaluation’, 
‘liberalization of prices’, and most importantly for this chapter, ‘fiscal responsibility’ and 
‘privatization’ (Pfeiffer, 2003). The emphasis should be on the productive rather than 
unproductive sectors, the latter including health and education (Cliff, 1993).  The idea was 
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that government services should be drastically reduced, and by 1990, state spending per 
capita on health was just half of what it used to be in 1980 (Pfeiffer, 2003). Furthermore, 
there was growing pressure by the IFIs for privatisation of health services (Marshall, 1990).  
In 1992, under the auspices of the UN, a peace deal was agreed between Renamo and 
Frelimo, and a liberal post-war programme of state building, under the watch of European 
donors and the IFIs, intensified Mozambique’s political and economic liberalization 
(Sabaratnam, 2012). Some argue that Mozambique had little alternative than to embrace the 
neoliberal consensus (Newitt, 2017), while others claim Frelimo’s position reflected a 
typical case of African elites engaging in ‘strategies of extraversion’ with international 
institutions and donors, using their privileged position for private gain (Vieira, 2011). What 
is important to note is that the relationship between Frelimo and international 
donors/institutions and agencies has never been characterized by a consensus based on a 
unified ideological position or narrative. In fact, as will be discussed, the government’s 
various responses to international donors and the IFIs reflect Frelimo’s ideological division 
since independence. As the previous Minister of Health stated in our interview, “[w]e are a 
front of very different people […] we have multiple [ideological] orientations within 
[Frelimo]” (Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018).  
The SAP implemented in Mozambique and more broadly in developing countries was 
based on the neoliberal paradigm, which held a “profoundly cynical view of the state in 
developing countries” (Toye, 1991: 322). The signifier ‘State’ was linked with corruption, 
and as such should be replaced by NGOs and the private sector as providers of health. The 
fact that international organizations and not corrupt governments were in charge of 
development was by itself seen as a positive factor (Powell and Seddon, 1997). In this 
context, aid started flooding the country through a growing army of international NGOs 
(INGOs) (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2015). By the late 1990s, 90% of health expenditures 
came from international donors (Pavignani and Durão, 1999). This meant to fill the gap 
created by the World Bank’s SAP and its roll back of the State. 
Instead, however, as documented by a large number of existing studies, the ‘New Policy 
Agenda’ has damaged rather than helped the Mozambican health system (Pfeiffer, 2003; 
Pavignani and Durão, 1999; Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2015; Renzio and Goldsbrough, 2007; 
Marshall, 1990). The narrative produced by the critical literature and many of my 
interviewees links international donors with ‘aid dependency’ towards the North; the 
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‘fragmentation’ of the state health infrastructure; and ‘brain drain’ of health experts from 
the public sector into NGOs and private organizations (Sabaratnam, 2017; Pfeiffer 2003; 
Pavignani and Durão, 1999; Renzio and Hanlon, 2007; Marshall, 1990). Fundamentally, as 
these studies argue, these effects followed the norms and practices implemented by the 
‘New Agenda’.  
The first social logic promoted by donors such as USAID and World Bank was the ‘results 
oriented approach’, or ‘managing for results’ (Pfeiffer, 2003). This meant aid should be 
delivered in the form of projects in line with specific donor-identified objectives rather than 
the State’s objectives, and in general lasted approximately 2 to 3 years (Pfeiffer, 2003).  A 
second set of logics concerned the implementation of projects through international NGOs 
rather than the government of Mozambique. This meant INGOs had the control of budgets 
and implementation practices, even though some of these projects were integrated into 
government programmes (Pfeiffer, 2003).  
Mozambique has been heavily dependent on foreign aid. As mentioned above, aid has 
started to flood into the country in the 1980s, when international donors, mainly the IFIs, 
invested heavily to promote the re-construction of the Mozambican state along neoliberal 
lines. More than twenty years later, in 2008, aid corresponded to more than two thirds of 
public expenditure (Castel-Branco, 2008a). According to Castel-Branco (2008a), aid 
dependency has penetrated every pore of the social, political and economic sphere. This, 
according to critics, was worsened by the fragmentation of public policies and government 
institutions, which rather than holding a long-term development view, focused on short-
term development goals established by NGOs (Cliff, 1993; Castel-Branco, 2008a; Renzio 
and Hanlon, 2007). 
Sabaratnam’s (2017) account of fragmentation is based on interviews with health workers 
and corroborates some of the discursive constructions around the health sector in the 
interviews I conducted both in Mozambique and in Brazil. In general, the perception of 
Mozambicans that INGOs “decid[ed] the needs of Mozambique” with several specific 
projects (Sabaratnam, 2017: 65) echoes a very common criticism in the development 
literature against uncoordinated aid and the related concept of fragmentation. In his 3-year 
study on the Mozambican national health system, Pfeiffer (2003: 732), for example, argues 
that most foreign agencies in Mozambique had “programmes and pet projects approved by 
their donors or head offices, with very specific objectives and targets that would be 
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evaluated to ensure their own continued funding”. This, he argues, has undermined local 
control of health programmes and dissipated efforts that should be directed towards specific 
government targets. Specific projects not only have their own time frames, budgets, 
reporting requirements, but they also require input from the Mozambican government in 
terms of time and resources  (Sabaratnam, 2017).  
Both the Mozambican government and international aid agencies acknowledged the 
fragmentation of the national health system and tried to promote a different set of logics in 
response: the ‘coordination of aid’ and ‘harmonization of planning’ was advocated through 
documents such as the ‘Agenda 2025’, the ‘5 Year Plan’, the ‘Action Plan for the 
Reduction of Absolute Poverty’ (PARPA in Portuguese), the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
effectiveness, and the ‘Sector Wide Approach’ (SWA), the latter two aimed at improving 
‘sector coordination’ and ‘country ownership’. With these initiatives, a growing share of 
aid was delivered through programme-based approaches, allocating funds directly to the 
state budget (Bidaurratzaga-Aurre and Colom-Jaén, 2012). But the results were not 
promising, with only 14% of health sector funding channelled through the SWA by 2008 
(Mussa et al, 2013), and no real planning promoting a nationally-owned development 
strategy (Renzio and Hanlon, 2007). According to Bidaurratzaga-Aurre and Colom-Jaén, 
(2012), donors such as USAID are still reticent about transferring decision-making power 
to the local government. Furthermore, government national plans such as PARPA were 
heavily influenced by foreign donors without being submitted to Parliament, or, in other 
cases, had little strong policy drives or input by civil society organizations (Renzio and 
Hanlon, 2007). Government plans, such as PARPA II promoted the neoliberal narrative 
according to which the government should focus on the private sector as the main engine 
for economic growth and poverty reduction  (PARPA II, 2006). 
Another dynamics mentioned by the literature and most of my interviewees is the 
“disappearance of human resources” (Sabaratnam, 2017: 67). Brain drain from the National 
Health System to the private sector and foreign agencies started with the SAP, when the 
constraints to budget expenditures resulted in a drastic drop of income amongst health 
workers in the national system (Pfeiffer, 2003) and a deterioration of health services such 
as shortage of drugs, equipment and bedding in hospitals (Marshall, 1990). To further 
illustrate this, from 1991 to 1996 nurses’ salaries dropped from USS110 to less than USS40 
per month (Hanlon, 1996 in Pfeiffer, 2003). Against this backdrop, Pfeiffer (2003) argues 
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that health workers were vulnerable to the financial temptations of the foreign agencies and 
the private sector. The result was that both private clinics and INGOs and foreign agencies 
were staffed with local health experts who came from the national health care system 
(Marshall, 1990; Pfeiffer, 2003). According to Pfeiffer (2003: 732), getting a job in an 
NGO was seen like “winning the lottery”. Even attempts at national capacity building, 
which aimed at offering technical training to local workers, has been criticized by the 
World Bank itself for being fragmented and inappropriate (Sabaratnam, 2017). 
In sum, countering the neoliberal logic according to which the State would be replaced by 
INGOs and the private sector in providing health, the critical literature explored above 
paints a different picture. It links ‘INGOs’ and the ‘results-oriented approach’ with 
fragmentation, brain drain, and aid dependency. According to this narrative, these are inter-
related aspects of the health sector in Mozambique. Treated as ‘effects’ of international 
intervention by the critical literature, they characterize the dynamics of the health sector, or 
more specifically the PHC system in Mozambique. Importantly, these dynamics contribute 
to what the development literature has extensively explored as ‘lack of ownership’ by the 
government or by an independent civil society over their national development 
plan/strategy and policies. In his study on aid dependency and ownership in the case of 
Mozambique, Castel-Branco (2008a) discussed the several definitions of ownership by the 
development and aid literatures. Simply put, ownership is sometimes defined as a “key 
determinant of the degree of commitment to a chosen policy direction”, and is often linked 
with subjective concepts such as ‘leadership’ (Castel-Branco, 2008a: 5-8). Ownership 
could also be thought of as the ability of a governmental agency to define its own political 
agenda and programme, which is financed by external aid (Castel-Branco, 2008a).  
But more interesting approaches analyse ‘ownership’ with reference to history, 
institutional, social and political conditions of the recipient country (Castel-Branco, 2008a). 
For the purpose of the ARV Factory case, ownership involves the discursive construction 
of an identity that positions Mozambique as a horizontal partner of Brazil in the 
implementation of the ARV project, along the lines of a SSC project. In order to construct 
this identity, I argue that political actors must draw on sedimented discourses that enable 
the construction of this identity and thus the implementation of the ARV factory along the 
lines of a SSC project. In other words, there must be discursive conditions of possibility for 
this policy to be implemented. These conditions represent the resources political actors 
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draw from in order to construct identities that could, to different extents, challenge 
hegemonic structures introduced by international donors and multilateral organizations. 
In this sense, apart from being the background against which ART norms will be discussed 
below, this section helps understand the resources available for Mozambicans to potentially 
construct the identity of a horizontal partner. On the one hand, floating signifiers from the 
time of the Alma-Ata and the independence have been revived through, for example, the 
constitutional review of 2004, which reinforces the role of the State in providing ‘Health 
for all’ (Sachy et al, 2018). Government documents such as PARPA still present health as a 
‘multisectorial issue’, subject to a wider debate that involves several sectors, and not only 
restricted to the Ministry of Health. In this sense, these signifiers construct the Mozambican 
State as an active state in the provision of health. It could be argued that the social logics 
promoted by the Alma-Ata and, in part, by the Government of Mozambique, recognize the 
contingency of social structures as it seeks to promote wider debates rather than a fixed 
recipe for development. 
On the other hand, the ‘social logic of foreign aid’, so to speak, promoted the idea of a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach which would work anywhere in the world. It disregarded the role of 
the State and with this, public debate around development issues. As such, it foregrounded 
the ideological dimension of social relations since it denied that development could be 
articulated in different manners. While many have challenged this narrative, including the 
international donors themselves, and effects such as fragmentation, aid dependency and 
brain drain have become prominent in the critical narrative, there is no other set of social 
logics that has replaced the logics of foreign aid.  
It is important to note, however, that the relationship the government of Mozambique has 
had with international donors in general, but particularly in the health sector, is not a clear-
cut case of Frelimo adopting the international donors’ narrative and norms or rejecting 
them by articulating a contrasting set of social norms. The political dynamics between 
donors, government and civil-society will be better explored in the next section, which aims 
to discuss the social logics of anti-retroviral treatment (ART) provision. 
 
6.3. The Logics of ARV Treatment Provision in Mozambique: Vertical 
Disease-Specific Funding x Disease Normalization  
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The end of the civil war in 1992 coincided with rising HIV/AIDS rates (Audet et al, 2010). 
According to tØe World Bank, in 1992, the prevalence of HIV among the Mozambican 
population between 15 to 49 years old was 2.8%. By 2001, this figure represented 10.5%, 
and in 2017, 12.5%.41  
 
Figure 2. : Percentage of population between 15 and 49 years old living with HIV between 
1990 and 2017 
 
This section aims to characterize two sets of social logics of ART applied by vertical funds 
(such as PEPFAR – The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), development 
agencies (such as USAID – United States Agency for International Development), and the 
Government of Mozambique. These are the social logic of ‘AIDS exceptionalism’, or 
vertical approach, and the contrasting social logic of ‘normalization’, or the ‘horizontal 
approach’  (Høg, 2014). In order to explore these, I analyse a series of national and 
international documents and commitments signed by the government of Mozambique and 
international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, and the 
vertical funds. I also draw on the literature on HIV-AIDS policy in Mozambique and more 
generally in Sub-Saharan Africa. As will be clear, both the government as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.AIDS.ZS?locations=MZ 
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international donors’ approaches required a negotiation over time, which resulted in a set of 
logics of its own, with norms and practices of both approaches. Overall, however, the 
literature on ART in Mozambique agrees that, despite efforts to the contrary, international 
donors have reinforced practices explored in the previous section, namely the fragmentation 
of the health sector, aid-dependency and brain drain (Pfeiffer, 2003; Mussa et al, 2013; 
Sabaratnam, 2017; Vieira, 2011). 
Following the recommendations of the WHO, in 1986 Mozambique set up a National 
Committee to advise MISAU on how to deal with the emergence of HIV-AIDS 
(Bidaurratzaga-Aurre and Colom-Jaén, 2012). But it was not until 1999 that the first 
meaningful National Strategic Plan on HIV-AIDS, the PEN I (Plano Estratégico Nacional 
in Portuguese) was elaborated to deal with the epidemic of HIV-AIDS (Bidaurratzaga-
Aurre and Colom-Jaén, 2012). Importantly, the PEN I established the Conselho Nacional 
de Combate ao HIV-SIDA, the CNCS, a multi-ministerial council that advocated a social 
logic of multi-sectoriality in response to the problem of HIV-AIDS (MISAU II, 2004). In 
line with recommendations by the WHO and the UNAIDS, multi-sectoriality was about 
integrating a diverse group of ministries, including not only the MISAU, but also the 
Minister of Education, Cooperation, Sports, Development, amongst others, as well as civil 
society organizations and Members of Parliament for activities linked with research, policy-
making and implementation for treatment and prevention of HIV-AIDS.42 This came from 
the belief that, given its gravity, HIV-AIDS needed a broad approach, involving several 
sectors of government and civil society, which could address the problem from a cultural, 
political, economic and social perspective (Bidaurratzaga-Aurre and Colom-Jaén, 2012). 
Multi-sectoriality was also a norm of the social logics of the Alma-Ata, to which the 
Government of Mozambique had subscribed after independence.  
In a similar way, the PEN also promoted a social logic of decentralization of decision-
making, policy-making, implementation and resources, the latter in an attempt to address 
the lack of resources to invest in the response to HIV-AIDS. Most importantly, 
decentralization meant providing HIV care and (mostly) prevention in as many 
communities as possible through its integration into the public health care system network 
(Pfeiffer et al, 2010). But these norms advocated by the PEN remained mostly as ‘projected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 http://cncs.co.mz/sobre-nos/ [accessed 8 February 2019]. 
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norms’ (Glynos et al, 2015), that is, norms that were not implemented or materialized in 
concrete practices.  
In the beginning of the 2000s another set of social logics dominated the response to HIV-
AIDS epidemic globally and in Mozambique, namely the social logics advocated by the 
‘vertical approach’, also known as ‘AIDS exceptionalism’. This followed another, 
overarching ‘logic of securitization’ towards the HIV-AIDS epidemic, according to which 
HIV-AIDS represented an existential global threat that required emergency measures 
(Vieira, 2011). What the securitization of HIV-AIDS did was to move the issue from the 
realm of normal public policy debate and policy decision-making to a realm of urgent 
matters that required extraordinary actions outside the normal political procedures (Vieira, 
2011). In these circumstances, the debate on – and prescription of – ‘best policies’ was 
restricted to a global and powerful network of foreign donors and international institutions 
such as the WHO, PEPFAR, the World Bank, the Global Fund, USAID, and foreign NGOs.  
What the social logic of securitization has done was to foreground the ideological 
dimension of social relations by attempting to fixate meanings that represent ‘the truth’ 
about AIDS treatment according to these institutions. The very definition of the issue as a 
‘global threat’ and the narrowing of political debate around HIV-AIDS to a coterie of 
international institutions meant there was no recognition of other points of view from the 
local Mozambican context. In this sense what the securitization discourse does is to conceal 
the contingency of social relations and prevent the contestation of the hegemonic norms 
promoted. The hegemonization of this social logic was performed through several 
international conferences such as 2000 African Development Forum in Addis Ababa and 
The Declaration of Commitment issued in 2001 and 2006 by the UN General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV-AIDS (UNGASS)  (Vieira, 2011).  
Specifically, norms promoted by the social logic of ‘AIDS exceptionalism’ were centred on 
the promotion of ‘vertical projects’ focused mostly on treatment (ART) (Mussa et al, 2013), 
and according to the results-oriented approach discussed above. Following this logic, in 
2004, the Government of Mozambique alongside foreign donors initiated ART scale up in 
order to “place large numbers of people on ART as quickly as possible” (Pfeiffer et al, 
2010: 2). The funds directed towards these vertical projects through foreign NGOs 
accounted for more than 58% of all health sector spending by 2008, and were responsible 
for creating separate and sometimes parallel systems (Mussa et al, 2013). The main parallel 
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infrastructure was known as Day Hospitals, and came to represent the most contested norm 
of the AIDS exceptionalism approach in Mozambique. Day Hospitals were defined as 
“specialized units for the treatment of people living with HIV-AIDS [and were created] 
[…] to reduce the burden on the National Health System” (MISAU, 2004: 78).  
AIDS exceptionalism has also promoted a logic of drug funding that has been criticized by 
the literature as producing a “Medicines Without Doctors Paradox” (Ooms, 2008 in Høg, 
2014: 215). Since international funds exclusively pay for drugs, training of health workers 
was underfunded (Høg, 2014). Day Hospitals and other parallel infrastructures most often 
operated with specifically allocated staff, who were mostly expatriates (Pfeiffer et al, 
2010).  Furthermore, critics argue that with better working conditions than in the rest of the 
health sector, the social logics of AIDS exceptionalism promoted brain drain. What is more, 
many of the management processes involved in drug provision and procurement supplanted 
national health regulations and promoted the harmonization of goals and priorities of 
donors rather than national health priorities (Sachy et al, 2018). 
Acknowledging the limitations of the social logics of AIDS exceptionalism, the 
Government of Mozambique decided to adopt a social logic of normalization in 2005 (Høg, 
2014). Reviving the norms contained in the PEN I, and promoted by subsequent PENs II, II 
and IV, normalization concerned the ‘integration’ and ‘decentralization’ of ART through 
the strengthening of the public healthcare system (Pfeiffer et al, 2010). Pfeiffer et al (2010: 
2) list the norms promoted by the logics of integration as: 
 
(1) co-location of different services within the same facility, even if those specific services 
remain separately staffed; (2) training of personnel to provide multiple services; (3) provision of 
tools, processes and training to better link separate services; (4) strengthening of linkages, 
referral and follow up between facility levels; and (5) harmonization of logistics systems, such 
as data collection, drug and material distribution, transport and supervision across services  
 
The former Minister of Health, Ivo Garrido, was a key political actor in advancing the logic 
of normalization. Referring to himself as the “Minister of Projects” in a clear reference to 
the fragmentation of the health sector by donors’ projects (Sabaratnam, 2017: 66), he was 
highly critical of Day Hospitals and vertical funds (Interview 3, Mozambique, January 
2018). To him, the decision to provide ART through the public system was a non-
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negotiable matter, and a matter for a ‘sovereign government’ to decide (Interview 3, 
Mozambique, 2018). On vertical funds like PEPFAR, he said: 
 
PEPFAR is just hot air! The approach of the US government is to not give a cent to any 
government. If you interview the US government, they will say: ‘we give 250 million dollars to 
Mozambique’s health’. OK, show me the distribution of the money that goes to US NGOs, who 
operate here and employ Americans. Therefore, if PEPFAR leaves tomorrow, nothing will 
happen. Here, nothing will happen. It is good for the US ambassador to publicize it. [But] you 
just have to ask the US ambassador, ‘here there is a government. How much do you give the 
Mozambican government?’ He will say, ‘Nothing’ (Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
In this interview, ‘vertical funds’ and ‘international donors’ are linked with the signifier 
‘interference’ and constructed in opposition to ‘government sovereignty’. Garrido’s 
combative attitude and outspoken criticism towards international donors seemed to have 
contributed to his dismissal in 2010, according to local news outlets.43 It also reflects the 
political dynamics and divisions within Frelimo. In his words, 
 
It is not surprising at all that within one of these parties [Mozambique’s Frelimo, South Africa’s 
ANC, Angola’s MPLA] there is an individual with openly capitalist tendencies and in favour of 
the IMF and the World Bank; and another who is more nationalist, who is more concerned with 
matters of sovereignty […]. Then there is the fight within the party, over which line controls it. 
(Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018) 
 
Efforts to integrate NGOs and their responses to HIV-AIDS into the public health care 
system did not mean, however, the end of AIDS exceptionalism. In fact, the Government of 
Mozambique did adopt the securitization discourse in order to secure the massive global 
mobilization of resources (Vieira, 2011). At the same time, it saw it as an opportunity to 
reconstruct, according to Høg (2014), the weak public health care system. Conversely, 
international donors such as the Global Fund, the World Bank, and GAVI Alliance have 
declared their support for the horizontal approach to HIV-AIDS, creating the Health 
Systems Funding Platform to coordinate aid (Høg, 2014). The Platform was supposed to 
“enable countries to use new and existing funds more effectively for health systems 
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development, and help them access donor funds in a less complicated manner that is more 
aligned to their own national processes”.44 The WHO has itself published reports in line 
with a “diagonal approach” (Ooms et al, 2008) whereby a reconciliation of the two 
contrasting social logics of HIV-AIDS treatment/response would produce positive 
synergies between health systems and global health initiatives (WHO, 2008). 
Many of the norms of the so-called “diagonal approach” remain, however, as ‘projected 
norms’ (Glynos et al, 2015). Despite recognition by foreign donors and multilateral 
organizations that aid should be integrated into broader national policies/systems, as 
acknowledged by the 2005 Paris Agreement, the social logics of AIDS exceptionalism 
remain dominant. International NGOs and donors and multilateral organizations such as the 
WHO and UNAIDS monopolize the HIV policy agenda in Mozambique, and enjoy a 
privileged status (Vieira, 2011), which means the Government has no ownership of HIV-
AIDS policies. Indeed, in terms of ART guidelines, for example, Mozambique follows the 
WHO’s recommendations, which, as will be explored, proved to be an obstacle for the 
implementation of the ARV factory. According to Garrido (Interview 3, Mozambique, 
2018): 
 
African countries do not have a critical mass able to conduct studies which are done by WHO’s 
experts. And because we do not want to be subject to shifting winds of country A, B or C, we 
follow the WHO.  
 
Vieira (2011) also noted that the lack of a strong local civil society prevents the elaboration 
of an alternative set of logics in response to HIV-AIDS. 
In sum, according to the critical literature, the social logics of AIDS exceptionalism 
reinforced the status quo and promoted further fragmentation, brain drain and donor 
dependency (Sabaratnam, 2017; Høg, 2014; Vieira, 2011; Pfeiffer et al, 2010; Mussa et al, 
2013; Bidaurratzaga-Aurre and Colom-Jaén, 2012).  
What this means in terms of the de-politicization of development is that norms such as 
‘securitization’ seek to promote a recipe for the fight against AIDS, and as such it denies 
further debate and thus the radical contingency of social structures. Following from 
securitization, vertical funds and a focus on drug donation weaken the role of the state and 
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its public health care system, as well as the multi-sectorial approach to AIDS, which would 
recognize different articulations and constructions of what health and more particularly 
AIDS mean and how to treat it. In other words, it foregrounds the ideological dimension of 
social relations, depoliticizing the debate on AIDS treatment. 
The next section aims to characterize in historical perspective the contrasting norms that 
have shaped Brazil’s ART norms. It starts with a historical overview of the National Health 
System. 
 
6.4. A Historical Overview of Brazil ’s Public Health Care System  
The 1988 Constitution marked the culmination of the re-democratization process in Brazil 
and the institution of a new national health system as part of an attempt to construct a 
welfare state (Assunção Paiva and Teixeira, 2014). The new ‘Unified Healthcare System’, 
or SUS (Sistema Único de Saúde), sought to replace the previously implemented model of 
health assistance developed during the 21 years of military dictatorship (Matta and 
Morosini, 2009). The latter was based on a model of healthcare provision conditioned by 
citizens’ occupations and tax contributions to the State, rather than one that provided 
unrestrictive health access to all (Fleury, 2009). Furthermore, in the last decade, the 
military government had promoted the growing privatization of health services, and in this 
context state investment in health was very low (Fleury, 2009). 
Undoubtedly, the most important social and political actor in charge of the reform of the 
health system and the institution of the SUS was the Sanitary Movement (Movimento 
Sanitário), born in the 1960s. Formed by progressive doctors, health professionals, 
academics, activists and the Catholic Church, the civic movement grew more important in 
the late 1970s, when the military dictatorship was going through its worst political and 
economic crisis (Assunção Paiva and Teixeira, 2014). The social logics advocated by the 
movement embodied norms such as ‘civil society’s participation’ in the construction of a 
healthcare system, and ‘health as human right and the duty of the State’, which were 
incompatible with the authoritarian military regime. As such, the Sanitary Movement was 
also an important political actor in demanding the re-democratization of the Brazilian state.  
In 1979, inspired by principles advocated by the 1978 Alma Ata Conference, the Sanitary 
Movement published a document with the main principles and norms that would constitute 
the social logics of the SUS (Assunção Paiva and Teixeira, 2014). Against the military 
regime’s logics of health provision, the new social logics promoted the principle of 
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‘universal healthcare’ (Fleury, 2009). The logics that organized the universal provision of 
health were based on the concept of ‘primary healthcare’, defined by the WHO as: 
 
[…] essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable 
methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the 
community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and country can 
afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-
determination. It forms an integral part both of the country's health system, of which it is the 
central function and main focus, and of the overall social and economic development of the 
community. It is the first level of contact of individuals, the family and community with the 
national health system bringing health care as close as possible to where people live and work, 
and constitutes the first element of a continuing health care process. (World Health 
Organization, 1978) 
 
In line with the Alma-Ata Declaration, and against an increasingly privatized health sector, 
the social logics of the SUS promoted health as a human right, and the role of the State not 
only as regulator of the health market but also a provider of healthcare (Matta and 
Morosini, 2009). Furthermore, another set of social logics concerned ‘social determinants 
of health’, which included the social and economic environment of a person, meaning that 
health was a ‘multi-sectorial field’, with multiple determinants. In other words, public 
health was not just a field focused on the bacteriological aspect of disease (Buss and 
Pellegrini Filho, 2007). Rather, the “very concept of ‘public health’ expressed its political 
character, and its practice implie[d] necessarily interference in the political and social life 
[of an individual and State] in order to identify and eliminate factors that affect people’s 
health” (Buss and Pellegrini Filho, 2007). This also meant that the healthcare system should 
emphasize prevention over curative care (Gómez, 2011). 
The reform of the national health system and institutionalization of the SUS along the lines 
of the Sanitary Movement’s promoted social logics were enabled by the growing 
importance of progressive doctors and health workers within the state bureaucracy since the 
mid 1970s (Escorel, 1999). Several individuals who were part of the Sanitary Movement 
started to hold positions not only in the Ministry of Health, and other governmental 
institutions, but also in public universities, contributing to the education of future public 
health workers (Assunção Paiva and Teixeira, 2014; Gómez, 2011).  
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One of the main actors in this process was the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), 
established in 1900 and named after the sanitarian Oswaldo Cruz. Involved in research and 
experimental medicine, Fiocruz and its National School of Public Health (ENSP) were 
fundamental in the education and capacitation of health workers and the elaboration and 
implementation of public policies around the idea of health as a human right and 
inseparable from social conditions and determinants (Fonseca and Buss, 2017; Krapp, 
2016). In the 1970s, Fiocruz’s ENSP managed to open several courses in different Brazilian 
states, constituting a network of schools that sought to challenge the old model of health 
assistance and engage in the debate on the sanitary reform (Krapp, 2016). The idea was to 
create “an ideological community within the bureaucracy [which] coincided with emerging 
commitments to decentralization and increase active participation of civil society in 
policymaking” (Gómez, 2011: 53).	  Importantly, Fiocruz was a key actor in the mobilization 
and debates that led to the 1986 8th National Conference on Health, a landmark in the 
history of the sanitary reform. Indeed, the conference was fundamental in the promotion of 
the social logics of the SUS through the drafting of an influential policy report that called 
for the creation of a universal healthcare system (Krapp, 2016; Assunção Paiva and 
Teixeira, 2014; Gómez, 2011).  
Overall, the social logics that regulated the SUS were discursively constructed in 
opposition to the previous model of healthcare. Fundamentally, though, at a time when the 
neoliberal counter-revolution was unfolding, with the IFIs implementing structural 
adjustment policies in developing countries, these social logics opposed the social logics of 
privatization and the roll back of the State. In this sense, the social logics of the SUS 
worked, in part, as a political logic of contestation against the neoliberal logics. In fact, as 
Esteves and Assunção (2017: 113) put it, “[t]he resistance against the World Bank’s 
policies became a landmark of the Brazilian Health Expert Community self-narrative”. 
However, despite several successful and replicable experiences afforded by the elaboration 
and implementation of the SUS during the 1990s and 2000s (Fonseca and Buss, 2017), 
many of the norms promoted were not materialized, and the structural reform that would 
transform the provision of health as a public good never happened (Fleury, 2009). 
Nevertheless, as Paim (2008, in Assunção Paiva and Teixeira, 2014) argues, the Sanitary 
Movement, and as part of it, the Fiocruz, were fundamental in the promotion and 
sedimentation of the idea of health as a citizen’s right and the state’s role in the provision of 
health as a universal public good. Importantly, the institutionalization of the norms 
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advocated by the social logics of the SUS also shaped the government’s response to AIDS 
and its policies (Gómez, 2011). 
Overall, Fiocruz’s role in the promotion of a public health care system along the lines of the 
SUS has continued to be of central importance. Perhaps one of its major achievement in the 
last decades was research, technology and the production of medicine against the HIV-
AIDS epidemic, which helped win Brazil’s national programme its international reputation 
as the best policy response to AIDS (Gómez, 2011).45 This has inspired the social logics of 
the ARV Factory to be implemented in Mozambique since Fiocruz was in charge of the 
elaboration and implementation of the project alongside the Government of Mozambique. 
Moreover, Fiocruz’s experience as a cooperation partner of developing countries also 
shaped its cooperation with Mozambique. 
The next two sections aim to explore and discuss Brazil’s social logics of ART and the 
logics of cooperation promoted by Fiocruz, which was very much in line with the principles 
promoted by the official discourse on SSC. These logics, as will be clear, were counter-
hegemonic in relation not only to the northern promoted norms of ART but also to foreign 
aid as a whole. 
 
6.5. Brazil ’s Counter-Hegemonic Social Logics of ART 
The decision by Lula da Silva’s government to implement an ARV drugs factory in 
Mozambique followed the successful policies and initiatives of Brazil’s AIDS programme 
since the 1990s. Internationally, Brazil had won a prize from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation in 2003 for having the best policy response to AIDS (Gómez, 2011). And in 
2005, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), referred to Brazil’s 
policies as the ‘model’ response to AIDS (Gómez, 2011).  
Brazil’s response to HIV-AIDS was firmly rooted in the norms advocated by the Sanitary 
Movement and institutionalized in the 1988 Constitution, and counted on the robust support 
and participation of civil society organizations engaged in the fight against AIDS in line 
with the Sanitarists’ principles (Gómez, 2011; Teixeira et al, 2003; Cohen and Lybecker, 
2005). This meant that since the beginning of the 1990s the National AIDS programme 
embodied the main norm of the public healthcare system, namely universal access to 
treatment. At the time, Brazil’s main donor to HIV-AIDS programme, the World Bank, 
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opposed universal treatment because of “Brazil’s precarious economic situation” (Gómez, 
2011: 58). Nevertheless, Brazil decided to ignore the Bank’s recommendation and 
institutionalized the 1996 federal law, which guaranteed free and universal provision to 
HIV medication, more particularly the Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAAT) 
through the Brazilian public healthcare system (Gómez, 2011; Teixeira et al, 2003).  
By 2002, the Ministry of Health was distributing 15 ARV drugs to HIV patients who met 
the criteria specified in national guidelines on treatment. Importantly, the Ministry of 
Health promoted a logic of domestic production of ART drugs, and by 2001 seven of these 
were locally produced with pharmacological specifications for generic versions (Teixeira et 




Internationally, Brazil’s logics of domestic production of generic medicines were highly 
contested by the pharmaceutical industry and developed nations. In 2001, the US threatened 
to have Brazil disciplined by the WTO against Brazil’s appeal to compulsory licenses 
(BBC, 2001). Compulsory licenses would guarantee further domestic production of HIV 
drugs against the monopoly of the pharmaceutical laboratories protected by intellectual 
property (patents) (Amorim, 2017). In this context, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs took a very firm stance against the pressures coming from developed 
nations (Amorim, 2017). They managed to articulate a chain of equivalence between the 
demands of developing countries and AIDS NGOs against the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) promoted by the WTO, which restricted the 
production of generic medicines through compulsory license. According to Celso Amorim, 
who was Brazil’s chief negotiator at the WTO at the time, developing nations, especially 
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African countries, were fully supportive of Brazil’s efforts in trying to negotiate the 
flexibilization of the TRIPS to address the right to generic production (Amorim, 2017). 
Also according to Amorim (2017: 21), an ambassador from Cameroon said he did not need 
to be present at the negotiations because “[w]e feel represented by Brazil”. The final result 
of the process of negotiations was the Doha Ministerial Declaration about TRIPS and 
Public Health, which stated that: 
 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all. (WTO, 2001) 
 
Brazil’s political stance against the hegemony of the World Bank at first, and the 
pharmaceutical industry and the US later, was firmly rooted in the principle of sovereignty 
and in the logics promoted by the Sanitarist Movement throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s, and sedimented through the 1988 Constitution. These norms also shaped the 
development of a very robust pharmaceutical infrastructure, such as the state-run 
pharmaceutical lab Farmanguinhos, from Fiocruz. As the main producer of public drugs, 
Farmanguinhos played a central role in the development of technology for the production 
of antiretroviral drugs, and became the main provider of ARV generics for the public health 
system. Although in the following years Brazil was successful in bargaining with 
pharmaceutical companies such as Roche and Merck for dramatic reductions in price of 
ARV drugs (Gómez, 2011), in 2007 it did effectively issue a compulsory license for the 
production of Merck’s Efavirenz (Gómez, 2011). At the time, Farmanguinhos had already 
developed the technology to be able to produce the drug itself. 
Unlike Mozambique’s reliance on the WHO Guideline for ART, Farmanguinhos’s 
production of ARV drugs relies on Brazil’s own ART Guidelines. As will be discussed, this 
is an important part of the logics of domestic production of ARV drugs. This means the 
Ministry of Health counts on a team of experts in AIDS, be they doctors or other health 
experts, academics, civil society organizations, government agencies such as the Brazilian 
Health Regulatory Agency (ANVISA), amongst other actors, to elaborate and change the 
list of drug recommendations for ART (Ministry of Health, 2010). Universal access to ART 
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is a key norm guiding this process, meaning that the team must consider, amongst other 
factors, cost/benefits of the drugs to be used (Ministry of Health, 2010). In this context, 
Brazil’s guidelines for ART has, until very recently, prescribed not the most modern 
medications, but off-patent drugs which are more affordable and can be produced locally. 
The logics of universal treatment is also related to the logic of decentralization and 
multisectoriality (Teixeira et al, 2003), and as such relied on a series of concerted actions 
and policies by the federal government in coordination with states and municipalities, but 
most importantly, with the army of grass roots civil organizations. These engaged with 
government programmes to expand free access to various vulnerable groups, such as 
pregnant women, young people and gay men (Gómez, 2011). Another set of social logics 
concerned prevention through awareness and campaigns. For example, by 2004, the 
National AIDS programme distributed 3 billion condoms a year (Gómez, 2011), and 
between 1994 and 2002 the implementation of syringe and needle exchange programs 
targeted 65,000 drug users (Teixeira et al, 2003). 
In sum, Brazil’s National AIDS Programme is characterized by the following sets of social 
logics of ART: universal access, decentralization, multisectoriality, prevention, domestic 
drug production (based on its own ART Guidelines), and civil-society participation. As 
noted, these are rooted in the social logics of Brazil’s healthcare system advocated by the 
Sanitarist Movement against the previous prevalent model of healthcare during the military 
regime and the neoliberal counter-revolution promoted by the IFIs in the 1980s and 1990s. 
These sets of logics successfully confronted the pharmaceutical interests in a time when 
Brazil was thriving both economically, with GDP growth of over 6%,46 and politically due 
to successful social policies implemented at home. In a way, then, the social logics of ART 
were shaped, strengthened and sedimented by a successful political logic of contestation 
against hegemonic norms produced by developed countries, the pharmaceutical industry 
and the IFIs. The political logics articulated at home with great support from various civil 
society groups came to shape the norms of the ARV Factory.  
 
6.6. The Logics of Structuring Cooperation and Horizontality and Fiocruz’s 
Institutional Identity 
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The implementation of a pharmaceutical plant, the Sociedade Moçambicana de 
Medicamentos (SMM), in Mozambique was carried out within the organizational structure 
of Brazil’s SSC. That is to say, the project was formally coordinated by the ABC, under the 
MRE, and had as the implementing agency the Fiocruz, more specifically Farmanguinhos, 
under the Ministry of Health. Because ABC’s capacity is low and coordination is still 
weak, the “true centre of gravity of Brazilian health cooperation” (Abdenur, 2015; 
Antonielli, 2018) has been the Ministry of Health and more particularly Fiocruz. But 
Fiocruz itself is a highly complex institution. It has seventeen technical-scientific units in 
several Brazilian states, but mostly in Rio de Janeiro, where it first started.47 The main units 
involved directly and indirectly in the implementation of the ARV factory were the Institute 
of Pharmaceutical Technology (Farmanguinhos), the Centre for International Relations in 
Health (CRIS) and later the National School of Public Health (ENSP) for the training of 
personnel.  
The CRIS was created in 2009 to coordinate and support Fiocruz’s international 
cooperation activities. As such, the CRIS liaises with other internal units as well as with the 
ABC and the Ministry of Health, in an attempt to “enhance and develop Fiocruz as Brazil’s 
strategic public institution in the realm of global health”. 48 The creation of the CRIS was a 
response to the growing demand for Fiocruz’s cooperation in health projects with 
developing countries, within the framework of SSC. The importance of the CRIS was never 
disputed amongst my interviewees. Unlike the case of many of my Embrapa interviewees 
who either dismissed or criticized the role of the Secretariat of International Relations 
established in 2010 (cf. Chapter 4), at Fiocruz the CRIS was seen as an important 
achievement for the exercise of SSC.  
But before the resurgence of SSC under the PT government, Fiocruz had long cooperated 
with both developed and developing countries. According to Fonseca and Buss (2017), 
since the beginning of the XX century, Fiocruz, but especially Farmanguinhos, were 
involved in intense cooperation with South American institutions. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Fiocruz and more broadly the members of the Sanitarist Movement were active participants 
in debates at international institutions such as the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO), the WHO and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
(Esteves and Assunção, 2017). Norms such as ‘social determinants of health’ had been 
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incorporated by the PAHO in the cooperation for the construction of healthcare systems 
throughout Latin America (Fonseca and Buss, 2017). In 1969, José Roberto Ferreira, a 
prominent Brazilian doctor from Fiocruz, joined the PAHO as the Human Resources and 
Research Director, and argued that technical cooperation should replace technical 
assistance as the latter was a “unidirectional process of knowledge transfer that reinforces 
developed and underdeveloped positions within the international system” (Esteves and 
Assunção, 2017: 114). As opposed to technical assistance, technical cooperation should 
forge autonomy and self-reliance, adaptation of knowledge and emphasis of local issues 
(Esteves and Assunção, 2017). 
Thus, the Brazilian Expert Health Community’s (Esteves and Assunção, 2017), and within 
it Fiocruz’s logics of international cooperation, had long been shaped by an intense 
international presence. In the 1990s, this international presence continued to be enhanced, 
with the engagement in multilateral institutions such as the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUL), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), and the Community of 
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) (Esteves and Assunção, 2017). 
When SSC returns to the government’s agenda under PT, Fiocruz already has a view of 
international cooperation and global health that had evolved in the previous periods, when 
it already occupied a prominent role in international fora (Interview 31, Brazil, 2017). 
Apart from a view of what healthcare should be like, there was a strong political and 
ideological convergence between Fiocruz as an institution and the PT’s foreign policy. 
According to one of my interviewees, when the Federal government starts to demand 
Fiocruz’s participation in SSC projects: 
 
[…] at that moment, Fiocruz is totally prepared for that [SSC projects] because first it had 
evolved and structured itself both conceptually and institutionally, and second because this new 
guideline [of SSC] was friendly, it coincided with the views the institution held about relations 
of solidarity, about facing the process of globalization […] so [in this sense] there is a match. 
(Interview 31, Brazil, 2017). 
 
Signifiers such as solidarity, horizontality and sovereignty were part, as I argue, of 
Fiocruz’s institutional identity. In fact, while I was conducting interviews at Fiocruz, two 
aspects struck me: First, the political convergence with PT’s SSC, and second, the 
discursive cohesion amongst the various actors within the institution in terms of the role of 
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Fiocruz in this process. According to one of my interviewees, this strategic and ideological 
alignment in relation to SSC was ultimately established as part of the institutional 
organization of Fiocruz: 
 
We will have 20 years following the same guidelines and conceptions; of course, with nuances 
because things change, and times also change. What I can assure you is that in our four-year 
plans […] there are five broad areas of work, one of them is international health, so you can have 
an idea of the importance Fiocruz gives to the field of international health. […] The four-year 
plans are voted on by a congress of 400 people who represent the 4,000 workers within Fiocruz. 
So the plan is voted on word by word, and is elaborated based on discussions held in each 
laboratory, each department, each institute of Fiocruz and finally at Fiocruz as a whole. Thus, 
the ideas in the plan are spread out […] and there has been a very beautiful support from the 
workers, which I say is a solidary support for cooperation with countries that are in a less 
favourable situation than us. (Interview 33, Brazil, 2017). 
 
It was in one of these congresses, I was informed, that Fiocruz voted in favour of 
establishing an office in Mozambique to have a concrete international presence in Africa 
(Interview 32, Brazil, 2017). From its international and domestic experience, Fiocruz 
developed a concept that became central to SSC in health, namely the concept of 
‘structuring cooperation’. This was based on Fiocruz’s analysis and diagnosis of the 
problems of developing countries, namely their extremely precarious healthcare systems, 
with limited governance, low capabilities for analysis, formulation and implementation of 
social and health policies, fragility, fragmentation, low levels of workforce, no social 
control etc (Fonseca and Buss, 2017). From this point of view, structuring cooperation 
should, thus, strengthen health systems as a whole, by strengthening organizations’ 
capacities and developing institutions as well as capacitating human resources (Fonseca and 
Buss, 2017). The strategic plan underpinning any structuring project should be elaborated 
by both cooperation partners, from “Ministries of Health, National Health Institutes, Public 
Health Schools, Technical Schools, Reference Hospitals and Treatment Centres” (Fonseca 
and Buss, 2017: 239). In this sense, structuring cooperation should be related to the 
principle of horizontality, which “breaks with the passive transfer of knowledge and 
technology […]” (Fonseca and Buss, 2017: 240). 
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The concept of structuring cooperation was defined in opposition to ‘vertical projects’, the 
‘results oriented approach’ and ‘implementation through international NGOs’, 
characteristic of the North-South cooperation in countries such as Mozambique. According 
to one of my interviewees: 
 
[Structuring cooperation] is a cooperation whose objective is to strengthen a partner’s entire 
health system by transferring technologies in several areas rather than working exclusively in 
vertical, small projects, limited to a well defined geographical area…we also do this, but our 
main goal is to collaborate, and the [strengthening of] National Institutes would serve this 
purpose […]. (Interview 33, Brazil, 2017) 
 
Importantly, structuring cooperation would serve the purpose to address “the huge 
fragmentation of objects [which] burdened the governments whose governance [in health] 
was already fragile […]” (Interview 33, Brazil, 2017). 
It is the logics of ‘structuring cooperation’, with its related logic of horizontality along 
other logics already discussed, which have characterized the ARV factory project, 
according to Fiocruz, the Ministry of Health and the MRE. The concept of structuring 
cooperation was, in fact, mentioned in virtually all my interviews with health experts from 
Fiocruz and the Brazilian Ministry of Health. In this sense, the meaning attributed to the 
factory was broader because it involved the strengthening of the healthcare sector as a 
whole. “This was not just a factory”, as one of my interviewees put it (Interview 32, Brazil, 
2017). Elaborating on the factory, another health expert told me:  
 
[W]hen thinking about the factory, we immediately thought that it should have a component 
related to strengthening the healthcare system in Mozambique. It [the factory] could not be seen 
just as a pharmacological unit to produce medicine…. ARV and other medicine, which is, in 
general, what people think. For us, the factory had to be an engine in the construction of 
something more permanent in the system […] we started to show the necessity of [the factory] to 
produce an effect on the general [health] system, of capacity building etc. (Interview 31, Brazil, 
2017). 
 
In opposition to the logics of Northern donors, one of my interviewees defined Brazil’s 
cooperation in health as “completely different [to the logics of Northern donors and] “even 
the WHO” (Interview 32, Brazil, October 2017). As he later put it, “[t]his lab [factory] has 
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to be inserted within a broader strategic logic”, or, in other words, within a strengthened 
public health system.  
The project was also strongly linked with the principle of sovereignty. Having a domestic 
pharmaceutical industry, as many of my interviewers said, is a matter of sovereignty 
against the dependency of Mozambique on donations. Furthermore, the idea was that a 




The social logics that characterized the AIDS National Programme have long been 
established in Brazil, and have also constituted a political logic of contestation, both within 
Brazil, and internationally. These logics have embodied norms such as ‘universal access’, 
‘multi-sectoriality’ with its related logics of ‘social determinants of health’,  ‘health as a 
duty of the State and a human right’, ‘decentralization’, ‘prevention’ and ‘social 
participation’. The logic of ‘domestic production of generic ARV’ was, thus, not in 
isolation from all the other norms discussed above and established in Brazil since the 
growth of the Sanitary Movement.   
Alongside the social logics of the ARV National Programme, Fiocruz’s experience in 
international cooperation also shaped the logics around the ARV factory in Mozambique. 
The two main norms, which have converged with the principles of SSC and the views of 
global health held by the PT government, were discussed above as ‘structuring cooperation’ 
and ‘horizontality’. In sum, then, the social logics that shaped the ARV factory contested 
the hegemonic norms of health promoted by the IFIs and thus foreign aid norms promoted 
in countries such as Mozambique.  
What happens when the two countries, with completely different social, economic and 
political histories interact in order to promote a common project? As discussed in this 
chapter, Mozambique’s healthcare sector has been characterized by fragmentation, aid 
dependency and brain drain. Against this background, the logics of AIDS exceptionalism 
has produced further fragmentation, dependency and brain drain. Clearly, norms such as 
‘results oriented approach’, ‘implementation through INGOs’, ‘aid dependency’, ‘AIDS 
exceptionalism’ and fragmentation contrast with Brazil’s norms, namely ‘structuring 
cooperation’, ‘universal access’, ‘domestic production’ and ‘multisectoriality’. 
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The next chapter aims to provide an account of the dynamics of the political logics 
mobilized for and against the ARV factory. In this context, it will aim to respond to the 
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Chapter 7: The Political Logics of the ARV Factory 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
The project for the installation of the ARV Factory, registered as Sociedade Moçambicana 
de Medicamentos (Mozambican Pharmaceutical Ltd. – Portuguese acronym, SMM), was 
agreed between the governments of Mozambique and Brazil in 2003. Known as the longest 
and most expensive Brazilian SSC project in Africa (Rossi, 2017), it was marked by 
setbacks and challenges for both sides – Brazil and Mozambique – and a fundamental 
disagreement between the two governments over the principles that should shape the SMM. 
It is this disagreement, which triggered political responses from both sides, that will be 
analysed in order to answer my research question, that is, did the ARV factory project re-
politicize development in health?  
Brazil sought to promote the factory in line with its own Anti-retroviral Treatment (ART), 
considered in Chapter 5 to be counter-hegemonic in relation to Northern norms of 
development. Brazil’s ART was based on Sanitarist principles such as ‘universal access to 
treatment’, ‘domestic production of ARV medicine’ under ‘state ownership’ (cf. Chapter 
5). Alongside these principles, the main implementing agency, Fiocruz, strongly promoted 
the logics of ‘structuring cooperation’, which saw the strengthening of the public health 
system as a fundamental norm, and the principle of ‘horizontality’ (cf. Chapter 5) as a 
guiding principle in the relationship between both countries. However, in Mozambique the 
health sector in general, and the ART particularly were shaped by a completely contrasting 
and different set of logics, namely, the ‘social logics of foreign aid’ and the ‘logics of AIDS 
exceptionalism’. These were related to the ‘results oriented approach’ which focused on 
narrow projects’ objectives, promoting the fragmentation of the health sector as well as 
donor dependency and brain drain (cf. Chapter 5). 
This chapter argues that the ARV project went through three phases. The first phase was 
characterized by a fragile political commitment between the two governments. This was 
based mostly on Brazil’s ART norms, which were tentatively articulated for the 
implementation of the project by Mozambique’s minister of health, Dr Ivo Garrido.  
However, despite Dr Garrido’s personal alignment with Fiocruz’s norms and his counter-
hegemonic stance against the ‘logics of foreign aid’ and ‘AIDS exceptionalism’, there was 
not enough political support for the project. In Mozambique, neither health experts nor 
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government representatives or politicians from Frelimo shared amongst them and with 
Brazilian experts Sanitarist and SSC principles. In other words, norms such as ‘state 
ownership’, ‘structuring cooperation’ and common ART guidelines were not established 
within Mozambique’s health sector. This fragile alignment was constructed in a scenario of 
fragmentation, aid dependency, and Frelimo’s own ideological division. The first phase 
ended when there was a change in ministers in Mozambique, with Dr Garrido being 
replaced by Dr Alexandre Manguele.  
In the second phase, the new health minister, Alexandre Manguele, was responsible for 
mobilizing a political logic of good governance in order to dismantle the incipient 
organizational structure and fragile political commitment set up in the previous phase. The 
logics of good governance fundamentally put into question the role of the State in the 
provision of public health. As such, they challenged the status of the SMM as a State 
pharmaceutical company. A key actor in this phase was the Institute for the Management of 
State Holdings (Portuguese acronym, IGEPE), the business arm of the government which 
should promote the re-structuring of the SMM. Established in the context of the IMF 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) in order to restructure state entities (which included 
privatization), IGEPE was the embodiment of the logics of good governance.  
As a response to the logics of good governance, in the third phase the Brazilian government 
and more particularly Fiocruz mobilized their own set of political logics based not only on 
the reinforcement of sanitarist principles, but also on SSC principles. On the one hand, they 
sought to challenge the Mozambique Ministry of Health’s logics of good governance by 
reinforcing the norm of ‘State ownership’. On the other hand, Fiocruz articulated a 
discourse that facilitated a political compromise between the two contrasting sets of norms, 
that of ‘good governance’, and that of ‘state ownership’. This discourse strongly articulated 
SSC principles of horizontality and sovereignty. As such, rather than denying 
Mozambicans their agency, Fiocruz, the MS and the MRE recognized them as active 
partners in a cooperation project. I argue that these principles constituted the discursive 
limits of the conflict that had unfolded in the second phase between the two countries.  
In sum, within these three phases I will discuss the following questions: How did the 
implementation of a project shaped by social logics of contestation against the neoliberal 
principles of aid play out in Mozambique’s environment? Following a political response by 
the Mozambican government in the second phase, to what extent did the project become 
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de-politicized? Ultimately, following the compromise both governments achieved, to what 
extent did the project manage to re-politicize the HIV-AIDS treatment long shaped by 
hegemonic norms? 
After this introduction, section two of this chapter examines the initial stage of the 
negotiations over the project. I discuss how certain actors, particularly the Minister of 
Health, started to articulate norms in line with Brazil’s sanitarist as well as ART logics. 
Despite Garrido’s attempt at re-politicizing the ART treatment in Mozambique, there was 
no discursive basis (or common norms) for the construction of a solid commitment. Section 
three will explore the political logics of good governance employed by MISAU when there 
was a change in ministers. I will discuss how the logics of good governance de-politicized 
the project. Section four explores the compromise between the two countries, based on 
Brazil’s articulation of good governance, satinarist principles, and SSC principles. Despite 
the compromise between sanitarist and good governance principles, I conclude that the 
ARV factory did promote the re-politicization of health in Mozambique. Section five 
briefly discusses why I was not able to detect fantasmatic logics that would have explained 
the grip of the political logics of good governance. In the conclusion, apart from 
summarizing the main points of the chapter, I anticipate the main points of discussion in 
Chapter 8. 
 
7.2. The Initial Stage: A Fragile Political Alignment  
The idea of transferring technology from Brazil for the domestic production of ARV drugs 
in Mozambique can be traced back to the III Conference of Heads of State and Government 
of the CPLP in Maputo in July 2000, as pointed out by documents available at the MRE 
website (Rodrigues, 2014).  According to the Maputo Declaration, the then president of 
Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, offered to expand Brazil’s cooperation in health with 
CPLP countries, and to transfer the technology successfully developed by Brazil for the 
production of ARV medicine (Rodrigues, 2014). This intended cooperation, especially with 
Lusophone Africa, came as a response to the need to work together against the HIV-AIDS 
epidemic. In this sense, the idea of the factory was firstly conceived in relation to ARV 
medicines and legitimized by Brazil’s successful policies in the fight against HIV-AIDS 
since the 1980s and 1990s. Although later both governments decided not to produce ARV 
medicines and focus on other essential drugs for reasons that will be explored, the signifier 
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‘ARV’ is still strongly related with the factory. As one of my interviewees commented: 
“The factory is [still] mostly known as ‘the ARV factory’” (Interview 11, Mozambique, 
2018). 
Following the 3rd CPLP Summit, Brazil and Mozambique signed a memorandum of 
understanding for technical cooperation in health, whereby the two countries mentioned, 
again, technology transfer for the production of ARV among other activities in capacity 
building, strengthening of health institutes and education (Rodrigues, 2014).  
But it was in 2003, after president Lula’s visit to Mozambique, that the ARV project started 
to materialize. A second memorandum of understanding was signed by the two presidents 
(Lula da Silva and Joaquim Chissano) to deal exclusively with the factory. Some of my 
interviewees at Fiocruz referred to the episode as a meeting between “two presidents who 
didn’t know [the complexities] of a [pharmaceutical] factory” (Interview 38, Brazil, 2017). 
In fact, there was an overall perception in both countries that this political agreement did 
not take into consideration all the complexities that the implementation and operation of a 
factory involved.  
From the beginning, the ‘Memorandum of Understanding about Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation in Health between Brazil and Mozambique’ stated its general 
objectives and responsibilities such as: 
 
[...] to strengthen bilateral cooperation by developing research projects and the exchange of 
knowhow and means necessary for the production of generic ARV medicines, having in mind 
the intention of the Government of Mozambique to install and manage a public pharmaceutical 
laboratory (henceforth the Laboratory) to attend predominantly to the needs of Mozambique’s 
public health. (MRE 2003) 
 
As for the overall responsibility of each government for the operationalization of the 
cooperation project, the memorandum stated that:  
 
It is the responsibility of both governments to identify the site with adequate infrastructure for 
the installation of the Laboratory. It is the responsibility of the government of Brazil to offer and 
enable capacity building courses for the technical personnel who will be responsible for the 
production and management of the Laboratory. It is the responsibility of the government of 
Mozambique to offer the physical infrastructure for the installation of the Laboratory, as well as 
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to pass on the capacity building to national technicians. It is the responsibility of the government 
of Mozambique to provide the Laboratory with material/inputs needed for the operation of the 
Laboratory as well as the production of the medicine” (MRE, 2003). 
 
The same Memorandum attributed to Fiocruz, and more particularly to Farmanguinhos, the 
responsibility to implement the project. Between 2005 and 2007, Fiocruz and the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health developed the “Study of Technical and Economic Viability for the 
Installation of the Mozambican Factory of Medicine” (Fiocruz, 2007), which gave the 
green light for the implementation of the project.  
In Mozambique, it was only in 2005, when Dr Ivo Garrido was appointed Minister of 
Health by the new president Armando Guebuza that the project started to take off. The idea 
that Dr Garrido had “a very close relationship with Brazil and with Fiocruz”, which he saw 
as a reference in international cooperation in health (Interview 45, Brazil, 2017), was 
recurrent in my interviews in Brazil. Indeed, Garrido’s account of the process of 
implementation of the factory under his mandate shows a story of close alignment between 
him and Brazilian politicians and health experts both in terms of the official narrative on 
SSC and more specifically of Fiocruz’s principles of healthcare and cooperation. Garrido 
told me of his relationship with former president Lula, the former Health Minister 
Temporão (who he refers to as ‘a friend’) and health experts at Fiocruz as a very close and 
honest relationship (Interview 3, Mozambique 2018). For Garrido, the factory, which 
initially meant to produce ARV medicines and later “other essential medications”,49 should 
be in accordance with Brazil’s sanitarist and SSC principles, more particularly ‘State 
ownership’ and ‘Southern self-reliance’: 
 
His [Lula’s] idea was that this [factory] should be a model of intergovernmental SSC. He [Lula] 
used to tell me: “here I don’t want any private actor”, “we have to show to the world that two 
governments from the South can cooperate successfully. (Interview 3, 2008, Mozambique). 
 
His ideas around the factory were very much in line with Brazil’s: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  These include antibiotics, anti-anaemic and anti-inflammatory medicine (Sachy, 2016). 
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Nobody convinces me that the private is better than the public, nobody sells me this theory […] I 
hate private medicine, it is awful! Because I know what happens with poor people when we 
follow this path [of privatization]” (Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018).  
 
Furthermore, when asked whether there was consensus within Mozambique that it was 
MISAU, and not IGEPE (the manager of the State business sector, which became a key 
actor in the management of the factory later on) that should be in charge of the factory, he 
stated:  
 
It [the factory] was supposed to be under the MISAU, of course, [because] under our legal 
system this subject should be dealt with by MISAU. This was clear and many times this subject 
was discussed by the Council of Ministers50 and there was nobody who had any doubt that this 
was a matter to be dealt with by MISAU and nobody else. (Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
Thus, in line with Brazil’s official narrative and Fiocruz’s principles, the ARV factory was, 
for Garrido, a “sovereign opportunity” for Mozambique to produce its own drugs based on 
a cooperation agreement that would privilege the capacity building of Mozambicans 
(Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018). For him, the factory was not only about the production 
of ARV drugs (and later, as he noted, 20 other drugs requested from Fiocruz by himself) 
but also about the creation of “a critical mass”, which “differentiates developed from 
underdeveloped countries” (Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018). In this sense the factory was 
linked with the idea of ‘structuring cooperation’ promoted by Fiocruz, the norm of 
domestic drug production and, importantly, the idea of universal access to treatment. They 
were all contrasting norms in relation to vertical funds and foreign aid. 
It is important to note that under Minister Garrido Fiocruz and MISAU signed cooperation 
agreements involving several other areas, namely the strengthening of the National Institute 
of Health, the implementation of postgraduate courses in health, distance learning, research, 
the implementation of health campaigns (called “Education for Health”), development of 
vaccines, training of technicians in pharmacy, among others (MISAU, 2008b). A major 
achievement, as mentioned by many of my Mozambican interviewees, was the agreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The Council of Ministers consists of the President, Prime Minister and Ministers. It “directs and coordinates the activities of the 
ministries, and reports to the president” (http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors-
mozambique/government/government_ministries/), [accessed 28 April, 2019]. 
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between MISAU and Brazil’s Health Regulatory Agency (Anvisa), which meant to 
strengthen the regulatory organ responsible for the inspection of medicine (Milani and 
Lopes, 2014). The agreement sought to provide support for Mozambique’s future 
pharmaceutical industry and training of personnel.  
In line with the idea of structuring cooperation and the disease-normalization approach to 
ART, both Fiocruz and Garrido (Interview 3, Mozambique, 2018) saw these initiatives as a 
way to strengthen the healthcare system in which the factory would be inserted. Several 
interviewees told me about Garrido’s personal involvement in each cooperation project, and 
how he saw these projects as a broader effort in strengthening the healthcare system.  
Likewise, when asked about initiatives to encourage ownership of the factory, for example, 
some of my interviewees from Fiocruz mentioned,  “[t]he most important component of 
structuring cooperation [in order to encourage ownership] was education. There were many 
courses there [in Mozambique]” (Interview, 41, Brazil 2017). Another interviewee stated 
that: 
  
I think the relationship between institutes [Fiocruz and the Mozambique INS] helps a lot in 
promoting a critical view because they [the Mozambicans] come here, we go there, the tutors 
here have a critical view [of the health system], and the theses that they [the Mozambican 
students] develop there are about their local reality. In this sense, they have to adapt knowledge 
to their local reality. They do not write about Brazil’s problems, but their own problems. This 
helps them develop a more critical view (Interview 38, Brazil, 2017).  
 
All these initiatives were, in this sense, implemented as part of structuring cooperation, 
which characterized most of Fiocruz’s projects, including the ARV Factory.  
But these meanings were not shared by the community of bureaucrats, politicians and 
health experts involved in the implementation of the factory on the Mozambican side. Nor 
was there an articulation with civil society organizations so that principles such as ‘State 
ownership’ and ‘structuring cooperation’ could be articulated around the ARV factory as a 
nodal point. In other words, there was no chain of equivalence formed in opposition to the 
logics of ‘results oriented approach’ and ‘implementation through INGOs’ so long 
promoted by foreign aid and IFIs. 
When Minister Garrido took office, he mobilized a team of bureaucrats and health experts 
within MISAU and the SMM to deal specifically with the project. Garrido’s function would 
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be that of a hegemonic agent who attempts to universalize the particular norms (State 
ownership, structuring cooperation) for the purpose of the project (Torfing, 1999). But 
while official documents collected from the MISAU archive show a more or less 
homogeneous discourse around the meaning of the factory and the importance of the 
cooperation with Fiocruz (with signifiers such as ‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘scientific 
benefit’ promoted by structuring cooperation), I gathered different views when conducting 
interviews with key personnel from MISAU. There were different interpretations with 
different signifiers linked with the factory, although they all considered the factory to be 
important for Mozambique.  
While some of these interviewees linked to the ‘factory’ signifiers such as ‘independence’, 
‘public interest’ (Interview 8, Mozambique, 2018), ‘a great partner for the MISAU’ 
(Interview 2, Mozambique, 2018), ‘a solution for Mozambique’s main problem [HIV]’ 
(Interview 11, Mozambique, 2018); others, or even the same ones, linked the factory with 
elements such as ‘slow’, ‘complex’, ‘not very stable’, ‘not priority for the State’, ‘high 
expenses’ (Interviews 10 and 11, Mozambique, 2018).  In general, there was not clarity 
over whether the factory should belong to the state or the private initiative. There was also 
confusion as to what the factory represented for Mozambique. Many of my interviewees, 
including health experts, admitted that they did not know what the role of the factory was in 
the Mozambican health system, or what exactly a pharmaceutical factory involved 
(Interviews 11 and 15, Mozambique, 2018). The extract below illustrates this confusion: 
 
I did not really understand what a [pharmaceutical] factory was, we knew it was a project that 
we had to support, but we did not have an idea of what the factory was nor when it was going to 
produce […] Now that I am here [at the factory], my perception has changed […] here in 
Mozambique we don’t have much contact with the pharmaceutical industry, we don’t have any 
pharmaceutical industry […] This [the factory] is a dream […] (Interview 11, Mozambique, 
2018) 
 
Despite a not very clear idea of what the factory represented, how it should be financed 
(privately or state funded), and what it involved in terms of operations and regulations, 
virtually all of my interviewees agreed that under Minister Garrido, the project had his 
political support.  
 
	   184	  
While I was there [at MISAU] I had the perception that there was the need for the MISAU to 
support the factory, and that the training I’d had was really to strengthen our regulatory system 
so that it would be ready for the factory, when it started working. And there was awareness, at 
least from that [ministerial] team that we had to support [the factory] from the legal point of 
view, and in all manners we could support its implementation. When the ministers changed I felt 
there was a difference because I ended up being transferred to another sector. (Interview 15, 
Mozambique, 2018) 
 
However, despite Garrido’s attempts, this was far from a solid political support or 
alignment based on widely shared principles. Esteves and Assunção (2017) also explored 
the lack of political support over the factory. They rightly claim that the evidence for this is 
“the insufficient or indeed lack of common vocabulary shared between Brazilian and 
Mozambican health communities”, and point to the variety of meanings the factory 
received in Mozambique (Esteves and Assunção, 2017: 126). As explored in the previous 
chapter, Mozambique’s health sector has been characterized by fragmentation and donor 
dependency. This, I suggest, has been responsible for the lack of a common goal, or 
common discourse around what health is, and what the role of the state should be. Although 
Mozambique does have Strategic Plans on how to tackle problems in health, or to fight 
HIV-AIDS, for example, this is not materialized for the reasons already explored in the 
previous chapter. According to one of my interviewees who worked directly in the project 
at MISAU, “to be honest, I don’t think we ever had a proper national health policy” 
(Interview 8, Mozambique, 2018). Furthermore, one of the main social logics that came to 
shape Mozambique’s health sector is the neoliberal view brought in by the IFIs. This, I will 
argue, was mobilized by the logics of good governance as a way to dismantle the incipient 
organizational structure and fragile political support that Garrido had been able to establish 
to sustain the factory – albeit weakly.  
Importantly, unlike the case of ProSavanna, in health there was no grass roots civil society 
involvement in the cooperation project. As mentioned in the previous chapter, grass roots 
civil society involvement in AIDS is very incipient in Mozambique. Since civil society 
participation was a strong norm in the construction of Brazil’s healthcare system and 
specifically its AIDS national programme, I asked my interviewees in Brazil whether this 
should not have been an important component in the materialization of the factory. 
Invoking the principle or idea of sovereignty, they said: “that would be, in my view, like an 
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unacceptable interference [in Mozambique’s internal affairs and sovereignty]. Our 
relationship is with our peer institutions” (Interview 33, Brazil, 2017). Another one said: 
“In the beginning, I wanted to involve civil society’s participation, but Itamaraty [MRE] 
has other rules” (Interview, 44, Brazil, 2017). 
Moreover, the different ART guidelines the two countries followed were a strong element 
in the decision from both sides not to produce ARV medication (cf. Chapter 5). On the 
Brazilian side, most of those who were directly involved in the implementation of the 
factory mentioned the difference between Mozambique’s and Brazil’s therapeutic 
guidelines as a roadblock in the cooperation between the two countries regarding the 
production of ARV medicine. As already mentioned in Chapter 5, Brazil follows its own 
therapeutic guidelines, which until very recently prescribed not the most modern 
medications, but off-patent drugs which are more affordable and can be produced locally. 
This has been, as discussed, guided by the principle of universality. Mozambique, on the 
other hand, has followed the WHO’s recommendations, which usually prescribe the most 
modern ARV medicines produced by the big pharmaceutical companies. Although this did 
not seem to be an obstacle in the beginning because both Mozambique’s (following the 
WHO) and Brazil’s guidelines were aligned to produce the same medication, in 2012 
MISAU requested that the factory produce other, more modern medications as 
recommended by the WHO (Rodrigues, 2014). At the time, however, Brazil’s guidelines 
were out-dated in relation to Mozambique’s and WHO’s guidelines.  
What this goes to show is that the ART guidelines should have been an important 
component of the political alignment between the two countries, and as such it should have 
been a common discursive structure underlining the ARV factory. But as part of the 
hegemonic social logic of ART (AIDS exceptionalism, or vertical approach, cf. Chapter 5), 
Mozambique’s guidelines were promoted not only by the WHO, but also by the vertical 
funds and international development agencies such as USAID. According to my 
interviewees at Fiocruz, the WHO’s ART guidelines directly benefit big pharmaceutical 
companies, including those that produce the medications bought by vertical funds in order 
to donate to developing countries (Interview 44, Brazil, 2017). It is, in sum, a relationship 
between the vertical funds (US mainly), the WHO and the US pharmaceutical companies 
that, according to Fiocruz (Interview 44 and 43, Brazil, 2017) perpetuated Mozambique’s 
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donor dependency and were a crucial aspect in the decision not to produce ARV medicines 
any more. 
On the Mozambican side, the major setbacks that have impacted the project started to 
manifest themselves during Garrido’s term at the ministry. In 2009, the government of 
Mozambique bought a private laboratory in Matola, in the outskirts of Maputo, for the 
future implementation of the ARV factory, as agreed in the MoU (MISAU, 2008b). 
However, the government fell short in providing the funds for the adaptation and 
rehabilitation works of the factory as also agreed in the MoU. While some of my 
interviewees (Interview 44, Brazil, 2017) saw this as a result of the political and economic 
crisis triggered by a rise of food and fuel prices (Brito et al, 2015), others noted that the 
factory was never a priority for the Frelimo government, an ideologically divided party 
(Interview 32, Brazil, 2017). This led the former president Lula to forcefully request the 
Brazilian mining giant Vale, whose operations in Mozambique included a mining 
concession, to provide a donation of 4.5 million dollars for the rehabilitation works 
(Pereira, 2010), illustrating the political dynamics of lulism discussed in Chapter 3. In other 
words, despite no interference from, or conditions imposed by Vale in the ARV factory’s 
operations, this was a project situated in the context of class compromise, whereby the 
interests of big businesses such as Vale (as the main mining company in Mozambique) as 
well as social initiatives such as the ARV factory co-exist (cf. Chapter 3). By providing 
funds to the ARV factory, Vale was able to project a positive image against its very 
contested mining operations in the North. Thus, from a broader political perspective, 
despite its counter-hegemonic logics, the factory was also part of the dynamics of 
reconciliation that characterized SSC (cf. Chapter 3). 
Meanwhile, Mozambique registered the enterprise as a private limited company (“so that 
we did not have the same restrictions as Farmanguinhos and could be more independent” – 
Interview 1, Mozambique, 2017) whose shares belonged 100% to the State. Whereas in 
Brazil Farmanguinhos belongs to the Ministry of Health, in Mozambique the factory 
belongs to the public business institution called the Institute for the Management of State 
Holdings (Portuguese acronym, IGEPE), and the sectorial tutelage is exercised by MISAU. 
IGEPE is an entity created in the context of the IMF structural adjustment policies, under 
the Ministry of Finance. Despite acknowledging IGEPE as the formal owner and financial 
tutor of the factory since 2008/2009, all my interviewees said that it was not until the 
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change in ministers that IGEPE started playing a key role in the management of the factory. 
This becomes one of the core strategies in the political logics of good governance, as will 
be explored in the next section. 
Apart from the fragile political commitment, another big obstacle to the implementation of 
the factory during this period was Brazil’s delay in approving the funds necessary to buy 
the equipment for the factory. As most of my interviewees from Fiocruz told me, the fact 
that Brazil, until the time the interviews were done, did not posses a legal framework for 
SSC made the allocation of resources into projects very difficult. In the case of the ARV 
factory, it took the national congress 20 months to approve the funds. This has certainly 
impacted in the way Mozambicans saw the viability of the factory, and how willing they 
were to make it work according to Fiocruz’s norms. It could be argued that their 
disappointment with the delay in the implementation helped trigger good governance norms 
that contested Fiocruz’s social logics. This will be explored in the next section. 
Despite the setbacks, however, until the end of Garrido’s mandate, progress was made. The 
viability study had confirmed that the ARV factory would also be able to produce other 
medications for basic healthcare according to Mozambique’s demands. Between 2008 and 
2009 other additional agreements were signed in relation to capacity building and training, 
which should be provided by Fiocruz to Mozambicans for the production of ARV and other 
medications (Russo et al, 2014).  
In sum, I argued that this initial phase in the implementation of the factory was marked by a 
fragile political alignment. Despite political will and commitment from the Minister of 
Health and the Council of Ministers (ABC, 2008), the essential discursive structures, or the 
social logics that should have been aligned with Brazil’s social logics of ART were not 
present. The Mozambican social logics of ART promoted different ART guidelines. 
Furthermore, as will become clearer, Frelimo itself was ideologically divided in relation to 
the factory. 
Ideally, the ARV factory should have become a ‘nodal point’, which represented the 
interests of both Brazil and Mozambique as part of a SSC project. This means that the ARV 
factory should have incorporated counter-hegemonic norms such as ‘State ownership’ 
against norms of foreign aid and IFIs prescriptions. However, rather than a nodal point, the 
ARV factory can be conceptualized as a floating signifier, i.e., a signifier whose meaning 
was not fixed. This fragile political alignment crumbled in the second phase of the 
	   188	  
implementation of the factory, when the new minister employs the political logics of good 
governance.  
 
7.3. The Political Logics of Good Governance 
	  
From October 2010, when Minister Alexandre Manguele replaced Minister Ivo Garrido at 
MISAU, two important strategic decisions were made: First, the dismantling of the teams 
that were formed within MISAU for the implementation of the project. This involved the 
reallocation of staff to other posts (Interview 44, Brazil, 2017, Interview 2, Mozambique, 
2018) and the nomination of a team of three members for the Administrative Council51 to 
be allocated outside the factory, at IGEPE. This dismantling was essential to prevent the 
articulation of principles that should shape the factory, most importantly ‘State ownership’.  
Second, and as part of this strategy, IGEPE took over a more important role in managing 
the ARV Factory, or rather in promoting its restructuring according to the logics of good 
governance, or as some of my interviewees referred to as ‘economic logics’. Before 
discussing the logics of good governance, it is important to note – or to reinforce – that 
already in January 2009 the factory had been registered as Sociedade Moçambicana de 
Medicamentos Ltd (Portuguese acronym, SMM) under the auspices of IGEPE. But it was 
not until 2010 that “its [IGEPE’s] presence was felt” (Interview 8, Mozambique, 2018). 
According to a key health expert, “the communication with the Ministry of Health 
[MISAU] was easier [than with IGEPE] because the Ministry of Health understood the 
social logics better than the economic logics” (Interview 34, Brazil, 2017). Indeed, 
according to most of my interviewees on both sides, what was a strong and close 
relationship between Fiocruz, Brazil’s Ministry of Health and MISAU becomes weakened 
and less important from 2010 onwards. Instead, it is the IGEPE that starts playing a major 
role in restructuring the factory and making decisions regarding its future. Although it is 
MISAU who appoints the chair of the Administrative Council and the executive director of 
the SMM, as Russo et al (2014: 6) noted: 
 
[…] [T]he GoM’s [Government of Mozambique] appointment of IGEPE, together with the 
conspicuous absence of references to the factory in MISAU’s policy documents, seem to signal a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The Administrative Council consists of three members who are responsible for managing the SMM. 
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more pronounced interest in the factory’s contribution to the country’s industrial asset, rather 
than to its public health goals. 
  
These two strategic decisions were part of the political logic of good governance, which 
sought to appropriate the floating signifier ‘ARV factory’ into a new discourse. Instead of 
‘structuring cooperation’, and all the other signifiers discussed above, the discourse 
employed signifiers such as ‘white elephant’, ‘burden’ (Interview, 34, 44 Brazil, 2017), 
‘not pragmatic’, ‘financially not viable’, ‘not profitable’, ‘not sustainable’, ‘Lula’s project’, 
‘Brazil’s flagship’, ‘left-wing ideas’, ‘Brazil’s donation to Mozambique’ (Interviews 4, 5, 
16, 6, Mozambique, 2018).  
Although these signifiers were often followed by others, more positive ones, such as ‘union 
between two peoples [from the South]’ (Interview 4, Mozambique, 2018), ‘support for 
people in need’ (Interview 5, Mozambique, 2018), or somewhat related to the idea of 
independence from aid donors such as Pepfar, there was an economistic discourse 
permeating the interviews I conducted with several of the key actors within Mozambique’s 
government, that is, within MISAU, IGEPE and the factory itself. While many of them did 
not want to comment on the supposedly will of the government to privatize the ARV 
factory from 2012 (Interviews 10, 11, 13, 16, Mozambique, 2018), there was a common 
and unchallenged belief that the State could not finance the factory because Mozambique 
did not have the financial resources. Indeed, this became a presupposition in almost every 
interview. Presuppositions, as Doty (1993: 306) put it are ‘background knowledge’ which 
accompany statements and are “things [that] are recognized as true”. Presuppositions are 
very useful ways of creating truths that depoliticize development because it hides 
controversy and conflict, or the radical contingency of social structures.  
What I suggest, thus, is that as a presupposition the ‘lack of resources by the State’ denied 
the participation of the State in a matter that should be, according to Fiocruz’s logics, 
subjected to public debate and social participation, rather than subjected to economistic 
arguments. As such, this discourse foregrounded the ideological dimension of social 
relations and depoliticized the development project. It was, after all, a matter of economics: 
the State cannot afford to spend money on the factory. A few extracts illustrate this:  
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[…] from the part of the State, at some point we thought that, because of these high costs for the 
implementation of this project, maybe ideally would be to find private partners that could lift the 
financial cost from the State […] 
[…] the State has no capacity, through IGEPE, to finance a factory like this (Interview 5, 
Mozambique, 2018). 
The processes that involve the State are complicated, slow. In the private sector, it would have 
been quicker. The private sector has a lot to lose, the State doesn’t, that is why it doesn’t care 
about the slowness. Had it been in the hands of the private sector, it would have been quicker 
[…] (Interview, 12, Mozambique, 2018) 
[…] unfortunately the state of our economy does not allow us to make the factory a reality at this 
moment […] (Interview, 6, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
Another common answer I received from interviewees in Mozambique, and which followed 
the presupposition mentioned was that it did not matter whether the factory was privately or 
state-owned, as long as it produced medications. Since the State did not have enough 
resources to invest in the factory, the conclusion was that the private sector would have 
been the solution because it would have enabled the factory to produce medications. An 
exception to this was the answer a very close ally of former Minister Garrido gave me:  
 
A private actor is worried about profit […] it doesn’t care, so it all depends on what we want in 
order to develop our country. I believe there can be several private factories, there is no problem, 
but a publicly owned factory makes a difference if it is managed to favour the people in need. 
Because a private actor will unlikely be worried with those in need, it will be concerned with 
profit. If this is good for the factory, I don’t know, but for those in need, I believe it is no good. 
But I’m not the one to decide. (Interview, 8, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
The management of the factory by IGEPE proved to be a controversial move in Brazil, as 
Fiocruz and the MS expected it to be managed by MISAU, in line with Brazil’s model, 
where Farmanguinhos is under the MS and its operations are shaped by the logics of the 
Sanitarist Movement. Asked whether the factory should be managed and privatized by 
IGEPE or should be under MISAU, the Minister of Health responsible for employing the 
political logics of good governance, Alexandre Manguele, said:  
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This is something to do with economics. I just want to be practical, to have medications for sick 
people! […] As a doctor, my only concern was whether there would be medication in 
Mozambique. I made sure to emphasize a few times, ‘look, transfer the control of this factory to 
the Ministry of Industry, because all I want is medication! I never wanted to have the factory 
under MISAU […] 
 
This ‘pragmatic’ and economistic discourse can be traced back to the 1990s Structural 
Adjustment Programme, as mentioned in Chapter 6. Following the IMF’s 
recommendations, Mozambique decided to implement an ‘ownership policy’ in order to 
restructure State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and determine the sectors where state 
ownership was considered necessary (Balbuena, 2014). It was in this context that the 
Council of Ministers established the IGEPE in 2001. According to a US Department of 
State report, in 2017 IGEPE held majority and minority interests in 128 companies, down 
from 156 before the privatization and restructuring programmes (US Department of State, 
2017). IGEPE’s general objective, according to its executive chairman, was to 
“[s]trength[en] intervention in management of State corporate sector with a view to 
increase revenues deriving from dividends in Government Linked Companies (GLC’s)” 
(Tembe, 2009: 5). Its mission was to “[m]anage state shares in compliance with good 
governance principles and promote new investment initiatives” (Tembe, 2009: 5). In sum, 
IGEPE’s concern was to make state companies profitable, or to alienate those that were not. 
According to one of Fiocruz’s personnel who participated in the project since the 
implementation phase from 2008: 
 
IGEPE’s official discourse in official meetings with MRE representatives or with Brazil’s 
technical team basically referred to the need for the factory to yield financial results in the 
shortest period possible so that it could become self-sustainable and not a ‘constant weight’ in 
the country’s budget. (Rodrigues, 2014: 104) 
  
Underlying IGEPE’s logics was the good governance principles. Promoted by the IFIs, 
‘good governance’ has acquired different meanings over the years. It was established in the 
1990s, when the World Bank changed its strategic approach to development and placed a 
new focus on the importance of institutions in economic reform and development 
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processes, articulating its new view of development around a new organizing concept, that 
of ‘good governance’ (Payne and Phillips, 2010: 81). However, according to Leftwich,  
 
The new preoccupation with ‘good governance’ was part of a wider technicist illusion which 
holds that there is always a technical, administrative or managerial ‘fix’ in the normally difficult 
affairs of human societies and organizations, and also holds that this applies to the field of 
development, defined essentially as a matter of economics (2000: 107)  
 
Thus, in this sense, although the World Bank understood governance as the “exercise of 
political power to manage a nation’s affair” (World Bank, 1989: 60, in Leftwich, 2000: 
105), it presented it as if it were detached from social forces, politics and the structure and 
purpose of the state (Leftwich, 2000: 108). Underpinned by the World Bank’s continued 
faith in the economic orthodoxy, ‘good governance’ focused on public sector management, 
accountability, transparency, civil society and the legal framework in order to provide an 
appropriate environment for the growth of the private sector and for poverty reduction 
(Payne and Phillips, 2010). Despite changes over the years in what ‘good governance’ 
means, some signifiers remained linked with it: ‘keeping the State out of the economy’, 
‘not promoting domestic industry’ (Hanlon, 2012) are some of the core ideas that good 
governance promotes. By contrast, ‘bad governance’, is linked with “‘protectionism as an 
obstacle to imports from abroad’ and restrictions on foreign companies bidding on public 
sector contracts” (Hanlon, 2012: 692).  
In this sense, while the previous minister Ivo Garrido tried to establish the signifier ‘ARV 
factory’ as a nodal point linked with norms that were in line with Fiocruz’s (and Brazil’s) 
SSC norms, the new Minister applied the logics of good governance, which sought to 
further weaken the potential alignment between Mozambique and Brazil. As such, this 
discourse introduced norms such as ‘private’ vs ‘public’; ‘expense’ vs ‘investment’; 
‘economic’ vs ‘social’, ‘privatization’ vs ‘sovereignty’. In other words, while my Brazilian 
interviewees would refer to the factory as an ‘investment’, some of my Mozambican 
interviewees used the word ‘expense’; and while for Brazilians the factory had a social 
character, for some key Mozambican players such as the previous minister, it was a matter 
of economics, albeit many times the signifier ‘social character’ would also be present in the 
same discourse. As a public institution in charge of SOEs, IGEPE played a central role in 
this political logic. 
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According to Laclau and Mouffe, what triggers conflict is the dislocation of identity. 
Although this is not a case of antagonism whereby Mozambicans see the ARV Factory as 
the ‘Other’, I suggest that Mozambique’s identity as a foreign aid recipient was, to some 
extent, further dislocated. As one of the major recipients of foreign aid, Mozambique has 
been characterized, as discussed in the previous chapter, as ‘donor-dependent’. Within 
academic and policymaking circles, Mozambique has been known as a ‘donor darling’, 
partly because of its post-war political and economic liberalization in line with the IFIs, 
partly due to successful absolute poverty reduction (Sabaratnam, 2017). Some of my 
interviewees have emphasized Mozambique’s impressive well-established structure to 
adequately deal with aid received from donors (Interviews 41, 42, Mozambique, 2018). In 
this context, I suggest that despite efforts from Garrido to implement a project in the 
context of a horizontal partnership, Mozambique never fully identified as a ‘horizontal 
partner in SSC’. The following extracts taken from interviews with key Mozambican actors 
illustrate this: 
 
To us, the factory was a donation by the Brazilian government to the government of 
Mozambique […]  
[…] the other aspect, which was very complicated, was to understand the term ‘donation’ 
because we understood the term donation as donating a factory, that is, Brazil was going to 
construct a factory and would donate it to the government of Mozambique, and in the process we 
realized that this was not the concept of ‘donation’. The concept of ‘donation’ was basically 
completely different. The State had, in this process, to construct the [physical] infrastructure, the 
plant, and Brazil would only be responsible for providing the equipment. But this is not what 
was in the minds of all the people who followed the process.  […] 
[…] this donation was a ‘half-donation’ […] (Interview, 5, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
[…] The ARV factory was Lula’s flagship! 
Brazil wanted to, as a more advanced country within the CPLP, show to its African brothers [as 
part of Lula’s policy] the factory: ‘here it is!’ 
[…] what I realized was that the Brazilian government wanted that this factory worked VERY 
MUCH. It was always what they wanted to show off [as an example of] cooperation with 
Mozambique. When there were CPLP meetings they made sure [to talk about it] and check the 
evolution of the factory. Lula da Silva never came to Mozambique without going there to see the 
factory…and I believe nor did Dilma! (Interview, 4, Mozambique, 2018). 
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We will always privilege the Brazilian will, in the sense that it was the Brazilian cooperation 
will to keep the factory under the State 100% […] (Interview 6, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
As illustrated by these extracts, and at the risk of generalization, the government of 
Mozambique did not put itself in the place of an active actor in the cooperation process – at 
least when it comes to key political and technical actors in the second phase of 
implementation. While the language of SSC had avoided the term ‘donor’ or ‘donation’, 
and instead used the language of ‘partnership for development’, the latter was not a 
common a language used by Mozambican actors. Instead of the shared SSC identity 
promoted by SSC language, Mozambique identified much more with a compliant recipient 
of aid. As Bourdieu (1977, 1990 in Mawdsley, 2017) argued, in the symbolic regime 
created between donors and recipients the latter acquiesces in their ‘symbolic domination’ 
by being actively complicit in creating and perpetuating an unequal social order. Other 
commentators on foreign aid have identified this as dependency (Mawdsley, 2012b). 
Mawdsley (2012b: 259) summarizes this point of view below: 
 
Individuals, institutions and economic and political systems may come to rely on aid rather than 
other resources (salaries, taxation revenues, economic growth etc.), as their compliance with the 
demands of the international aid regime is rewarded, and/or as their attempts to assert more 
autonomy and independence are enervated or undermined. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the literature has written extensively about the effects of SAPs 
in hollowing out the state capacity, and foreign aid in promoting fragmentation and donor 
dependency, which weakened the state and hindered its ability to formulate a national 
policy. Thus, what I suggest is that decades of aid dependency may have contributed to 
sediment Mozambique’s identity as an aid-dependent and compliant recipient country. 
Furthermore (and related to this), in many of these people’s perceptions, the project was 
much more about Brazil than about Mozambique, as clear from the extracts above. This can 
also be interpreted as a strategy of differentiation, whereby Brazil and Mozambique are 
represented as having different goals otherwise needed for a SSC project. Furthermore, it 
illustrates a perceived hierarchy between Mozambique and Brazil, and the perpetuation of 
the compliant recipient status. During the interviews conducted in Mozambique, there were 
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several examples of Mozambicans talking about the importance of complying with certain 
[Brazil’s] principles or measures rather than helping determine them. This perceived 
hierarchy is discussed in the next section.  
In sum, what I suggest is that the implementation of the factory within the logic of SSC and 
horizontal partnership dislocated Mozambique’s identity as a ‘donor darling’. In 
Mozambique’s context it is reasonable to suppose that constructing the identity of a 
horizontal partner within a SSC logics proved difficult in a country that is characterized by 
aid-dependency, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
Nevertheless, despite the mismatch between the political logics of good governance and the 
political logics of the ARV factory, both parts reached a compromise based on the 
articulation of SSC principles promoted by Brazil’s official discourse, the principle of 
‘State ownership’ with principles of good governance. 
 
7.4. Compromise based on SSC principles: Articulating the Logics of 
Sanitarism with the Logics of Good Governance  
 
When the desire to privatize the ARV factory became clearer, there was intense 
mobilization from the MRE, the Ministry of Health and particularly from Fiocruz to 
convince the Mozambican government of the strategic importance of the factory to the 
health system (Interview, 31, 37, 34, Brazil, 2017). As hegemonic agents, these Brazilian 
actors reinforced the principle of ‘State ownership’, and articulated it with the logics of 
good governance. This was underpinned by SSC principles of horizontality and 
sovereignty. 
Thus, instead of a process whereby the government of Brazil and the health institutions 
impose their view, the two parts constructed a compromise around the fate of the factory. 
To this end, Brazil’s health experts and diplomats drew on principles of SSC to justify their 
compromise with the government of Mozambique on issues such as listing the SMM in the 
country’s stock exchange (whereby approximately 35% of the company would be available 
in order to raise capital), or the agreement with other private and public laboratories in 
order to enable technology transfer and make the factory financially sustainable. Apart 
from the MRE, health experts at Fiocruz and the MS recurrently employed principles of 
horizontality, non-interference and sovereignty during our interviews. For example, when 
asked about why the government of Mozambique had delegated more decision power to the 
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IGEPE, one of my interviewees at Fiocruz said: “This is an internal decision, a sovereign 
decision of the government of Mozambique” (Interview, 34, Brazil, 2017). Another 
interviewee responded to the same question: 
 
[…] To us, this [the allocation of the factory under IGEPE] was something that started different 
[from our model], but you can’t interfere in other countries’ politics […] but to us ideally it 
would be under the management of MISAU, but there [in Mozambique] no ministry manages 
these companies. (Interview 38, Brazil, 2017). 
 
Despite making it clear that the bilateral agreement between the two governments explicitly 
stated that the factory had to belong to the State, my interviewees recurrently referred to the 
idea of horizontality based on ‘dialogue’ and ‘compromise’ in order to reach an agreement. 
When asked how Fiocruz, the MS and the MRE reacted to the supposedly will by the 
government of Mozambique to privatize the SMM once IGEPE took over a stronger role in 
the management of the factory, my interviewees responded: 
 
When the government starts to imply a will, a tendency to privatize, or when the government 
starts to have difficulties investing in the factory as if it were, ‘ah, this [the factory] is Brazil’s 
will, not necessarily Mozambique’s will’, at this shifting moment we need to clearly sit down 
again, realign [our ideas] and have everyone at the table, because otherwise it gets out of control. 
(Interview 37, Brazil, 2017). 
 
We are not advocating that the factory has to promote financial loss. Nobody is saying that. But 
the economic logic cannot be privileged in relation to the Sanitarist logic. There must be 
compromise. (Interview 34, Brazil, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, my interviewees emphasized the idea that the factory belonged to the 
Mozambicans, whose decisions should be taken into consideration:   
 
[…] we knew there would be a moment when we were no longer the main protagonists. We 
were protagonists based on a view of horizontal cooperation up until the moment of the 
implementation [of the factory] and the [transfer of] competence … from then onwards, it 
depended on how the Mozambican government would choose to constitute their health system. 
There are countries, such as South Africa, who declared peremptorily that they had no interest in 
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having an industrial park of medications, that they preferred to import because it was cheaper 
(Interview 31, Brazil, 2017). 
 
These SSC principles such as horizontality and other principles and ideas were repeatedly 
emphasized and constructed in opposition to the North-South cooperation, or aid: 
 
Our idea since the beginning was to make a different kind of cooperation in all senses. First, 
South-South. Second, not colonialist. We never considered this [a colonialist cooperation]. We 
always wanted to build their [Mozambicans] capacity, competence so that they can develop 
themselves. Many people confuse this, and think that it is just a factory […]. And that it is 
Fiocruz’s factory. It is not. It belongs to the government of Mozambique. We simply 
implemented it, as if it was a kind of clone of what we have in Brazil, for them. So much so that 
it is called Mozambican Society of Medicines. (Interview 34, Brazil, 2017). 
 
We have always feared being compared with North-South cooperation, and this is something we 
don’t do. Thus, we worked based on giving them guidance, ‘look, in Brazil it works like this, we 
serve this kind of population, through these actions. How would you like to do? […] (Interview 
43, Brazil, 2017). 
 
An interesting moment in one of the interviews with a health expert from the MS was when 
I inadvertently used the term ‘donation’ to refer to the ARV project, to which he 
immediately responded, correcting me: “We are not donating a factory. We helped them 
construct their [own] factory” (Interview 45, Brazil, 2017). 
These extracts, among others, show that not only the MRE but also the health experts’ 
discourse drew heavily on SSC principles. This was a sedimented discourse for them, and 
one that shaped their relations with Mozambicans. While it is not difficult to understand 
why and how conflict unfolded within a South-South relation, precisely because of 
different historical experiences and thus uncommon discursive structures and mismatched 
principles, it is important to note that it was precisely the same SSC discourse that 
weakened this conflict and tried to re-politicized the project. It did so by challenging some 
of the economistic fundamentals applied by the government of Mozambique, while at the 
same time conceding that the Government of Mozambique was entitled to their sovereignty 
and decision-making. Undoubtedly, this could also be interpreted as a transformist strategy 
that tries to find a compromise between two potentially antagonic positions. 
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In Mozambique, what I gathered from key actors especially within IGEPE is that after the 
process of negotiation with the Brazilian government in which Fiocruz played a key role 
the discourse linked the ‘SMM’ with the signifiers ‘self-sustainable’ and ‘the state as the 
main shareholder’. The construction of this compromise was, thus, underpinned by a 
discourse that would allow for the Mozambican government to attract private capital to the 
SMM while at the same time keeping the ownership of the factory. Signifiers such as 
‘public interest’, ‘improve the quality of life of the population’, ‘priority for the 
Mozambican government’ were linked to the SMM as a signifier. But also ‘profitability’, 
‘company rather than State unit’ were signifiers that denoted a different logic than the 
Sanitarist logic.  
A second aspect of this discourse was their response to the fact that SMM would no longer 
produce ARV medicines. At MISAU, SMM and IGEPE their view on the decision to stop 
manufacturing the ARV medicine largely overlapped with that of Fiocruz and the MS in 
Brazil.  In 2008, when the implementation started, five years had passed since the 
agreement had been signed between the two governments in 2003. This means the HIV 
virus had suffered mutations, and the treatment according to WHO’s guidelines had 
changed. Brazil’s ART guidelines were out-dated in relation to Mozambique’s (and the 
WHO’s), and as a consequence Farmanguinhos did not produce the drugs Mozambique 
required for the ART. The decision, agreed by both sides, was to transfer the technology 
required for the production of the essential medicines in primary healthcare only. This, as 
explained to me by all my interviewees at Fiocruz and the MS was not a negative decision. 
Rather, producing these essential medicines, for them, was as important as producing ARV 
medicine. Producing essential medicines would spearhead the production of other 
technologies. In this sense, this was part of the structuring logics promoted by SSC in 
health. Along the same lines, my Mozambican interviewees had virtually the same answer, 
although some of them voiced some frustration for not producing ARV medicine. Overall, 
however, it was clear to me that the narrative was very aligned, perhaps as a result of 
dialogue and common decision making. As such it is safe to assume that Mozambican 
health experts shared, to some extent, the principle of structuring cooperation shaping the 
factory’s operations. 
In sum, although some economistic principles persist in their discourse, my Mozambican 
interviewees also drew on important SSC principles such as structuring cooperation and 
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public interest to justify the final decision to keep the factory under state ownership. On the 
other hand, it would be naïve to assume that this compromise reached by the Mozambican 
and Brazilian governments was a result of both parts negotiating on equal terms. Brazil-
Mozambique relationships in the field of health, agriculture and others are, of course, based 
on unequal power relations. Brazil is the provider of the cooperation and a hegemonic agent 
in the case of the factory. It is the one that has know-how, resources and a more prominent 
position in the international realm, which allowed it to challenge the pharmaceutical 
industry. The logics that shaped this project came from Brazil, and was considered the right 
one, the one towards which the government of Mozambique should compromise. This was 
also felt by many of my interviewees, and, as I argue below, is underpinned by a perceived 
hierarchy between the actors. 
Indeed, there is enough literature problematizing the supposedly horizontal relationship 
between Brazil and its cooperation partners in Africa, or between SSC partners in general 
(Hatzky, 2015; Ress 2015; Taela, 2017) Taela (2017), for example, examines through 
interviews and ethnography the interactions between Mozambican and Brazilian workers in 
an International HIV-AIDS NGO in Mozambique. She argues that although SSC has to a 
large extent rejected the knowledge hierarchies created by the North in relation to the 
South, it has created new forms of authoritative knowledge that reproduce old hierarchies. 
Taela (2017) draws on the notion of ‘authoritative knowledge and expertise’ (Jordan, 1997 
in Taela 2017) according to which,  
 
[…] some knowledge systems are legitimated ‘either because they explain the state of the world 
better for the purpose at hand (efficacy) or because they are associated with a stronger power 
base (structural superiority), and usually both” (Jordan 1997:56 cited in Taela, 2017: 71).  
 
Indeed, Fiocruz’s identity based on internationally successful policies against HIV/AIDS 
and celebrated know-how against tropical diseases has placed it in an authoritative position 
in relation to Mozambique. It would be difficult to claim that this position did not influence 
Brazilian health experts’ self perception as the ‘experts’ and ‘providers’ and Mozambican 
health experts’ self-perception as ‘recipients’ and thus occupying an inferior structural 
position, specially as Mozambique still identified as a ‘donor darling’. An in-depth research 
based on ethnography would have to be employed in order to delve deep into this issue. 
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On the other hand, despite this structural difference, it is hard to ignore that the relationship 
between Mozambique and Brazil was, to a large extent, based on the principle of 
horizontality. Even if this horizontality was not perfect, their relationship was not 
motivated by the threat of a cut in resources, conditionalities or penalties that could have 
arisen against Mozambique’s decision. Furthermore, my interviewees demonstrated a 
genuine interest in understanding the Mozambican health system and their problems 
through Mozambicans’ eyes. They seemed to care deeply about the principle of 
horizontality. For one of my interviewees, horizontality was an exercise that should be 
undertaken constantly by Brazilian health experts.  He mentioned how difficult and 
challenging it was to “put myself in their shoes” and “try not to look at them from a 
position of superiority, of someone who knows more” (Interview 32, Brazil, 2017). 
As a caveat, as mentioned in Chapter 1, authors such as Cesarino (2013) argued that re-
politicization may have to do more with practical conditions on the field than with 
principles being filtered through the implementation process. In fact, these principles may 
actually end up promoting de-politicization, as is the case of ‘sovereignty’ (Cesarino, 
2013). Practical considerations may indeed have played an important role in the enactment 
of principles in the case of the ARV factory. The deployment of ‘horizontality’ may have 
been the only way to deal with the government of Mozambique in a less conflictive way. 
But while this may also be true, in the case of Fiocruz, what I have seen was a strong 
political convergence with the official SSC narrative (cf. Chapter 5). This alignment did not 
happen overnight, but was part of Fiocruz’s own institutional identity as a cooperante. 
Other projects within the realm of Fiocruz also incorporated the principle of horizontality in 
a serious way. For example, the construction of the Mozambique INS (National Health 
Institute) was permeated by the principle of horizontality, which guided a process whereby 
“we [Mozambicans and Brazilians] discuss everything together: criteria, social 
determination [of health], because this is contested and there are conceptual discussions [to 
be had]” (Interview 39, Brazil, 2017). 
What I wish to suggest is that a political alignment based on SSC principles did offer a 
more politicized view of development in the case of Fiocruz, even if initially Mozambique 
did not share these principles. Faced with Mozambique’s wish to privatize the factory, 
Fiocruz (and the MRE) reacted in a way to acknowledge Mozambique’s agency, rather than 
denying it as was the case of Brazil’s reaction to ProSavannah’s opponents. 
Notwithstanding Brazil’s ambiguities in relation to its own identities as an emerging 
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country and a third world country (cf. Chapter 3), what came to be known as the principles 
of SSC did offer a more politicized attitude to development cooperation in the case of 
Fiocruz.  
Thus, while a compromise towards good governance principles may seem contradictory 
with the process of re-politicization, it is important to recognize that hegemonic structures 
have been sedimented in Mozambique since colonial times. As a newly independent 
country, Mozambique was flooded with foreign aid for its liberal post-war programme of 
state building (Sabaratnam, 2012, cf. Chapter 5). Until 2016, before international donors 
cut aid to Mozambique due to the ‘hidden loan scandal’52 the country still received large 
amounts of foreign aid, constituting more than 50% of their national budget (Newitt, 2017). 
In this renegotiation and re-articulation of Mozambique’s and Brazil’s interests, it could be 
claimed that Mozambique’s identity as an ‘aid dependent country’ and Brazil’s identity as a 
‘health cooperante’ have been shaped and changed. The response to the dislocation caused 
by the conflict between the two countries resulted in Fiocruz’s reinforced identity as a SSC 
partner, but one which compromises on core principles (such as 100% State ownership) on 
behalf of horizontality and sovereignty. This is clear in the extracts above and in other 
interviews I had with health experts, whereby principles of SSC are constantly invoked 
when asked about conflicts and disagreements with the government of Mozambique. The 
same applies to MRE diplomats who were directly involved in the process. 
As for Mozambique’s identity as an aid dependent country, it is hard to claim that it was 
drastically rearticulated with principles of SSC such as horizontality. At the same time, it is 
difficult to claim that the neoliberal ideology of the World Bank and their associates was so 
fixed and hegemonic that it could not have been challenged, even within IGEPE. In fact, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, some norms aligned with the Alma Ata Declaration were 
somehow present in Mozambique, and were invoked by Garrido, who represented a 
counter-hegemonic force within Frelimo, especially against the hegemonic norms of 
neoliberalism.  
To conclude, I argue that there was a change in perception from both sides. Crucially, the 
Sanitarist logic did promote the re-politicization of development in health to the extent that 
it challenged the economistic discourse promoted by key actors. However, for 
Mozambique, this was a recent partnership within a new logic, and as such it still remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36158118 [accessed 5 June 2019]. 
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to be seen whether meanings promoted by Sanitarism and SSC will become prevalent in 
their health institutions in the context of other structuring cooperation projects with Brazil. 
 
7.5. Fantasmatic Logics 
 
Fantasy, as discussed in Chapter 2, is structured through narratives with ideals and 
obstacles, wherein subjects are implicated and overinvested, and juissance or empty 
signifiers represent the promise of the full, or the object-cause of desire. I could not detect, 
in my interviewees any of these. There may be three reasons for this. First, although the 
political logics of good governance did draw on neoliberal arguments and principles such 
as privatization, there were other opposing signifiers articulated to the same discourse. 
Second, at the time I conducted fieldwork, both parts had achieved compromise, and in this 
way fantasmatic elements may have been watered down. There is no doubt that the 
economistic discourse was present and taken for granted in Mozambique, but the norms 
articulated by Fiocruz had also been articulated by Mozambicans at the time I conducted 
my interviews. Finally, as discussed in the methodological section in Chapter 1, as a 
Brazilian, this may have impacted the way Mozambicans confided in me, which may have 
prevented me from identifying fantasmatic narratives. Thus, the fact that I did not detect 





In this chapter I discussed and analysed the political dynamics that shaped the ARV factory 
in Mozambique. I argued that the ARV project went through three phases. The first phase 
was characterized by a failure in building a political commitment based on common norms 
around the ARV Factory.  Despite the Mozambican minister of health Ivo Garrido’s 
counter-hegemonic stance and promotion of Sanitarist norms, the opposing logics of health 
and ART, and the fragmentation and donor-dependency that characterized Mozambique’s 
health sector did not contribute to a solid commitment between the two countries. 
The second phase in the implementation of the ARV factory was characterized by a 
political logic of good governance which underlined the dismantling of the incipient 
structure set up in the first phase. A key actor in this process was the IGEPE, responsible 
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for re-structuring state companies in line with good governance principles such as 
efficiency. The changes made by the new Mozambique minister triggered a reaction from 
the Brazilian government. A conflict over the fundamental principles of the ARV factory 
unfolded, but it soon found its structural limits in the third phase of the project.   
In the third phase, Brazilian actors reinforced in their discourse principles of SSC, such as 
sovereignty and horizontality. In spite of being based on hierarchical knowledge, SSC 
principle of horizontality in this case allowed both parts to reach a compromise on how the 
ARV factory should be structured. Overall, I argue that in relation to the prevalent norms 
within the Mozambican health sector, the ARV factory was indeed an example of re-
politicization as it managed to expose and challenge the ideological dimension of neoliberal 
norms in health. 
While it could be argued that the case of the ProSavannah also illustrates this 
accommodation and re-articulation of demands because the Master Plan had also been 
reframed, I argued that the ProSavannah proponents did not in fact address the essential 
criticisms made against the project, and disregarded them as ‘ideological’. Furthermore, as 
I’d argued in Chapter 5, the latest Master Plan, despite having the peasant as the main actor, 
is just one step towards a ‘mixed model’, whereby the peasant is ‘integrated’ into a chain of 
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The genealogy of SSC (cf. Chapter 3) meant to problematize SSC as a foreign policy 
strategy exclusively concerned with offering alternatives to the Western hegemony. 
Throughout the three periods analysed, while SSC was indeed a discursive space for Brazil 
as a third-world country to enact its identity and articulate demands, it was also a source of 
identity for Brazil as a future great power. It was as part of a political logic of contestation 
that SSC sought to re-politicize development by challenging hegemonic structures 
sedimented by the West. This political logic articulated principles such as sovereignty, 
solidarity, horizontality and non-interference. 
I argued that an alignment between Fiocruz and Brazil’s official discourse and its principles 
produced a more politicized view on development, and the recognition of the radical 
contingency of social structures when conflict broke out. Embrapa’s institutional identity, 
on the other hand, was not particularly linked with SSC principles. 
This chapter reflects on the possibility of SSC to be part of a political logic of contestation 
broadly articulated by domestic institutions such as Embrapa, Fiocruz and ABC, but also by 
SSC partners such as the BRICS and African countries against the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Can SSC offer a re-
politicized alternative to the OECD-DAC official development assistance? In other words, 
can SSC as an empty signifier articulate a logic of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) 
that promotes a new view of development against the DAC as ‘the Other’? This chain of 
equivalence would not only articulate the interests of domestic institutions involved in the 
implementation of SSC projects, but also those of cooperation partners. 
The ABC (Brazilian Agency of Cooperation) has emphasized the importance of creating a 
framework of Brazil’s SSC, and has worked on the alignment, standardization and 
coordination of SSC principles and practices over the last 10 years, publishing manuals and 
guidelines of SSC (Interview 16, Brazil, 2017). As for the legal framework, at the time of 
my fieldwork the MRE was still working on a draft of the law that would regulate SSC. 
However, the latest domestic developments will most likely limit and perhaps end SSC for 
the time being. 
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At the international level, SSC as part of a collective strategy led by emerging countries 
like the BRICS has evolved a long way since its re-emergence in the 2000s. Different 
movements characterize this evolution: on the one hand, traditional donors (OECD-DAC 
countries) attempted to involve SSC providers in previously DAC-dominated spaces such 
as High Level Forums. On the other hand, traditional donors sought to get themselves 
involved in SSC initiatives with emerging countries through triangular arrangements (TrC). 
Simultaneously, SSC providers have created their own platforms, seen as more legitimate 
spaces for developing countries to debate development cooperation.  
This chapter considers these initiatives as part of concurrent processes of co-optation and 
accommodation of SSC by Northern countries, as well as resistance against –and 
convergence with – hegemonic norms by SSC providers. The analysis points to a complex 
scenario of de-politicization and re-politicization of the field of international development 
rather than an exclusive political logic against the DAC models. 
Against this background, much of the literature still emphasizes the continuing importance 
of emerging countries and SSC providers such as the BRICS in promoting a ‘paradigm 
shift’ or a “collective and distinct development agenda” (Chenoy et al, 2016: 233). Whether 
SSC will in fact evolve into a common and well-established framework amongst countries 
from the South – as different as they may be – will depend on various factors such as shifts 
in economic power in the international system, and domestic politics that will allow them to 
form a chain of equivalence. 
This chapter is divided into four sections including this introduction. The second section 
will reflect on the importance of a domestic SSC framework in order to articulate principles 
that unite several different SSC domestic actors. The third section will discuss the evolution 
of SSC since its re-emergence in the 2000s, and how processes of co-optation and 
convergence unfolded. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main points of 
discussions and will lay out the factors that may influence the possibility for SSC to re-
politicize development. 
  
8.2. A Domestic SSC Framework: Articulating Common Principles 
Brazil’s SSC organizational structure, as previously mentioned, is incipient and lacks a 
legislative framework for international cooperation as well as a robust apparatus to monitor 
and evaluate the progress and impact of projects. This not only interferes with practical 
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issues such as hiring personnel, acquiring machinery and transferring resources to projects, 
activities that are performed, most of the times, by the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme), but it also does not allow for policy to inform practice and vice 
versa in a systematic and robust way (Cesarino, 2013). 
Furthermore, monitoring and measuring SSC is essential for creating transparency and 
allowing civil society organizations to participate in policymaking and to monitor Brazil’s 
initiatives according to human rights principles (Suyama, 2017). Having a broader 
conception of what is SSC, according to civil society organizations (Suyama, 2017), would 
allow for a clearer idea of principles and norms that guide Brazil’s actions abroad. Over the 
last 10 years, the ABC has published manuals for the management of SSC projects,53 
promoted workshops for the standardization of principles and norms between the ABC and 
other institutions such as Embrapa, and has worked on manuals (such as trilateral 
cooperation manuals) and guidelines in order to align strategies of SSC (Interview 16, 
Brazil, 2017).  
As part of a political logic, it is necessary for actors such as the ABC to elaborate a SSC 
framework with common principles to be shared by different implementing agencies 
(Fiocruz, Embrapa etc), superceeding their own particular views on cooperation so that they 
can support the same model of development while opposing hegemonic structures. Brazil’s 
SSC principles would then be incorporated in a broader SSC narrative or imaginary. 
A ‘SSC imaginary’, as Mawdsley (2012a) noted, works as the glue or the common 
discursive resource for countries to propose a new model of development, in which radical 
contingency is recognized and not concealed. As Mawdsley (2012a) also noted, although 
SSC discourses can be contradictory and ambiguous, they also serve as important meta-
narratives that provide meaningful national identities to citizens and officials alike.  
The next section aims to discuss the evolution of SSC within the global landscape of 
development cooperation. It will look at the political interaction between SSC providers, 
mainly the BRICS, and traditional donors under the OECD-DAC. This discussion will 
allow me to reflect on the possibilities for SSC to offer a counter-hegemonic, politicized 
view of development that unites new providers and recipients alike. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Several manuals have been published over the last few years, in an attempt to align principles and provide general guidelines of SSC 
http://www.abc.gov.br/imprensa/publicacoes (accessed 21 July 2019). 
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8.3. SSC and the evolution of the international development field in the 
2000s  
The re-emergence of SSC in the 2000s happened in a more favourable international 
scenario than its emergence in the 1950s during the Cold War. On the one hand, the 
economic importance of emerging countries such as the BRICS grew significantly,54 on the 
other, the global financial crisis and the consequent adoption of austerity measures by the 
industrialized North contributed to the DAC’s countries’ waning influence in the field of 
international cooperation. Furthermore, the eroding legitimacy of the neoliberal ideology 
opened up a space for new ways of thinking about development. All this meant that 
countries like the BRICS could exercise an increasingly greater influence as SSC providers 
in a more multipolar context. Although later other groupings such as the MINT (Mexico, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) were seen as “the next economic giants”55, the BRICS were 
still seen as the most important actors driving a ‘paradigm shift’ in development 
cooperation (Chenoy et al, 2016). 
While each of the emerging countries promoted a narrative, emphasizing different 
principles of SSC, it is safe to say that the ‘Bandung Spirit’ was still underlining their 
discourses at least to some extent (Chenoy et al, 2016), as illustrated by the Nairobi 
outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South-South 
Cooperation. Solidarity, self-collective reliance, respect for sovereignty, national ownership 
and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs, 
demand-driven initiatives and mutual benefit were some of the common principles agreed 
by the G-77 plus China (UNGA, 2009). These principles were endorsed later by the Buenos 
Aires outcome document of the second High-level United Nations Conference on South-
South Cooperation, which took place 40 years after the Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
(BAPA) agreed in the 1978 United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (GA 2019). 
Although relatively recent, SSC providers such as the BRICS grouping have established 
platforms and forums aimed at coordination and lesson-learning in the field of SSC, 
encouraging collective action and thus greater influence in international institutions 
(Chenoy et al, 2016). Chenoy et al (2016) argued that these initiatives are not exclusively 
for the promotion of BRICS’s self-interest, but also of other emerging countries’ interests. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Between 1980 and 2013 the share of BRICS in world GDP trebled from 6% to 19% (Nayyar, 2016) 
55 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060 [accessed 11 July 2019].	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The authors mention the BRICS’s pursuit of the reform of global economic governance 
institutions, such as the IFIs so that developing countries have a greater share of 
representation (Chenoy et al, 2016). At the same time, though, it is important to note that 
the identity of the BRICS’s countries as bridges between the North and the South set them 
apart from other developing countries (Chenoy et al, 2016). This means that the promotion 
of a SSC framework, narrative or imaginary may, in the future, reflect and reproduce a 
well-established division amongst developing countries, with emerging economies pushing 
forward their own agenda. 
Notwithstanding this possibility, the shift in global power and the simultaneous resurgence 
of SSC raises the important question as to whether a common Southern imaginary is being 
(re-)created, and to what extent the South (as problematic as the term is) is challenging the 
long-established and sedimented hegemonic structures of the North, or accommodating to 
them. 
Some predicted that the OECD-DAC would socialize non-DAC members into the DAC-
dominated development regime, and re-shape or harness SSC (Mawdsley, 2017; Abdenur 
and Da Fonseca, 2013). However, many in the literature explored ways in which these new 
cooperation providers profoundly unsettled long standing normative hierarchies whereby 
the North was the provider of knowledge and material assistance and the South was the 
recipient (Mawdsley, 2017; Esteves and Assunção, 2014). 
Attempts by the DAC to socialize or co-opt emerging countries into its hegemonic 
framework and maintain its influence over norms and practices of development cooperation 
have been indeed visible in the last decade (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). As such, in 
response to the significant impact of emerging countries (sometimes called ‘new 
cooperation providers’) DAC members increased their efforts to involve the new SSC 
providers in mechanisms such as high-level forums (HLF) on aid effectiveness. DAC 
members also sought to get themselves involved in triangular cooperation projects with 
SSC providers (Sato, 2018; Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013).  
In the context of HLFs, there were both attempts at homogenising SSC into common 
practices, especially those involving monitoring, evaluation and quantification (Gomes and 
Esteves, 2018), and at the same time attempts at accommodating and recognizing new 
definitions and signifiers employed by the SSC discourse. The latter involved two 
fundamental issues, namely the opposition by SSC providers to the “dyadic structure of 
donorship”, and the rejection of the definition of development cooperation based on aid and 
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assistance (Esteves and Assunção, 2014: 1784). Instead, emerging countries referred to 
themselves as ‘partners’ in a horizontal relationship, rather than ‘donors’, and understood 
development cooperation as based on mutual gains, rather than the strict definition of aid, 
which excluded trade and investment as well as knowledge transfer (Renzio and Seifert, 
2014).  
However, despite becoming a more inclusive platform, the HLFs did not offer deep 
structural transformations to address the problems of development. The First High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-1) organized by the DAC and held in Rome in 2003 
represented a landmark for the engagement of multiple stakeholders in the debate on aid 
effectiveness (Li et al, 2018), following a trend or a “transition from a closed to an invited 
space” (Eyben, 2013: 84). Two years later, the second High-Level Forum in Paris (HLF-2) 
represented a response by the DAC members to the growing impact of the new cooperation 
providers and the erosion of ODA (Esteves and Assunção, 2014). The attempt to rebuild the 
boundaries of the international development field (Gomes and Esteves, 2018) was 
translated into the promotion of principles such as ownership, alignment and 
harmonization, seeking to strengthen recipients’ agency and coordinate donors’ aid. 56 It 
also tried to align the international development agenda with the broader UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). However, structural asymmetries between donors and 
recipients remained intact (Esteves and Assunção, 2014; Gomes and Esteves, 2018), and 
many Southern countries felt that their presence was tokenistic, with traditional donors 
employing a co-opting strategy to diffuse opposition (Eyben, 2013). 
It was only in 2008, in the Accra HLF-3, that SSC was officially recognized as a 
complement to North-South cooperation: 
 
We acknowledge the contributions made by all development actors, and in particular the role of 
middle-income countries as both providers and recipients of aid. We recognise the importance 
and particularities of South-South co-operation and acknowledge that we can learn from the 
experience of developing countries. We encourage further development of triangular co-
operation […] 
[…] South-South co-operation on development aims to observe the principle of non-interference 
in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for their independence, 
national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local content. It plays an important role 
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in international development co-operation and is a valuable complement to North-South co-
operation (OECD 2008: 18). 
 
However, recipient countries and rising states still resented the DAC’s global influence in 
setting the ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda and trying to enroll everyone without substantial 
change (Eyben, 2013). At the same time, SSC was gaining momentum with the emerging 
countries such as the BRICS playing an increasingly important role in development 
cooperation, despite the large bulk of aid still coming from the DAC countries (Esteves and 
Assunção, 2014). In this context, in 2008 at the initiative of the G-77, the UN established a 
parallel institution, the UN Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), seen by SSC 
providers as a more legitimate and inclusive system to debate development cooperation 
(Esteves and Assunção, 2014). 
Following Accra, the 2011 HLF-4 in Busan, South Korea, was seen as a turning point in the 
development agenda, shifting its focus from ‘aid effectiveness’ to ‘development 
effectiveness’ (Li et al, 2018). The larger participation of different stakeholders such as 
global civil society and new cooperation providers allowed for a dispute of meanings 
around development. In a workshop organized by the OECD’s Development Cooperation 
Directorate (DCD), the DAC’s secretariat, three definitions or understandings of 
‘development effectiveness’ emerged: 
 
The first was synonymous with ‘aid effectiveness’ but with a particular emphasis on ‘results’; 
the second was that ‘development effectiveness’ implies a broader agenda than ‘aid’, requiring 
private sector flows; and the third was the realisation of rights and social justice – the aspirations 
of the 1990s, which were absent from the ‘aid-effectiveness’ agenda. (Eyben, 2013: 88). 
 
Besides this shift or broadening of the definition of development cooperation, the Busan 
Outcome Document brought two other critical innovations. First, the further recognition of 
different actors as providers of development cooperation, namely SSC providers and 
private actors. Mawdsley (2017: 110) says that the recognition and respect for Southern 
states and their SSC implied “a profound re-making of [their] international identity”. 
Second, and as a consequence of the first, the establishment of a more inclusive platform 
for discussions around international development, the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (GPEDC) (Esteves and Assunção, 2014). 
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The GPEDC was meant to be a more inclusive platform than the HLF, encompassing the 
diversity of stakeholders in the development cooperation field (Li et al, 2018). However, as 
many have noted (Li et al, 2018; Esteves and Assunção, 2014; Constantine et al, 2015) 
emerging countries such as Brazil, India and China saw it as a platform to advance 
Northern interests and as a continuation of the OECD agenda (Constantine et al, 2015). The 
power of agenda setting and the ideological dominance of the West based on a “well 
articulated knowledge and knowledge production system” still persisted (Li et al, 2018: 
149). In this sense, the agenda on development was still dominated by the DAC’s framing 
of aid as constituted essentially by concessional flows. This, according to SSC providers 
such as Brazil, India and China, disregarded important aspects of SSC such as mutual 
economic benefit, or knowledge transfer based on emerging countries’ domestic 
experiences  (Constantine et al, 2015). 
Due to ‘trust issues’ (Constantine et al, 2015) then, emerging countries regard other 
platforms as more legitimate in order to discuss development cooperation and to reinforce 
SSC as a different modality. The G-20 Development Working Group, the UN-DCF and the 
UN Conference on SSC, as well as initiatives such as IBSA represent, for them, appropriate 
platforms for coordination and norm-setting (Li et al, 2018). In sum, attempts to co-op new 
cooperation providers through high-level forums into a hegemonic structure did not seem to 
succeed.  
Instead of exclusively articulating a political logic of contestation around a ‘new Bandung 
consensus’ (Cheru, 2011) SSC providers adopted some key hegemonic principles. As 
Mawdsley (2017) noted, in the last few years DAC members and SSC providers alike 
converged around the idea of development linked with economic growth. This convergence 
could be found in the elaboration and definition of the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG). Adopted by all UN member states in 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development was “an urgent call for action by all countries - developed and developing - in 
a global partnership”. 57  Both the HLFs and UN platforms for SSC renewed their 
commitment to the implementation of the 17 goals for sustainable development.  
Apart from promoting the discourse of economic growth as a poverty reduction strategy 
rather than challenging the unequal wealth distribution (Hickel, 2015), the SDGs present 
two other problems. First, unequal global structures of power, crystalized in multilateral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 [accessed 8 July 2019]. 
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organizations such as the WTO remain unaddressed, and so do the issues of debt and 
further regulation of financial markets (Hickel, 2015).  
Second, the SDGs seek to further de-politicize the debate on development by de-
emphasizing differences in capacity between developed and developing countries. As 
Esteves (2017) argued, the means of implementation of the SDGs ignore the structural 
asymmetries between developed and developing countries, assuming that everyone was 
equally responsible for the implementation of development goals. The issue of attribution 
of responsibilities is a sensitive one for emerging countries. Already in the GPEDC they 
made it clear that development cooperation should be guided by the principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) in recognition that Northern countries are 
historically more responsible for the problems of underdevelopment  (Constantine et al, 
2015). What is more, the indicators proposed by the SDGs to measure both NSC and SSC 
were based on the monetary values which defined traditional aid. Given that Brazilian SSC 
does not transfer financial flows to cooperation partners, other forms or cooperation such as 
the strengthening of spaces for the elaboration of policies and the construction of policy 
networks are not captured by the monetization of these activities (Esteves, 2017).  
In sum, this section explored how the rise of SSC providers triggered a process whereby 
DAC members sought to co-opt and accommodate SSC providers, who responded by 
resisting Northern donors’ norms and at the same time converging with some fundamental 
norms.  
 
8.3.1. South-South Triangular Cooperation (TrC) 
Over the last 15 years, DAC members have started to explore ways in which traditional 
donors could become involved in SSC initiatives. It was in this context that triangular 
cooperation re-emerged in the 2000s (Sato, 2018; Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). The 
expansion of trilateral arrangements was reflected in the number of publications and 
guidelines written by agencies such as JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), 
GIZ (German Agency for International Cooperation) and the UNDP (Abdenur and Da 
Fonseca, 2013)58, but is also recognized in HLF’s outcome documents such as the The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Enhancing South–South and Triangular Cooperation (UNDP, 2009) 
Scaling up South–South and Triangular Cooperation (JICA, 2012), and Triangular Cooperation: A Guideline for Working in Practice 
(GIZ, 2013). 
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Abdenur and Da Fonseca (2013) noted that the growth of triangular arrangements was 
driven more by the initiative of traditional donors than by the demand from the South.  
For traditional donors in general, TrC would be a diplomatic tool to maintain relationships 
with emerging countries, with the recognition that the latter may have a comparative 
advantage (namely language, technology, cultural similarities etc) in relation to traditional 
donors, or more effective development experiences to transfer given similar levels of 
development between the emerging and the recipient country (Sato, 2018; Interview 46, 
Brazil, 2017). Furthermore, as Ashoff (cited in Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013: 1484) put 
it, traditional donors wanted to “sensitiz[e] new donors on the principles and procedures of 
effective aid as agreed to in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra 
Agenda for Action”. 
For emerging providers like Brazil, the possibility to cooperate with a developing partner 
alongside a Northern donor meant due recognition of Brazil’s own domestic development 
experiences, and the possibility to promote its SSC initiatives abroad (Interview 18, Brazil 
2017). It was, in other words, a way to scale up Brazil’s own domestic experience by 
teaming up with countries that should offer some type of comparative advantages through 
SSC initiatives. Moreover, with the economic and political crisis that started in 2013 in 
Brazil and saw the ABC budget drastically reduced, TrC became an attractive option to 
Brazil. 
As Sato (2018: 113) noted, most literature on development view TrC as “an enhanced form 
of South-South cooperation”. Indeed, the UN first recommended Triangular Cooperation 
(TrC) in the 1978 BAPA document, and referred to it as the involvement of a Northern 
actor in providing financial support for cooperation between two developing countries 
(Pino, 2013). In 1995, the UN reinforced this conception and recommended the triangular 
arrangements (Pino, 2013).  
But as Pino (2013) noted, the definition of TrC has been contested.  Despite being 
recommended and endorsed by HLFs, emerging countries and UN platforms alike, there are 
different understandings of what TrC is. Pino (2013) notes that for most Latin American 
countries (as well as the UN) TrC is a tool for the support of SSC between two developing 
countries, with a Northern country providing financial support. In this sense, the principles 
that shape this practice are those of SSC: horizontality, demand-driven, sovereignty etc 
(Pino, 2013). This was also the definition I heard from diplomats and ABC staff during my 
fieldwork in Brazil. In fact, the ABC prefers to call it ‘trilateral’ rather than triangular 
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because the latter may imply some kind of verticality (Interview 46, Brazil, 2017; Interview 
16, Brazil, 2017). In their General Guidelines for TrC, the ABC provides the following 
rationale for trilateral initiatives: 
 
Although bilateral South-South technical cooperation is a priority for the Brazilian 
government, trilateral partnerships are seen as a sum of efforts that complements and adds value 
to bilateral initiatives. In this sense, the choice of trilateral technical cooperation is warranted 
when it enables comparative advantages to be created and synergies between the parties to be 
tapped, scaling up South-South technical cooperation initiatives and promoting high-impact 
actions. (ABC, 2019) 
 
The idea that Northern aid and SSC are complementary, and not oppositional, and that the 
presence of a traditional donor enables the scaling up of SSC is emphasized in the 
document (ABC, 2019). It is as if both SSC provider and traditional donor could work in 
harmony, enjoying each other’s competitive advantage, but always under the umbrella of 
SSC principles. 
For members of the OECD, TrC has its origins in the pre-arrangement of a developing 
country (provider of SSC) with a traditional donor, followed by the identification of a 
recipient country. Sato (2018) claims that in projects involving the German Agency for 
International Cooperation (GIZ) there was no triangular arrangement initiated at the 
recipient’s initiative. In this sense, Pino (2013) argues that TrC could easily work as a tool 
for the interests of the emerging and the traditional donor rather than a demand driven type 
of cooperation whereby the recipient’s needs guide the project (Pino, 2013). In fact, in the 
case of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and GIZ, Sato (2018) argues 
that TrC is seen as an extension of bilateral cooperation. In a similar way, in my interview 
with USAID representatives in Brazil, I heard that the US does not officially recognize the 
triangular arrangement, and for this reason “we apply our norms and rules of bilateral aid 
into a triangular arrangement” when involved in a TrC project (Interview 46, Brazil, 2017). 
If the meaning of TrC is contested and disputed, the political dynamics of implementation 
and elaboration can also be complex and conflicting (Sato, 2018). During fieldwork in 
Brazil, when I asked diplomats whether TrC projects could create conflicts of interest and 
interference or imposition by traditional donors in the dynamics of SSC, their response was 
very similar. One of my interviewees said:  
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[t]he sine qua non condition for there to be trilateral cooperation with a country from the North 
is that they agree with our principles […] of SSC. This is very important, and it doesn’t 
necessarily work with all of them […] with the USA […] I admit I was a bit sceptical but the 
results were very good, with flexibility, no political interference […] they agreed with our 
principles. (Interview 18, Brazil, 2017). 
 
But when I interviewed technicians, researchers and analysts involved in TrC especially at 
Embrapa, there were different perceptions of TrC projects, with many claiming that 
Northern donors wanted to impose their views in a project whose institutional leadership 
should be Embrapa’s. I found long standing sensitivities in relation to Northern countries 
“who have a superior attitude towards us” (Interview 10, Brazil, 2017), or complaints about 
the way USAID wanted to deliver a cooperation project, without concerns for sustainability 
(Interview 7, Brazil, 2017).  
In relation to ProSavannah, while many Brazilians complained of a difficult relationship 
with the Japanese from JICA (“they always wanted to act in a bilateral way” – Interview 7, 
Brazil, 2017), Mozambicans reported to me that both parts, Brazil and Japan, worked 
individually, without involving Mozambican technicians. The following extract of an 
interview with a former ProSavannah director illustrates this: 
 
Interviewee: The initial idea was to involve the researchers from the IIAM in capacity building. 
But because the culture of the institutions involved [Embrapa and JICA] was very different, 
unfortunately this was not possible. I can give you an example in relation to the Brazilian 
participation: the plans of implementation at the time were designed jointly, but Embrapa had 
the tendency to do the implementation in a very different way than the others. 
Me: Different than JICA’s? 
Interviewee: Yes, and the idea of having a single programme, a single and solid programme in 
which all [participated in synergy] was not always possible, thus in that context, maybe Brazil 
tried to be the protagonists. (Interview 23, Mozambique, 2018). 
 
Thus, while the official narrative articulates SSC principles with TrC, when it comes to 
implementation, the political dynamics was clearly more complex. Accounts of 
relationships based on suspicions, and of disregard for the interests of the recipient painted 
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a more complicated picture, despite many of my interviewees concluding that TrC projects 
had been quite successful.  
From my interviews with international agencies, the most contentious issue between 
Northern cooperation and Brazilian SSC at the TrC management level was Brazil’s lack of 
a monitoring and evaluation framework. While traditional donors have frameworks that 
assess projects against pre-defined results and based on financial flows, Brazilian 
policymakers and experts in SSC argue that there must be evaluation approaches 
specifically tailored to the principles of SSC.  
While I was on fieldwork, the ABC was working on the General Guidelines for the Design, 
Coordination and Management of Trilateral Technical Cooperation Initiatives (ABC, 
2019). The document emphasized the importance of flexibility in defining assessment tools, 
always tailored to each partners’ needs, under SSC principles. According to the document: 
 
Each cooperation scheme under this modality [TrC] has its own requirements and practices. If 
monitoring and evaluation instruments are to be harmonized, it is important to seek a common 
understanding during project design, without prejudice to each partner’s needs and priorities, 
while respecting the nature of trilateral technical cooperation and the options available to all 
parties. (ABC, 2019) 
 
In sum, Brazil has strongly emphasized that TrC initiatives must follow SSC principles, 
while acknowledging “each partner’s needs and priorities” (ABC, 2019). At the same time, 
the political dynamics of the engagement of three distinct partners with different interests 
and views seem to be more complex and conflicting than what the official narrative 
conveys. Still, SSC principles do have political strength in TrC arrangements, and by no 
means one can argue that these projects are guided more by DAC’s principles than by SSC 
principles. While at Embrapa there were accounts of conflicts, at Fiocruz the accounts were 
most of the times very positive, with TrC being more about SSC principles defined by 
Brazil. 
However, it is important to note that Brazil’s growing involvement in TrC has been, 
according to my interviewees, also a response to ABC’s shrinking budget since Dilma 
Rousseff’s first term. This tendency has grown after Rousseff’s impeachment, when the 
centre-right vice President Michel Temer took office and shifted Brazil’s foreign policy 
towards prioritizing the North. If Brazil’s Southern identity had reflected the left‑wing 
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ideology of the Workers’ Party (PT) (Cabral, 2017), the current far right government of Jair 
Bolsonaro is trying to forge a new identity more in line with US interests. In this context, 
there is no space for SSC. This means, inevitably, not only the practical disengagement 
with international development, but also Brazil’s loss of political strength when it comes to 
determining the terms of its involvement in TrC.   
 
8.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reflected on the possibilities for SSC to be part of a political logic of 
contestation against traditional aid. Although the articulation of a common view of SSC 
was incipient at the domestic level, recent developments have shown efforts by ABC to 
develop and consolidate a framework with guidelines and principles of SSC. 
To understand whether SSC can form a chain of equivalence between emerging countries 
(or countries from the South) and become hegemonic, it is necessary to understand its 
evolution since its re-emergence in the 2000s. On the one hand, the literature points to a 
movement of socialization of SSC providers by traditional donors. On the other, there is 
accommodation from both sides: traditional donors seem to have even drawn on the 
discourse of horizontality and solidarity (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013), while SSC 
providers are also seeking common understandings which accommodate partners’ needs 
and priorities, as Brazil’s General Guidelines for TrC shows.  
The analysis offered in this chapter painted a picture in which both processes of re-
politicization and de-politicization are unfolding. On the one hand, SSC providers such as 
the BRICS have challenged the DAC-dominated field of development cooperation, on the 
other, they have also converged with key principles and views established by the SDGs. 
Against this background, there is much speculation as to whether the BRICS and SSC in 
general will be able to offer a politicized view of development, and which factors will 
contribute to its hegemonization or demise. 
Recent domestic developments in Brazil show that SSC has no place in the foreign policy 
agenda. Although by the time of my fieldwork in 2017 institutions involved in SSC showed 
resilience against the cut in SSC budget, with the election of far right Jair Bolsonaro in 
2018 everything points to the end of Brazil’s engagement in international development. 
This certainly means the loss of Brazil’s power and influence to set the agenda on 
development cooperation. Even if Brazilian institutions engage in international 
development outside the scope of the federal government, and in arrangements such as TrC, 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1.  The Main Argument of this Thesis 
 
The idea of re/de-politicization as the recognition or backgrounding of the radical 
contingency of social structures has been central to my analysis of Brazil-Mozambique 
SSC. In the genealogical analysis of SSC as a Brazilian foreign policy strategy (cf. Chapter 
3), I argued that SSC was as much part of a political logic of contestation informed by 
Brazil’s identity as a member of the South, as it was about reinforcing the status quo of the 
international order – a logics informed by Brazil’s identity as an emerging country.  Central 
to Brazil’s official narrative was the strategy of reconciling these two logics by presenting 
itself as a ‘neutral bridge’, which was highly de-politicizing. Understanding Brazil’s own 
historical relations with Africa, its ambivalent positions and contradictory identities in 
relation to the so called ‘South’ or ‘North’ were important to provide an explanation for 
these simultaneous processes of re/de-politicization. 
SSC projects in practice were also characterized by ambivalence. When conflict broke out 
between different institutions and actors with different interests, experiences and views of 
development, political logics of contestation and de-contestation were activated. Actors and 
institutions such as Embrapa, the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture, the Mozambican 
Minister of Health and IGEPE applied political strategies that recovered discourses that 
sought to pre-empt the contestation of hegemonic norms. On the other hand, institutions 
such as Fiocruz and the Brazil-Mozambique-Japan network of like-minded civil society 
organizations against ProSavannah reacted in a way to foreground the radical contingency 
of discourse, articulating counter-hegemonic norms of development whilst challenging the 
‘naturalness’ of norms such as ‘productivity’, ‘food security’, and in the case of health, 
‘privatization’. The strategies and reactions of all political actors were deeply related, as 
observed, to whether these actors/institutions had been shaped by hegemonic norms of 
foreign aid, the agribusiness model, and good governance, or, on the other hand, if they had 
constructed their identity around counter-hegemonic norms such as domestic production of 
drugs, structural cooperation, or food sovereignty. 
While politically strong and collective actors proved fundamental for the contestation of 
hegemonic norms in the case of the ProSavannah, the ideological alignment between 
Fiocruz and SSC as a political logic of contestation was fundamental in the materialization 
of norms such as ‘horizontality’ and ‘non-interference’. Horizontality sought to break with 
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the hierarchical structure promoted by colonization and long-term aid dependency, which 
organized identities around binary oppositions such as donor/recipient, 
educated/uneducated, white/black, civilized/uncivilized. Horizontality, as discussed, was 
about the recognition of the agency of Mozambican actors. 
I have also reflected more broadly on whether SSC as practiced by emerging countries such 
as the BRICS constituted a political logic of contestation in relation to hegemonic 
structures – particularly the DAC’s ODA. Instead of a simple case of re-politicization of the 
international development field, the political dynamics that have shaped the evolution of 
SSC in the 2000s was characterized, as I argued, by co-optation and accommodation of 
SSC by Northern countries, as well as resistance against –and convergence with – 
hegemonic norms by SSC providers. The evolution and sedimentation of SSC as a political 
logic of contestation will depend not only on economic power but also on domestic politics. 
 
9.2. Contributions of this Thesis to the Study of SSC 
Although Brazil’s SSC is under threat with the far-right government withdrawing resources 
for projects, Brazil may still engage in SSC in the future. Understanding how actors 
respond to disagreements and engage in SSC projects, framing and reframing discursive 
interventions on development and identities, is essential not only for the implementing 
institutions themselves, but also for policymakers, ministers, presidents and those who are 
involved in shaping SSC as part of Brazil’s foreign policy strategy.  
During my fieldwork in Brazil, I interviewed Brazil’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Celso Amorim, who alongside Lula was perhaps the main actor in the elaboration and 
promotion of SSC as a foreign policy strategy. One of the questions I asked him was how 
the government – particularly him as the minister of Foreign Affairs – saw or reacted to the 
civil society’s accusation that Brazil was exporting its domestic contradictions with the 
ProSavannah project. He answered with the following: 
	  
[Y]ou know, the minister […] gets involved up to certain extent, then […] Silveira, who was the [foreign] 
minister at the time of [Ernesto] Geisel used to say a phrase that was very true: ‘we make the cloud, but 
we cannot make it rain’. This means, you put people in contact, and all. Then, the way the projects 
develop, I don’t know. If you ask me today, ‘was there any cooperation with Malawi?’ I don’t know how 
to respond.  
	  
	   221	  
If SSC is to become a political logic that promotes principles such as horizontality, non-
interference and solidarity, actors would have to reflect on the ways in which they respond 
to the radical contingency that inevitably comes to the fore when projects based on 
domestic experiences are transferred to different contexts. As Cabral (2018: 160) put it, 
“reflecting and reflexivity are the key words [for Brazilian SSC], and this requires a 
considerable change in attitudes by those at the front line of Brazilian official and non-
official diplomacy (being state or non-state actors)”. This involves analysing and 
understanding what happens between the cloud and the rain, and whether there is a 
common political logic shaping projects. It is important to note on the other hand that (as 
noted before) Brazil is not a monolith, and responses will always be divergent according to 
the very development path each institution went through.  
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical 
explanation provided an ideal framework for a systematic exploration of the political 
dynamics that shaped the ProSavannah and the ARV factory in the context of antagonism 
and conflict, particularly because the two SSC projects were inspired by Brazil’s domestic 
experiences and transferred into a completely different context, a situation that inevitably 
foregrounds the radical contingency of social reality. The analysis of the political dynamics 
of SSC challenges the discourse based on ‘shared realities’ which informs much of the 
emerging countries’ SSC rhetoric. In this sense, this framework would apply to other 
emerging countries whose SSC policies are inspired by their own experience and 
supposedly similar development trajectory, and transferred into contexts that have been to a 
larger or lesser extent shaped by hegemonic norms. Within the International Development 
field, this framework allows for a dynamic exploration of the politics of development, 
especially when there is conflict and antagonism involved. Within the IR field, which is 
very much centred on SSC as a soft power tool to balance against the hegemon (cf. Chapter 
1), this framework allows for a more dynamic, nuanced and complex view of the state. To 
my knowledge, none of these fields have drawn on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory or on 
Glynos and Howarth’s logics framework to critically explain the politics and anti-politics 
of SSC. 
 
9.3. Ideas for Future Research 
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Finally, the theme of re/de-politicization and SSC would benefit from further research into 
emerging countries’ SSC in general, and into both Mozambique’s and Brazil’s evolving 
partnerships with other cooperation providers/recipients. Analysing projects in the areas of 
agriculture and health and focusing on whether Brazilian and/or Mozambican identities as 
cooperation partners did in fact change after these two important projects analysed here 
would be an interesting topic of study. For example, in a future project with an emerging 
cooperante, does Mozambique occupy a more horizontal position? Likewise, how does 
Embrapa respond to contestation in other SSC projects? Was Embrapa’s identity as a 
cooperante shaped by the interaction with Mozambique in the ProSavannah project? These 
are questions worth pursuing because they can shed light into whether SSC can re-politicize 
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